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The  practice  based  research  project  presented  in  this  thesis  
draws  upon  theoretical  research  in  affect  studies  and  film-­philosophy.  
The  aim  of  the  thesis  is  to  reconsider  the  pre-­production  and  production  
process  of  narrative  cinema  and  involve  the  rich  and  varied  research  
into  the  area  of  affect  and  the  body  in  the  field  of  film  studies  that  is  
currently  being  used  to  analyse  the  reception  and  meaning  making  
process  used  as  the  foundation  for  producing  a  series  of  narrative  films  
that  privilege  affect  over  traditional  storytelling  structures.    
Four  films  were  made  as  part  of  an  investigation  into  affective  
film  practice.  These  films  accompany  the  written  exegesis  and  serve  as  
a  testing  ground  for  concepts  developed  in  the  written  component  of  the  
thesis.  Each  piece  of  practice  is  formally  and  conceptually  more  
complex  than  the  last.  The  fourth  and  final  film  serves  as  an  example  
for  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  and  as  such  constitutes  the  central,  
visual  argument.  
The  theoretical  research  and  experimental  moving-­image  
practice  result  in  the  outlining  of  five  conditions  for  the  production  of  a  
cinema  of  affective  tonality,  which  are  combined  with  a  taxonomy  of  
affect  developed  by  the  author  of  the  thesis.  The  taxonomy  and  
guidelines  offer  filmmakers  and  researchers  -­  engaged  in  moving-­image  
practice  and  visual  methods  -­  a  proposition  to  construct  cinema  through  
affect  rather  than  linguistics  and  ideology  of  film  grammar.  	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PREFACE:  
THE  BODY  OF  THE  FILMMAKER,  AND  THE  BODY  OF  THE  WORK  
  
In   early   November   2011   I   attended   a   conference   on   urban   culture   in  
Philadelphia  to  give  a  paper  on  my  approach  to  film  and  video  practice.  On  an  
afternoon  away  from  the  conference  I  decided  to  visit  the  Philadelphia  Museum  
of  Art.  The  museum  houses  paintings  and  sculptures  from  different  parts  of  the  
world   and   from   many   different   eras.   The   museum   houses   a   unique   mix   of  
classical   and   contemporary   art.   On   display   are   works   by   Rubens,   Picasso,  
Monet,  Dalí  and  many  others.  However,  one  piece  in  particular  left  a  memorable  
impression   on   me.   The   piece   was   by   Marcel   Duchamp:  Étant   donnés:   1º   la  
chute  d’eau,  2º  le  gaz  d’éclairage…  (figure  1).  
Étant  donnés…  is  housed  in  gallery  182,  ‘Modern  and  Contemporary  Art’,  
along  with  a  collection  of  several  of  Duchamp’s  works.  Towards  the  lower  right-­
hand  corner  of  gallery  182  is  a  single  door  leading  to  a  smaller  room.  This  is  the  
room  that  holds  the  artwork.  I  wandered  into  this  small  room  and  found  myself  
face-­to-­face  with  a  large  wooden  door  encased  in  a  rough  grey  concrete  wall.  It  
was   in   itself   a   fairly   simple   piece.   If   one   were   to   approach   the   door   to   peek  
through   either   of   two   small   holes   in   the  wood,   one  would   see   an   image   of   a  
naked   woman   surrounded   by   foliage,   but   I   did   not   make   it   that   far.   When   I  
entered   the   room   I   just   stood   still,   staring   at   the   door,   transfixed.   I  wanted   to  
leave  the  room,  but  I  could  not  move.  I  felt  sick,  light-­headed  and  confused.  
I  was  overwhelmed.    
I  stood  in  the  centre  of  this  room  as  people  came  in  and  approached  the  
door  to  take  a  look  at  the  naked  woman.  I  remained  still,  at  the  back  of  the  room,  
unable  to  move.    
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Even   though   this   may   seem   a   counter-­intuitive   or   even   inappropriate  
thing  to  say,  I  cannot  explain  why  I  felt  this  way,  nor  do  I  wish  to.  This  refusal  to  
understand,   which   is   as   much   an   intellectual   decision   as   it   is   an   affective  
dismantling  of   the  perceiving  and   cognizant   subject,   is   precisely  what   shapes  
my  practice,  and  what   I  aim   to   theorize   in  my  analysis  of  my  practice.  This   is  
why  I  want  to  hold  onto  the  memory  of  that  feeling  I  experienced  when  seeing  
Étant  donnés…  for  the  first  time.  It  is  difficult  to  express  through  language  how  
this   piece   worked   artistically.   I   am   unsure   whether   a   conceptual   framework  
exists   that   would   allow   me   to   fully   articulate   the   nature   of   this   piece,   how   it  
creates  meaning  and  so  forth.  I  do  not  come  from  a  fine-­art  background,  and  I  
am   unable   to   position   this   piece   historically;;   nor   do   I   understand   the   artist’s  
intentions.   I   do  not   know   if   this   piece   is   to   be  understood  at   all.  Although  my  
cogito  could  not  tame  this  work,  my  body  knew  something  of  its  nature.  Some  of  
the   feeling   I   experienced   on   that   afternoon   has   stayed  with  me.   It   was   not   a  
pleasant   feeling,  however.   I   struggled   to  breathe,  my  head  span  and  my   legs  
felt  weak.  I  thought  for  a  moment  I  might  collapse.  A  part  of  me  wanted  to  leave  
the  room,  yet  I  stayed  in  front  of  that  wooden  door  for  a  few  moments  longer.  I  
stayed  with  the  feeling.    
I  was  reminded  whilst  in  that  small  room  of  Dario  Argento’s  The  Stendhal  
Syndrome   (1996).   In   Argento’s   film   the   lead   actor   is   inflicted   with   the   titular  
condition,   in  which  sufferers  become  nauseous  and  dizzy,  and  can  often   lose  
consciousness   when   witnessing   particularly   beautiful   or   otherwise   impactful  
works  of  art.i  The  affective  power  of  the  artwork  overwhelms  the  senses  of  the  
spectator,  who  ceases  to  be  able  to  function  normally.  In  the  opening  sequence  
of   the   film,  police  detective  Anna  Manni  walks   through   the  streets  of  Florence  
and  into  the  Galleria  degli  Uffizi.  As  Anna  wanders  through  the  gallery  she  looks  
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around  at  the  various  paintings  and  artefacts.  They  seem  to  inspire  in  her  equal  
feelings   of   fascination   and   dread.   This   is   what   aesthetic   theory,   via   Edmund  
Burke  and  Immanuel  Kant,  has  referred  to  as  ‘the  sublime’.  Anna  stands  in  front  
of  Landscape  with   the   Fall   of   Icarus,   and   the   film   cuts   between   close-­ups   of  
different  sections  of  the  painting,  juxtaposed  with  the  image  of  Anna’s  face.  The  
close-­up  of  her  face  is  frozen  in  a  mix  of  awe  and  terror.  She  swoons  and  falls  
to   the  ground,   losing  consciousness  and  banging  her  head  on   the  way  down.  
The  affective  power  of  this  artwork  is  seemingly  too  much  for  the  lead  character  
to  take.  Her  bodily  response  is  extreme  and  violent,  and  the  constitution  of  her  
body   changes   quite   severely.   She   has   to   be   escorted   out   of   the   gallery,   and  
when  she  awakes,  after  a  particularly  disturbing  hallucination,  she  is  weak  and  
light-­headed.    
I   found   Duchamp’s   Étant   donnés…   neither   particularly   beautiful   nor  
terrifying,  but  I  too  suffered  from  the  affective  power  of  this  piece  quite  severely.  
Even  once   I  had   left   the   room,   the   feeling  stayed  with  me.   It   felt   as   though   it  
were   in   my   blood,   and   it   was   some   time   before   I   fully   recovered   from   this  
affectual  violation.    
I   am  aware,   quite   acutely,   of  my  bodily   response   to  works  of   art.   I   am  
also  aware  that  such  ways  of  experiencing  art  and  other   forms  of  practice  are  
common,   but   they   are   often   denied   proper   understanding   and   theorization,  
being   seen   instead   as   something   nebulous,  mystical   or   indeed   ineffable.   It   is  
precisely  this  awareness  that  shapes  both  the  practice  I  produce  and  the  way  I  
understand   and   theorize   the   practice   of   others.   The   ontological   shift   that   one  
goes   through  when  affected  by  a  work  of  art  can  resonate   in  a  spectator   long  
after   they  have   left   the  gallery,   the  cinema  or   the  nightclub.  The  nature  of  our  
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being-­in-­the-­world  alters,  and  the  nature  of  our  perception  changes  through  our  
interactions  and  exchanges  with  these  artworks.    
Several   years   before  my   Philadelphia   trip,   I   paid   a   visit   to   the   Curzon  
cinema  on  London’s  Shaftesbury  Avenue.  It  was  a  cold  Sunday  afternoon  at  a  
time   when   you   could   attend   a   matinee   screening   in   Soho   for   six   pounds.   I  
passed  many  hours  in  that  cinema  watching  double  bills  from  Godard,  Antonioni,  
Eisenstein   and  many   other   canonical   filmmakers.   On   this   particular   weekend  
they  were  screening  Wong  Kar-­Wai’s   In   the  Mood   for  Love   (2000).  The   film’s  
cinematic   elements,   the  movement,   the   colour,   shades   of   light   and   dark,   the  
soundtrack  and  the  musical  score  all  combined  to  affect  me  in  a  very  profound  
way.  When  I  left  the  cinema  I  was  wrapped  in  a  feeling  of  bliss.  I  could  feel  it  in  
my  skin;;  it  affected  the  way  I  breathed,  the  way  I  moved  through  the  streets.  It  
affected  the  way  in  which  I  perceived  colours  and  the  way  in  which  I  listened  to  
the   sounds  of   the  world   around  me.   I   have   seen   In   the  Mood   for   Love  many  
times  since,  yet  when  I  recall   the  film  and  discuss  it  with  others  I  never  talk  of  
what  the  film  is  actually  about.  In  fact,  I  do  not  easily  recall  the  plot  or  narrative  
of  the  film,  despite  my  familiarity  with  the  work.  I  can,  however,  easily  describe  
how  the  film  makes  me  feel.  The  plot  is  not  particularly  complicated,  nor  are  its  
characters   obtuse.   It   is   in   fact   a   relatively   straightforward   narrative:   a   pair   of  
betrayed  spouses  fall  in  love  with  each  other,  whilst  trying  to  come  to  terms  with  
their   respective   partners’   infidelity   and   their   own   conflicted   feelings   towards  
each  other.  Yet   the  plot   of   the   film  has  never   really   been  a   concern  of  mine.  
Watching  Wong  Kar-­Wai’s  film  can  be  compared  to  listening  to  a  great  musical  
composition   played   by   a   world-­class   orchestra:   it   changes   the   way   you  
experience  the  world.  
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Of  course,  there  are  also  films  that  have  quite  the  opposite  effect  from  In  
the  Mood  for  Love.  There  are  films  that  when  they  finish  leave  you  with  a  bad  
feeling.   You   feel   as   if   the   film  were   clinging   to   your   skin,   like   dirt.   You   try   to  
shake  this  feeling,  but  it  is  not  always  easy.  There  are  films  that,  when  they  are  
over,   you   never  want   to   see   again.   This   can   come   from   a   feeling   of   disgust,  
evoked   through   images   that   disagree  with   us   culturally   and   physically.   There  
are  classic  examples  of  films  which  elicit  this  response  in  European  and  North  
American   cinema.   The   images   of   sexual   depravity   and   anguish   in  Pier  Paolo  
Pasolini’s  Salò,  or  the  120  Days  of  Sodom  (1975)  can  make  spectators  squirm  
in   their   seats,   at   times   uncomfortable   and   at   others   disgusted.   Images   from  
John  Waters’   early   films  have  passed   into   cinephile  mythology   for   their   sheer  
repulsiveness.  The  sight  of  Divine  eating  dog  shit   inevitably  turns  the  stomach  
of   those   that   have  seen  Pink  Flamingos   (Waters,   1972),   in  a   response  which  
Julia  Kristeva  might  call  abjection   (1982).   I  have  witnessed  many   times  whole  
classes  of   hardened   film   students  wince  at   the   sight   of   blood  gushing   from  a  
bull’s   throat   as   it   is   sliced   open   in   Sergei   Eisenstein’s   Strike   (1925).   These  
images  disagree  with  our  bodies,  as  Deleuze,   channelling  Spinoza,  would   tell  
us   (1988:  33,  37,  118).  The  history  of  cinema   is  marked  by   images  of  horror,  
depravity  and  violence.  These  images  often  make  the  viewer  recoil  in  disgust.    
There  are  other  films  that  leave  the  spectator  with  a  different  feeling,  one  
less  sickening  but  perhaps  equally  unpleasant.  The  noir-­inflected   film  Winter’s  
Bone   (Granik,   2010),  with  a   colour   palette  of   grey  and  brown,   and   themes  of  
unrelenting  misery,  leaves  the  spectator  with  cold,  empty  feelings.  The  searing  
reds  of  We  Need  to  Talk  About  Kevin  (Ramsay,  2011)  exist  at  a  different  end  of  
the   colour   spectrum   to   those   of  Winter’s   Bone,   but   the   film   has   an   equally  
harrowing  effect  on  many  spectators.  There  is  a  moment  in  the  film  in  which  the  
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shrill  sound  of  a  baby  crying  mixes  with  the  incessant  sound  of  a  pneumatic  drill  
from  the  street  outside  the  house.  It  is  a  moment  of  violence,  which  penetrates  
to   the   core   of   the   body   of   both   the   film   viewer   and   the   character   of  Eva,   the  
child’s  mother.   It   is  a  physical  disturbance  that  echoes  throughout   the  body  of  
the   film   and   the   body   of   the   film   viewer,   leaving   one  with   a   feeling   of   almost  
sickness  after  the  final  credits  roll.  The  spectator  caries  this  sickness  with  them  
for   a   time,   as   they   leave   the   cinema.   The   artist-­filmmaker   Nathaniel   Dorsky  
states   that   films   can   leave   you   with   an   unhealthy   feeling   (2005:   22).   Dorsky  
writes   of   an   early   experience   of   a   trip   to   the   movie   theatre   in   his   book  
Devotional  Cinema   (2005).  He  describes  the  experience  of   leaving  the  theatre  
as  a  nine-­year-­old  child  after  an  extra-­long  screening  of  a  series  of  family  films  
one  Saturday  afternoon.  He  states  that  he  remembers  having  an  odd  sensation,  
and   he   describes   how   he   perceived   the   texture   of   the   light   from   the   late  
afternoon   sun   and   the  movement   of   passing   cars   in   a   strange  way,   the   local  
architecture   taking   on   an   eerie   quality.   He   found   this   feeling   to   be   quite  
disconcerting,   and  he   struggled   to   shift   this   alien   strangeness   for  most   of   the  
evening   (2005:   20).   For  Dorsky,   this   day  was   revelatory.   It  was   a  moment   in  
which   he   realised   that   cinema   ‘was   powerful,   even   something   to   be   feared’  
(2005:  20).  Dorsky,  like  many  film  viewers,  experienced  the  ontological  shift  that  
one  experiences  whilst  in  the  cinema  auditorium.  He  was  moved  from  a  state  of  
happy  contentment  to  a  state  of  uncertainty,  verging  on  fear.  
At   any   moment   in   time   during   our   waking   lives   we   are   subject   to   a  
barrage   of   affects:   light,   darkness,   sounds   of   cars   passing,   people   shouting,  
birds  singing,  silence.  A  symphony  of  sights  and  sounds  collides  with  our  body  
constantly,  all  of  it  emanating  from  the  milieu  that  surrounds  us.  This  collection  
of   stimuli   amounts   to   the   affective   tone   of   our   daily   lives.   Steve   Goodman  
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defines   affective   tonality   as   ‘dimensions   of   mood,   ambience,   or   atmosphere’  
(2010:   195).   This   affective   mood   is   constantly   shifting,   changing,   moving   in  
different   somatic   directions;;   as   Goodman   notes,   this   affective   tonality  
‘possesses,  abducts,  or  envelops  a  subject’   (2010:  189),  and  the  manipulation  
of  affective  tonality  can  be  used  to  control,  manipulate  or  attack  a  subject  (2010:  
xiii,  144,  183).  This  is  true  of  the  affective  tone  of  our  daily  lives,  as  it  is  true  for  
the  affective  tone  of  the  cinema.  
Moving-­image  works  produce  a  series  of  affects  that  operate  at  different  
intensities   and  envelop,   attack   and  manipulate   the   spectator   in   varying  ways.  
When  spectators  attend  a  film  screening  they  wilfully  submit  themselves  to  this  
affective   violation.   Paul   Gormley   notes   that   attending   a   screening   can   be  
described  as  a  masochistic  endeavour  (2005:  12),  in  that  the  spectator  submits  
to   the   affective   envelopment   that   occurs   throughout   the   duration   of   a   film.  
Herein   lies   the   power   of   cinema.   Cinema   has   the   ability   to   disrupt   affective  
tonality  and  rebuild  it  anew  in  a  different  form.  In  the  pages  that  follow  and  the  
films  I  produce,  I  shall  attempt  to  mobilize  the  concept  of  affective  tonality  as  a  
method   to   create   and   understand   how   narrative   can   operate   in   a   uniquely  
cinematic  fashion,  in  a  way  that  privileges  affect,  rhythm  and  sensation.    
I   will   begin   this   investigation   through   my   own   practice,   in   order   to  
recontextualize  and  reappropriate  theories  of  affect  as  a  tool  for  film  production.  
Affect  theory  has  helped  with  the  analysis  of  cinema  and  our  understanding  of  
cinema’s  creative  mechanisms,  but  until  now  notions  of  affect  have  not  directly  
informed  the  production  of  narrative  film  work.  The  films  produced  through  this  
investigation  will  comprise  the  beginning  of  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
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Figure  1  -­  Marcel  Duchamp, Étant  donnés:  1°  la  chute  d’eau,  2°  le  gaz  d’éclairage...  (Given:  1  










  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i  The  Stendhal  syndrome  is  a  condition  named  by  the  psychiatrist  Graziella  Magherini  after  she  
observed  acute  attacks  of  affect  and  anxiety  in  tourists  visiting  Florence  (Guerrero  et  al.,  2010).  
	   9  
CHAPTER  1:  
AN  INTRODUCTION:  DEFINING  AFFECTIVE  TONALITY,    
AND  THE  POSITION  OF  THE  THESIS  
  
This   research   project,   encompassing   both   a   written   thesis   and   four   moving-­
image  works,   investigates   how   the   concept   of   affective   tonality   can  provide  a  
platform   for   analysing   and   producing   cinematic   works   beyond   textuality.   The  
Arts   and  Humanities   Research  Council   (AHRC)   identified   ‘Beyond   Text’   as   a  
key   research   area   in   2007.   According   to   the   Beyond   Text:   Performances,  
Sounds,   Images,  Objects   executive   summary,   ‘visual   communication,   sensory  
perception,   orality   and   material   culture   [are]   key   concerns   for   21st   century  
scholarship  and   the  wider  community’   (AHRC,  2007:  2).  This   research  project  
draws   upon   some   of   these   key   concerns,   especially   around   notions   of  
conceptualizing   film   outside   a   linguistic   framework   and   privileging   the   senses  
and  the  material  nature  of  moving  images  when  constructing  film  practice  work.    
The  term  ‘affective  tone’  can  be  equated  with  the  ‘mood’  or  ‘feel’  of  a  film.  
Film,  because  of  an  unbalanced  preference  for  the  visual,  is  easily  broken  down  
into   neat   blocks,   like   Lego,   and   subjected   to   semiotic   analysis,   cognitive  
analysis  and  psychoanalytic   film  theory.  The  shot—the  single  unit  of  a  film,  as  
described   by   Bordwell   and   Thompson   (2008   [1979]),   Eisenstein   (1970)   and  
others—is   discrete   in   that   it   has   clear   spatial   and   temporal   dimensions:   each  
shot  in  a  film  has  a  beginning  and  end  point.  When  optical  processes  are  used  
such   as   dissolves   or   superimpositions,   as   seen   famously   at   the   end   of   the  
shower  scene  in  Psycho  (Hitchcock,  1960),  the  discrete  boundary  of  the  shot  is  
obscured,   but   this   boundary   is   not   erased   completely.   The   spectator   or   film  
analyst  is  able  to  view  the  images  of  the  shots  as  units,  which  can  be  numbered,  
counted,  timed  and  categorized  in  many  different  ways.  As  such,  film  lends  itself  
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to  structural  and  linguistic  analysis,  which  was  the  dominant  position  in  the  field  
of  film  studies  for  many  years.  The  challenge  to  the  linguistic/structural  position  
began  with  the  publication  of  Gilles  Deleuze’s  Cinema  1:  The  Movement-­Image  
in  France  in  1983  and  Cinema  2:  The  Time-­Image  in  1985,  and  was  taken  up  in  
the  anglophone  tradition  with  the  publication  of  Steven  Shaviro’s  The  Cinematic  
Body   in  1993  in  the  USA.  The  importance  of  affect  and  the  role  of  the  body  in  
understanding  meaning-­making  processes  have  been   thoroughly  discussed   in  
the   thirty   years   following   Deleuze’s   publication,   yet   there   has   been   little  
research  on  the  potential  of  using  affect  as  a  tool  to  produce  and  conceptualize  
narrative  (in)  film  practice.    
The   importance  of   the   individual  shot   is  emphasized   in   the  approach  to  
film   production.   A   screenplay   is   written   and   broken   down   into   shot   lists,   and  
storyboards   are   produced.   These   storyboards   and   shot   lists   lay   out   in   great  
detail   each   ‘unit’   of   the   film  and   the  order   in  which   they  should  appear   in   the  
finished   film.  The   fact   that  cinema  so  often  begins  with  words  on  a  page,   lists  
and   numbers   is   somewhat   counter-­intuitive   for   an   art   form   composed   of   light  
and  sound  waves.i  One  of   the  aims  of   this   thesis   is   to  address   this   issue  and  
suggest   an   alternative   approach   to   narrative   film   practice.   Drawing   on  
arguments   developed   through   affect   theory   and   film   studies,   I   argue   that  
cinematic  works  have  a  more  fluid  nature,  in  which  colour,  movement,  light  and  
sound   can   be   approached   as   part   of   an   overlapping   tapestry   of   affect   and  
sensation  in  constant  flow  within  the  frame  of  the  film’s  screen.  To  consider  film  
as  a   collection  of   discrete   shots  and  moments  of   sound   that   build   upon  each  
other  in  order  to  produce  a  meaning  that  is  read  or  decoded  by  the  audience,  as  
argued  by  cognitive  film  theorists,  is  to  constrain  narrative  cinema  to  the  level  of  
language   and   semiotics.   One   can   consider   individual   shots   within   a   film   as  
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discrete   units   which   act   as   building   blocks   of   narrative,   but   this   thesis   is  
concerned   with   the   play   of   affective   markers   that   make   up   a   cinematic  
composition,  as  this  is  a  way  in  which  to  understand  narrative  through  the  body.  
The  summative  dance  of  light  and  sound  that  plays  out  across  the  duration  of  a  
film  is  what  I  shall  term  the  ‘affective  tone’  of  the  film.  I  argue  that  understanding  
the   concept   of   affective   tonality   is   key   to   understanding   the   transformative  
power   of   the   cinema,   and   the   spectator’s   relationship   to   narrative   in   cinema.  
Understanding  how  the  play  of  affects  operates  holistically  across  the  duration  
of  the  film  can  present  practitioners,  theoreticians  and  those  that  work  with  both  
(film)  theory  and  (film)  practice  with  a  unique  way  to  approach  narrative  cinema,  
in  which  the  narrative  is  embodied  in  the  work  and  the  spectator.  The  outcomes  
of  my  research  will   influence  not  only   film  theory,  but  also   the  methodology  of  
practice-­based   research   in   other   areas   where   senses   and   emotions   are  
recognized   as   important   channels   of   human   interaction,   especially   in   social  
ethnography  and  arts.    
The   interaction   of   individual   sites   of   affect   becomes   affective   tonality.  
This  affective   tonality  becomes   the  narrative  of   the   film.  Affective   tonality   is   a  
concept  that  privileges  the  experiential  nature  of  the  cinema,  one  that  takes  into  
account  the  role  of  the  body  in  perception  and  cognition,  draws  from  film  theory  
and   continental   philosophy   (with   particular   emphasis   on   the   work   of   Gilles  
Deleuze  and  his  work  co-­authored  with  Félix  Guattari)  and  borrows  from  certain  
theoretical  aspects  of  neuroscience,  namely  the  work  of  Semir  Zeki  and  Antonio  
Damasio.  I  engage  with  this  concept  through  my  own  practice  whilst  composing  
a   series   of   tonal-­narrative   films.   Through   my   practice   and   the   discourse  
surrounding   it,   I   am   able   to   explore   a   new   or   alternative   way   in   which   to  
approach  affect/film  studies,  which   incorporates  practice  as   theory,  as  well  as  
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putting   forth   a   language   and   system   in   which   to   engage   affectively   with   film  
practice.    
It  can  be  difficult  to  write  clearly  and  lucidly  on  the  subject  of  mood  and  
feeling   in   the   cinema.   Mood   and   feeling   are   properties   that   are   not   directly  
visible,   difficult   to   codify   and   hard   to   explain   without   the   use   of   abstract  
terminology.  Writing  on  the  poetic  films  of  Andrei  Tarkovsky,  Robert  Bird  states  
that  the  Soviet  filmmaker’s  style,  characters  and  stories  can  be  seen  as  merely  
occasions   for   showing   ‘earth-­stained   objects,   burning   buildings,   water   logged  
landscapes,   and,   perhaps   most   fundamentally,   an   invisible   but   poignant  
atmosphere’   (2008:  10).  It   is  the  invisible  but  poignant  mood  or  atmosphere  of  
the   cinema   that   I   wish   to   contextualize   and   go   some   way   towards  
understanding   in   this   thesis.   Robert   Sinnerbrink   notes   that   the   aesthetics   of  
mood  are  often  overlooked,   and   that   “words   frequently   fail   us  when  we   try   to  
articulate   such   moods   in   a   more   abstract   or   analytical   vein”   (2012:   148).  
Perhaps   because   of   its   evanescence,   detailed   discussion   of   mood   or  
atmosphere   largely   disappeared   from   academic   discourse   after   ideas   of  
photogénie  vanished  from  theoretical  frameworks,  as  argued  by  Robert  B.  Ray  
(2001).   In   the  preface   to   the  collection  Jean  Epstein:  Critical  Essays  and  New  
Translations   (Keller   and   Paul   2012)   Tom   Gunning   states   that   “the   films   and  
writings  of  Jean  Epstein  still  remain  one  of  the  best-­kept  secrets  of  film  studies”  
(2012:   13).   However,   as   Keller   and   Paul’s   collection   of   essays   attests,   the  
important  work  of  Epstein   is   being   reassessed  and  brought  back   into   the   film  
studies  discourse.   I  argue   that   the  poignant  but   invisible  atmosphere  of  which  
Bird  writes  can  be  conceptualised  by  filmmakers  through  privileging  affect  and  
rhythm,  and  that  through  this  conceptualisation  theorists  and  filmmakers  can  be  
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armed  with  a  new   tool   to  both  understand  and  construct  moving-­image  works  
and  narrative  structure  that  is  based  upon  affect  rather  than  story  progression.    
The   aim   of   this   investigation   is   to   explore   and   define   the   concept   of  
affective   tonality,   and   to   apply   this   concept   to   cinema   in   order   to   identify   a  
unique   way   in   which   to   approach   questions   of   narrative   and   the   corporeal  
power  of  the  moving  image.  By  doing  so  it  will  be  possible  to  work  towards  an  
original   consideration,   contextualization   and   production   of   narrative   cinematic  
forms,   a   consideration   that   privileges   embodied   experience   over   cognitive  
experience  and  representational  interpretations  of  cinema  as  text.  In  this  sense,  
this   practice-­based   thesis   will   provide   tools   for   the  
theorist/practitioner/researcher   to  use   in  order   to  analyse  cinema  and   to  make  
cinema  in  relation  to  narrative  and  the  body.  The  ultimate  aim  is  to  define  and  
produce  a  new  form  of  cinema:  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
By  combining  theory  and  practice  in  a  synergetic  way  I  shall  contribute  to  
an  emerging  strand  of   research  within   film  studies   that  engages  with  practice.  
However,  rather  than  treat  the  films  as  text  and  the  thesis  as  an  exegesis  of  the  
work  produced,  I  shall  use  practice  as  the  ground  to  produce  theory.  The  theory  
emerges   out   of   the   practice,   and   the   theoretical   investigation   feeds   back   into  
the  practice  work.  It   is  a  process  that  leads  to  a  situation  in  which  it  should  be  
impossible   to  distinguish,   through  chronology,  a  difference  between   the  words  
on   the   page   and   the   images   on   the   screen.   This   thesis   does   not   present   a  
retrospective  analysis  of   the  narrative  structure  of   canonical  works  of   cinema,  
nor  a  reassessment  of  little-­known  works,  and  I  do  not  analyse  in  detail  films  by  
other  directors.  This  thesis  is  an  argument  for  the  future  of  narrative  cinema,  a  
narrative   cinema   that   is   to   come.   I   bring  practice  work   into   being   through  my  
writing  around  the  issue  of  affective  tone  and  narrative.  This  creative  work  then  
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feeds   back   into   my   writing   and   vice   versa,   until   it   becomes   impossible   to  
distinguish  which  element  comes   first,   image  or  word.  The  way   to  understand  
the  concept  of  affective  tonality   is  through  the  practice  work,  as  the  concept   is  
embodied  in  the  films  themselves.  The  four  pieces  of  practice  successively  build  
upon   one   another,   whilst   engaging   with   the   concepts   explored   in   the   written  
component  of  the  thesis.  Practice  iv  presents  the  culmination  of  this  experiment,  
and  is  the  most  complete  example  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality.  
My  research  is  positioned  broadly  within  the  field  of  film  studies.  Despite  
the   fact   that   this   is  a  broad  area  of   study,   it   is  worth   starting  here   in  order   to  
place  my  work  within  a   larger  academic   framework.  Dominique  Chateau,   in  a  
lecture  given  for  the  Arthemis  research  project  in  2009,  posed  the  question  ‘do  
film   studies   form   a   discipline?’,   noting   that   the   term   ‘film   studies’   is   itself   a  
contested  subject.  For  Chateau,  the  only  unifying  property  of  film  studies  is  the  
object   of   study   itself:   the   film   (2009).   Chateau   argues   that   academia   is  
presented  with  several  disparate  disciplines,  such  as  film  history,  semiotics,  the  
sociology  of   film  and   film  analysis,   all   positioned  under   the  broad  umbrella   of  
film   studies,   with   the   only   thing   in   common   being   this   one   unifying   property.  
Thomas  Elsaesser  and  Malte  Hagener  note  that  the  history  of  film  studies  has  
now  become  an  object  of  study   in   itself   (2010).   In   their  book  Film  Theory:  An  
Introduction   Through   the   Senses,   the   authors   state   that   film   studies   is  
constantly   reinventing   and   reformulating   itself,   both   through   its   present   (yet  
ever-­changing)   form  and   through   its   history,   the   conception  of  which  alters   in  
relation   to   how   a   certain   field   interprets   the   umbrella   title   of   film   studies.  
Deleuzian  scholar  and   film   theorist  D.  N.  Rodowick  states   that   the  1960s  and  
1970s  saw  film  studies  turn  towards  a  concern  with  theory  that  emerged  out  of  
‘literary   semiology,   Lacanian   psychoanalysis,   and   Althusserian   Marxism,  
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echoed   in   the  broader   influence  of  structuralism  and  post-­structuralism  on   the  
humanities’   (2007a:   91),   whereas   film   studies   from   the   1980s   onwards   has  
‘been  marked   both   by   a   decentering   of   film  with   respect   to  media   and   visual  
studies   and   by   a   retreat   from   theory’   (2007a:   91).   From   the   1980s   onwards  
philosophers   and   film   theorists   have   made   a   conscious   move   away   from  
semiotics  and  psychoanalytic  theory  in  the  field  of  film  studies  (Deleuze,  1989,  
1992,   Shaviro,   1993,   Rodowick,   1997,   Kennedy,   2000,   Gormley,   2005,  
Frampton,  2006,  Bolton,  2011,  Martin-­Jones  and  Brown,  2012)  towards  theories  
of   affect.   Rodowick   describes   the   move   away   from   theory   as   a   triple  
displacement   by   history,   science   and   philosophy,   and   he   makes   a   clear  
distinction   between   film   theory   and   film-­philosophy   (2007a:   95,   102).   For  
Rodowick,   film  theory  has  for  now  been  replaced  by  film-­philosophy  within   the  
broader  field  of  film  studies.  
This   research   project   can   also   be   positioned   within   the   field   of   film-­
philosophy,  drawing  as  it  does  on  concepts  of  affect  derived  from  Deleuze  and  
Guattari,   and   by   proxy   from   Spinoza   and   Bergson.   However,   to   classify   this  
research   project   as   a   work   of   film-­philosophy   would   be   reductive   and   a   little  
misleading.  Even  within  film-­philosophy  as  a  relatively  new  area  of  study,  there  
is  a  methodological   split   between  on   the  one  hand  scholars   that  demonstrate  
that  film  can  express  philosophical  ideas  through  theme,  plot  and  dialogue,  and  
on   the   other   hand   researchers   that   mobilize   philosophical   concepts   to  
investigate   how   the   nature   of   the   cinematic   image   can   be   philosophical.   The  
first  method  can  be  seen  in  the  book  series  ‘The  Philosophy  of  Popular  Culture’,  
in  which  authors  discuss  the  bodies  of  work  of  film  directors  such  as  the  Coen  
brothers   (Conard,   2009)   and   David   Lynch   (Devlin,   2011)   in   relation   to  
philosophical   concepts,   and   explore   how   these   philosophical   concepts   are  
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expressed  in  the  work  of  the  said  directors.  An  example  of  this  can  be  found  in  
a   discussion   held   between   Nigel   Warburton   and   Stephen   Mulhall   for   the  
Philosophy   Bites   podcast   (Warburton,   2008).   Mulhall   gives   the   example   of  
Blade  Runner  (Scott,  1982)  as  a  film  that  does  philosophy,  drawing  an  analogy  
between   the   Voight-­Kampff   machine   and   the   film   camera,   as   well   as   citing  
dialogue   between   two   characters   in   which   they   discuss   life   and   death   as   an  
example  of  how  film  can  do  philosophy.  This  method,  which  can  be  described  
as   textual   analysis,   shares   certain   intellectual   assumptions   with   areas   of   film  
studies  that  treat  film  as  text.  The  more  dominant  branch  of  film-­philosophy,  as  
exemplified  in  the  work  found  in  the  journal  of  the  same  name  (1997  to  present),  
investigates  the  relationship  between  film  and  philosophy  with  an  emphasis  on  
cinema’s  ability  to  produce  philosophical  concepts,  rather  than  simply  represent,  
or   discuss   through   the   use   of   dialogue,   philosophical   ideas.   David   Sorfa  
summarizes  some  of  the  key  elements  of  film-­philosophy:    
Film-­Philosophy   supports   the   strong   argument   that   cinema   can   do  
philosophy   in   a  way   that   is   unique   to   the  medium.   Therefore,   film   is   not  
only   capable   of   presenting   extended   thought   experiments   or   illustrating  
philosophical  concepts,  but  is  philosophy  itself…  this  begs  the  question  of  
what  cinema  is  (and,  of  course,  what  philosophy  is),  but  these  fundamental  
questions  are  also  the  concern  of  film-­philosophy.    
(2016:  3)  
  
This   thesis   shares   some   of   the   concerns   expressed   by   Sorfa   in   the  
journal   Film-­Philosophy.   I   attempt   to   mobilize   philosophical   concepts   in   the  
continental   tradition,   as   favoured   by   the   journal   (Sorfa,   2016),   in   order   to  
understand  and  conceptualize  what  cinema   is  or  can  become.  The  method  of  
film   practice   as   research   differs   from   the   majority   of   film-­philosophy   work,  
however.  Whilst  Film-­Philosophy  counts   filmmakers  and  cineastes  amongst   its  
contributors,  namely  Steven  Eastwood,  William  Brown  and  the  journal’s  founder  
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Daniel   Frampton,   outputs   are   currently   limited   to   traditional   textual   journal  
articles.    
It   is  the  research  undertaken  in  the  field  of  film-­philosophy  to  which  this  
thesis   is   most   indebted.   The   film-­philosophy   journal,   which   celebrated   the  
publication  of  its  20th  edition  in  2016,  is  at  the  forefront  of  the  of  debates  around  
film   and   philosophy.   Many   of   the   contributors   to   the   journal   and   the   annual  
conference   have   conceptualised   affect,   mood,   narrative   and   cinematic  
subjectivity  including  Vivian  Sobchack,  Laura  U.  Marks,  Warren  Buckland,  Carl  
Plantinga,   Lucy   Bolton,   Robert   Sinnerbrink,   and   Sarah   Cooper.   In   his   article  
Stimmung:   Exploring   the   Aesthetics   of   Mood   (2012),   Sinnerbrink   argues   that  
mood   should   not   be   considered   as   a   minor   feature   of   aesthetic   experience,  
noting   that   the   theory  of  emotion   in  cinema  has  a   tendency   to  concentrate  on  
character   identification   and  narrative   structure.  Sinnerbrink   offers   a   critique  of  
this  approach,  however,  arguing  that,  
it   overlooks   the  specifically  aesthetic  and  expressive  aspects  of  narrative  
film.  It  is  not  just  character  action  and  narrative  content  that  elicit  emotion,  
it   is   the  entire   repertoire  of  cinematic-­aesthetic  devices  (lighting,  mise-­en-­
scene,   montage,   rhythm,   tempo,   colour,   texture,   gesture,   performance,  
music  and  sound)  that  together  contribute  to  the  expression  of  a  film’s  style  
and   meaning.   Emotion   is   communicated   aesthetically,   with   feeling,  
sensibility   and   reflection,   as   well   as   cognitively.   We   can   be   attuned   or  
responsive  to  films  in  ways  that  are  not  principally  oriented  towards  a  goal,  
focused   on   grasping   narrative   content   or   on   cognitive   comprehension  
(2012:  152).  
  
The   taxonomy   of   affect   posited   in   this   thesis   as   a   tool   for   an   affective   film  
practice   considers   what   Sinnerbrink   has   termed   a   repertoire   of   cinematic-­
aesthetic   devices   in   order   to   construct   a   narrative   that   is   not   principally   goal  
orientated,   but   instead   focused   on   the   emotional   experience   of   the   central  
characters.  The  affective  tone  of  a  film  is  best  understood  through  an  aesthetic  
engagement  with   the  mood   of   the   film.   Sinnerbrink   identifies   and   categorises  
four  distinctive  moods  in  narrative  cinema:  disclosive,  episodic,  transitional  and  
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autonomous   moods.   A   disclosive   mood   reveals   a   cinematic   world,   which  
“attunes   us   to   the   various   tonal   qualities   of   the   narrative,   its   characters,   its  
generic  aspects  and  so  on”   (2012:  156).  Episodic  mood  cues   recur  at  various  
points  throughout  a  films  duration,  which  act  like  interludes  “that  vary  the  mood  
or   shift   the   emotional   dynamics   of   the   narrative”   (2012:   157),   whereas  
transitional  moods  help  shift  the  mood  or  intensity  of  a  scene  in  preparation  for  
a   change   or   development   in   the   narrative   (ibid).   The   first   three   categories   of  
mood   are   closely   linked   to   narrative   and   character.   The   fourth   category,  
autonomous  mood,  occurs  when  mood  is  favored  over  narrative  progression  or  
engagement  with  character.   In   these   instances,   “mood  becomes  autonomous,  
taking   on   a   primary,   rather   than   supporting   role   in   the   composition   of   the  
fictional  world”  (2012:  161).  The  example  of  Mulholland  Drive  (Lynch,  2001)   is  
given,   in   which   two   central   characters,   Betty   (Naomi  Watts)   and   Rita   (Laura  
Elena  Harring),  enter  Club  Silencio  and  bear  witness  to  an  artificial  performance  
“saturated  in  deep  reds,  flashing  lights  and  mysterious  smoke”  (ibid).  The  Club  
Silencio   sequence   is   one   in   which   affective   elements   of   mood   go   beyond  
narrative   function   (2012:   162).   Mullholland   Drive’s   director,   David   Lynch,  
comments  on  cinematic  abstractions  which  are  more  intuitive,  or  affectual,  as  I  
would  term  them.  In  an  interview  with  Matt  Diehl,  Lynch  states,  “[t]o  me,  a  story  
can  be  both  concrete  and  abstract,  or  a  concrete  story  can  hold  abstractions.  
And  abstractions  are  things  that  really  can't  be  said  so  well  with  words.  They’re  
intuited.  They’re  understood  in  a  different  way,  and  cinema  can  do  those  things”  
(Lynch,  2012).  There  are  parallels  between  what  Lynch  terms  abstractions  and  
Sinnerbrink   terms   autonomous   moods.   In   both   instances   the   affective  
resonance   is   given   privilege   over   narrative   progression.   The   concepts   in   this  
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thesis  build  upon  these  ideas  in  order  to  consider  how  elements  of  affect  can  be  
used  to  construct  narrative  cinema  that  emphasizes  autonomous  mood.    
   The   four   moods   defined   by   Sinnerbink   comprise   the   Stimmung   of   the  
articles  title,  defined  as  “a  properly  cinematic  aesthetic  with  the  power  to  evoke  
atmosphere  or   to  disclose  an  experience  of  world   imbued  with  subtle  varieties  
of   mood”   (Sinnerbink,   2012:   150).   Drawing   on   the   early   film   theory   of   Béla  
Balzász,  the  concept  of  stimmung  is  conceptualized  as  the  soul  of  the  film  (ibid).  
The  affective  tone  of  a  film  could  be  considered  the  film’s  soul,  in  this  regard  as  
this  tone  runs  through  the  whole  of  the  film,  existing  in  every  frame,  every  sound  
and  every  fluctuation  of  light.  The  affective  tone  of  the  film  is  a  composite  of  all  
of  these  elements,  and  the  soul  of  the  film  or  the  stimmung  is  a  good  metaphor  
to  help  full  conceptualise  this  idea.  Sarah  Cooper  further  takes  up  this  argument  
in  her  monograph  The  Soul  of  Film  Theory  (2013).  Cooper  surveys  the  concept  
of   a   cinematic   soul   from   the   early   20th   century   through   to   contemporary  
examples.  The   idea  of  a  soul   in   film  originates   in   the  early  period  of   the  20th  
century,  and  can  be   found   in   the  concept  of  photogénie,  Hugo  Münsterberg’s  
‘soul  psychology’,  and  the  physiognomics  of  Weimar  film  theory  (Cooper,  2013:  
23).  Early  theories  of  the  soul  in  film  and  photography  focus  on  the  ability  of  the  
photochemical   process   to   capture   the   inner   workings   of   human   experience.  
Cooper   references  19th   century  photographer  Julia  Margaret  Cameron’s  belief  
that  her  photography  could  capture  the  essence  of  her  subject’s  spirit,  and  that  
her  process  would  “enter  the  inner  life  of  her  subjects  and  grasp  mechanically,  
their  vital  energy”  (2013:  26),  whereas  Münsterberg  considered  the  experience  
of   watching   cinema   to   be   shaped   by   the   act   of   the   spectator’s  
attention.     “Münsterberg   writes:  ‘it   is   as   if   reality   has   lost   its   own   continuous  
connection  and  become  shaped  by  the  demands  of  our  soul’”  (2006  [1916]:  30-­
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31   cited   in   Cooper,   2013:   35).   Copper   finds   evidence   of   the   soul   in   the  
Deleuze’s  writing  on  cinema,  also,  arguing   that   the   ‘espirit’,  which  he  refers   in  
his  cinema  books  (1989,  1992),   “harnesses   the  dual  sense  of  mind  and  spirit”  
(2013:   132),   and   for   Cooper,   this   spirit   is   “ghosted   by   the   soul”   (ibid).  
Subjectivity  in  this  instance  is  linked  to  the  experience  of  time,  and  through  the  
experience   of   cinematic   time   we   are   given   an   affective   experience   of  
subjectivity  (Cooper,  2013:  142).    
Sinnerbrink   and   Cooper   arguments   are   concerned   with   the   soul   and  
affect,   whereas   Vivian   Sobchack   takes   a   phenomenological   approach   to   the  
understanding  cinema’s  physicality.  In  Fleshing  out  the  Image:  Phenomenology,  
Pedagogy,   and   Derek   Jarman’s   Blue   (2012),   Sobchack   argues   that   a  
phenomenological  method  “fleshes  out”  the  image  in  cinema,  and  this  fleshing  
out   should   be   central   to   the   foundation   of   film   studies,   as   it   enables   both   a  
reflective  and  embodied  engagement  with  the  film  (2012:  192).  Sobchack  sets  
out   a   phenomenological   method   for   film   analysis,   drawing   on   the   work   of  
Maurice  Merlau-­Ponty  and  citing  the  experimental  documentary,  Blue  (Jarman,  
1993)  as  an  example,  arguing  that  the  first  step  in  a  phenomenological  analysis  
is  an  engagement  with   the   formal  elements  of   the   film.  She  argues   that   “step  
one  in  a  phenomenological  analysis  of  a  film  is  not  to  consider  or  to  explain  the  
form   ‘film’,   but   rather   to   describe   what   you   see   and   hear”   (2012:   195).   The  
taxonomy  of  affective   tonality   inverts   this  method  and   takes  what  you  will   see  
and  hear  in  the  film  as  the  starting  point  for  constructing  a  cinematic  narrative  in  
which   affect   is   privileged.   Sobchack   observes   that   many   of   her   graduate  
students  “forget  to  attend  to  their  own  experience  of  ‘seeing’  and  ‘listening’  –  or  
they  devalue  it”  (2012:  193).  In  the  preproduction  process  for  narrative  cinema,  
in   which   story,   treatment,   character,   narrative   structure   and   screenplay   are  
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often  prioritised,  the  formal  elements  of   the  cinematic  experience  can  often  be  
devalued,  also.  This  thesis  argues  that  what  Sinnerbrink  describes  as  the  entire  
repertoire   of   cinematic-­aesthetic   devices,   and   what   Sobchack   describes   as  
what   one   would   see   and   hear,   should   be   taken   as   a   starting   point   for   the  
production  of  narrative  cinema.    
   In  the  chapter,  What  My  Fingers  Knew:  the  Cinesthetic  Subject,  or  Vision  
in  the  Flesh  (2004)  Sobchack  laments  the  lack  of  “work  in  English  to  be  found  
on   the   carnal   sensuality   of   the   film   experience   and   what—and   how—it  
constitutes  meaning”  (2004:  56).    She  argues  that  when  the  kinetic  experience  
is  discussed  it  is  often  framed  in  relation  to  the  demise  of  classical  narrative  or  
the  rise  of  transmedia  storytelling  (2004:  57).  Much  of  Sobchack’s  work  argues  
for   placing   the   sensual   experience   of   cinema   at   the   centre   of   the   meaning  
making  process,  rather  than  viewing  this  experience  as  a  by-­product  of  the  film  
itself,  as  the  author  goes  on  to  state,  “the  film  experience   is  meaningful  not   to  
the  side  of  our  bodies  but  because  of  our  bodies  (emphasis   in  original)  (2012:  
59),  and  it  is  exactly  because  our  bodily  experience  is  so  central  to  meaningful  
experience   in   the   cinema   that   I   argue   for   its   primacy   in   the   film   production  
process.   Sobchack   draws   upon   her   experience   of   watching   Jane   Campion’s  
The   Piano   (1993)   to   illuminate   her   analysis   of   the   kinaesthetic   experience   of  
watching  a  film.  She  describes  the  experience,  stating  that  the  film,    
“not   only   “filled   me   up”   and   often   “suffocated”   me   with   feelings   that  
resonated  in  and  constricted  my  chest  and  stomach,  but  it  also  “sensitized”  
the  very  surfaces  of  my  skin—as  well  as   its  own—to   touch”   (emphasis   in  
original)  (2004:  61).    
  
This  touch  is  central  to  the  meaning  making  process,  as  the  author’s  body  knew  
of   the   images   on   screen   before   she   could   understand   them   cognitively,   and,  
through  touch  and  the  surface  of  her  skin,  the  fingers  offscreen  and  onscreen,  
hers   and   the   images,   and   the   eventual   representation   confirmed   what   “her  
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fingers…   reflexively   if   not   yet   reflectively—already   knew”   (2004:   63).  
Sobchack’s   responsive,   knowing   fingers   leads   her   into   an   argument   that   we  
perceive  with  our  whole  bodies:  
But   vision   is   not   isolated   from   our   other   senses.   Whatever   its   specific  
structure,   capacities,   and   sensual   discriminations,   vision   is   only   one  
modality   of  my   lived   body’s   access   to   the   world   and   only   one  means   of  
making   the  world   of   objects   and   others   sensible—that   is,  meaningful—to  
me.  Vision  may  be  the  sense  most  privileged  in  the  culture  and  the  cinema,  
with   hearing   a   close   second;;   nonetheless,   I   do   not   leave  my   capacity   to  
touch   or   to   smell   or   to   taste   at   the   door,   nor,   once   in   the   theater,   do   I  
devote  these  senses  only  to  my  popcorn.  (2004:  64-­65).  
  
When   we   are   touched,   or   moved   by   a   film,   it   is   not   a   metaphor.   There   are  
moments  when  watching  The  Piano  in  which  Sobchack  shares  her  skin  with  the  
film   itself.  When   characters   of  Baines   (Harvey  Keitel)   and  Ada   (Holly  Hunter)  
touch,  it  is  felt  somatically,  “I  feel  not  only  my  “own”  body  but  also  Baines’s  body,  
Ada’s   body,   and   what   I   have   elsewhere   called   the   “film’s   body”  …   I   am   not  
speaking  metaphorically   of   touching  and  being   touched  at   and  by   the  movies  
but  “in  some  sense”  quite  literally  of  our  capacity  to  feel  the  world  we  see  and  
hear  onscreen  and  of  the  cinema’s  capacity  to  “touch”  and  “move”  us  offscreen.  
(2004:  66).  The  production  of  meaning,  in  this  case,  is  not  derived  from  the  film  
itself,  nor  in  the  body  of  the  spectator,  but  in  the  meeting  of  the  two  (ibid).    The  
eyes   and   ears   facilitate   an   engagement  with   the  whole   body,  whilst  watching  
the  film.    
   Laura  U.  Marks  also  argues  for  the  importance  of  touch  and  the  senses  
in   the   experience   of   consuming   media.   In   her   collection   of   essays   Touch:  
Sensuous   Theory   and   Multisensory   Media   (2002)   Marks   begins   what   she  
describes  as  a  haptic  criticism  (ix),  a  criticism  which  moves  along  the  surface  of  
an  object,  which  is  mimetic,  pressing  up  against  an  object  and  taking  its  shape  
(xiii).   Marks   applies   haptic   criticism   to   many   forms   of   media,   including   the  
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cinema.  For  Marks,  the  eye  is  like  an  organ  of  touch  (2002:  2),  which  allows  the  
viewer  to  perceive  with  all  of  the  senses,  to  think  with  the  skin,  for  example.  A  
haptic  criticism  gives  “as  much  significance  to  the  physical  presence  of  an  other  
as   to   the   mental   operations   of   symbolization.   This   is   not   a   call   to   willful  
regression  but  to  recognizing  the  intelligence  of  the  perceiving  body”  (2002:  18).  
This   film  analysis   takes   in   to  account   touch,  haptics  and   the  role  of   the  whole  
body.  Marks   also   notes   the   importance  of  what   I   have   termed  micro-­affective  
elements,   such   as   grain,   exposure,   and   changes   in   focal   length,   which   she  
terms  prohaptic  properties  (2002:  9).  Every  element  of  the  film  can  be  used  in  
the  form  of  a  haptic  analysis.  The  whole  of  the  body  and  the  whole  of  the  film  
shape  an  affective  understanding  of  the  cinematic  experience.  The  taxonomy  of  
affective   tonality   attempts   to   give   shape   to   all   of   these   elements,   so   the  
filmmaker  might  have  a   language   in  which   to  approach   film  production   from  a  
position  of  affect.  Marks  states,  “[c]ontact  with  another  language  should  deepen  
one’s  own”  (2002:  xv).  Contact  between  the  affective  properties  of  the  film  and  
the   filmmaker  will   hopefully   deepen   the   language  of   film  practice,   and  offer   a  
potential  for  a  bodily  approach  to  the  production  and  not  just  the  consumption  of  
film.    
In   the   introduction   to   the  edited  collection  Film,  Theory  and  Philosophy:  
The   Key   Thinkers,   Felicity   Colman   suggests   that   the   main   concern   of   film-­
philosophy  is  the  question  ‘what  is  the  very  nature  of  the  cinematic?’  (2009:  3).  
Outlining  an  answer  to  this  question  is  a  fundamental  element  in  understanding  
affective   tonality  as  a  way  of  conceptualizing  narratives  which  privilege  feeling  
in   cinema.   The   study   of   narrative   in   cinema   has   traditionally   concerned   itself  
with  story,  plot  and  structure.  Structure   in   its  essence   is   the  shape  of   the  film,  
the  order  in  which  events  occur:  plot  points,  character  arcs,  and  the  positioning  
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and   timing  of   ‘acts’.ii  The  study  of  narrative   from   the  perspective  of  plot,   story  
and  structure   is  not  uniquely  cinematic.  The  same  method  of  analysis  can  be  
applied  to  other  art  forms,  most  notably  literature  and  the  theatre,  as  well  as  to  
the   study  of   the   screenplay.iii  The   film   itself—the  physical   entity   comprising  of  
the  formal  elements  of  light,  sound,  movement  and  colour—is  almost  redundant  
to   the  understanding  of  narrative   from   this  perspective.  Affective   tonality,  as  a  
tool   for   understanding   what   it   is   to   narrate   in   cinema,   must   take   into  
consideration  the  formal  elements  of  film.    
The   question   posed   by   André   Bazin,   which   forms   the   title   of   the  
collection   of   his   essays  What   is   Cinema?   (2005),   is   still   fundamental.   This  
question  may  not   require  a  definitive  answer,   but   it   is   important   to   come   to  a  
consensus  on  the  basic  elements  of  cinema  if  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  
affective  narrative  is  to  be  established.  It  has  been  noted  that  Bazin’s  question  
is   itself  ontological  (Colman,  2009).   I  argue  that  understanding  the  ontology  of  
the   cinematic   image   is   dependent   upon   a   consideration   of   the   affective   tone  
produced  by  a  film,  which  results  in  a  collision  between  the  physical  make-­up  of  
the  film  and  the  physical  make-­up  of  the  film’s  spectator(s).  Drehli  Robnik  notes  
that   Jacques   Rancière   ‘locates   cinema’s   strength   in   a   kind   of   self-­abuse…  
cinema  submits   its  unique  potential,   the  material,  sensorial,   rhythmic  chaos  of  
images,   to   film   industries   with   their   representational   orders   of   genre   and  
storytelling’   (2009:  47).  To  approach  cinema  and   the  construction  of   narrative  
from  an  affective  perspective  is  to  return  to  what  Robnik  describes  as  cinema’s  
unique   potential.   Rancière’s   idea   that   the   cinematic   image   possesses   a  
potential   beyond   that   of   representation   (2006:   10)   is   supported   by   Antonin  
Artaud.  Artaud  states  that  ‘no  matter  how  deep  we  dig  into  the  mind,  we  find  at  
the  bottom  of  every  emotion,  even  an  intellectual  one,  an  affective  sensation  of  
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a  nervous  order’  (1976:  150).  Artaud  was  aware  that  the  mind  is  affected  by  the  
cinema   beyond   representation   (Powell,   2009:   65).   Artaud,   like   Rancière,  
believed  that  using  cinema  to  ‘tell  stories’  was  not  the  best  use  of  the  medium.  
For  Artaud,  the  filmmaker  that  concentrates  on  representation  only  deprives  the  
cinema  of  its  innate  ability  to  express  thought  and  the  interior  of  consciousness  
(Powell,  2009:  65).    
Hugo   Münsterberg   identifies   two   forms   of   attention   in   the   cinema:  
voluntary  and   involuntary  acts  of   attention   (Sinnerbrink,   2009:  22).  Within   this  
paradigm,  voluntary  acts  of  attention  are   those   in  which   the  audience  actively  
and  cognitively  perceives  an  image  and  a  soundtrack  in  order  to  make  meaning  
or   understand;;   involuntary   attention   occurs   at   the   moments   in   which   the  
audience’s  attention  is  caught  before  cognition  occurs,  such  as  an  explosion  or  
the  appearance  of  a  bright  light,  to  give  two  simplistic  examples.  Differentiating  
between  Münsterberg’s   two  categories  of  attention   is  useful   for  understanding  
how   an   audience   may   experience   tonality   in   the   cinema,   and   how   this  
influences   the   comprehension   of   narrative   from   an   affective   position.   In   any  
moment   during   the   duration   of   a   film   there   is   a   complex   interplay   between  
voluntary  and  involuntary  markers  of  attention.  However,  Münsterberg  suggests  
that   an   effective   film   prefers   involuntary   attention   in   order   to   engage   an  
audience   (2006),   and   as   such   an   audience   should   not   be   aware   of   the  
mechanics   of   the   cinematic   process.   This   theory   is   developed   and   expanded  
upon  by  Bordwell,  Staiger  and  Thompson  in  The  Classical  Hollywood  Cinema:  
Film   Style   and   Mode   of   Production   to   1960   (1985).   This   position   does   not,  
however,   engage   with   notions   of   representation,   and   it   approaches   the  
voluntary   and   the   involuntary   as   two   clearly   separate   and   distinct   entities,  
whereas   if   one   were   to   approach   Münsterberg’s   ideas   from   a   Bergsonian  
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perspective   it   would   become   apparent   that   the   two   forms   of   attention   are  
different  in  degree  rather  than  kind.    
Münsterberg  makes  a   film-­mind  comparison,  stating   that   film’s  ability   to  
operate   outside   the   spatial   and   temporal   boundaries   of   human  
perception/experience   is   similar   to   the   act   of   remembering   or   the   act   of  
daydreaming.   Sinnerbrink,   drawing   upon   Mark   Wicclair   (1978),   Noël   Carroll  
(1988)  and  Daniel  Frampton  (2006),  refutes  Münsterberg’s  theoretical  position,  
which  suggests   that  a   film-­mind   is  directly  analogous  to  human  perception,  by  
observing  that  the  precise  mimicry  of  memory  would  involve  the  superimposition  
of   one   image   upon   another   (Sinnerbrink,   2009:   28).   Although,   Sinnerbrink  
doubts   the   phenomenological   dimension   of   the   film-­mind   analogy,   there   are  
important   implications  of   this   idea   that  must  be   taken   into  consideration   if   it   is  
possible  to  answer  the  question  ‘what  is  cinematic?’  Cinema’s  ability  to  disrupt  
the   perceived   unity   of   space   and   time   does   not   mimic   the   phenomenon   of  
memory   in   human   experience;;   rather,   it   brings   this   experience   into   focus.  
Memory   by   its   nature   is   always   distant,   once   removed   from   the   primacy   of  
present  experience,  occurring  in  the  background  of  consciousness.  The  images  
of  memory  are  often   fuzzy  and  distant,  and  at   times  are  difficult   to   fully  grasp  
and  hold  onto.  The  perception  of  the  present  moment  often  interferes  with  and  
disrupts  these  images.  This  is  not  the  case  in  the  cinema.  A  cut  to  a  memory  in  
cinema  pushes  the  image  to  the  foreground  of  perception.  This  is  not  to  say  that  
these   images  cannot  be  fleeting;;   they  can  be,  of  course,  but   they  can  also  be  
solid   images   at   the   forefront   of   the   experience   of   the   film’s   narrative.   The  
flashback  is  the  temporal  equivalent  of  the  formal  spatial  unit  of  the  close-­up.  A  
vivid  example  of   this  can  be  seen   in  Sidney  Lumet’s  The  Pawnbroker   (1964).  
Lumet   attempted   to   recreate   the   experience   of   an   unwanted   memory   that  
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invades  the  protagonist’s  consciousness.  Lumet  describes  how  he  did  not  want  
to   straight-­cut   to   a   flashback   in   the   film;;   rather,   he   wanted   the   memory   to  
puncture  the  image  at  regular  intervals  until  finally  the  memory-­image  plays  out  
in   full.  The   first  memory-­images  are  only  on  screen   for   four   frames  at  a   time,  
which   is   only   just   long   enough   for   the   audience   to   recognize   them   (Lumet,  
1996:   158–160).   The   editing   of   flashback   sequences   in   The   Pawnbroker   is  
motivated   by   the   movements   of   the   protagonist’s   subconscious.   Scant  
information   is   given   by   the   memory-­images,   and   the   rather   sudden,   violent  
eruption   of   these   images   onto   the   screen   is   disturbing   and   disorientating,  
evoking  a  feeling  in  the  spectator  akin  to  that  of  the  protagonist.    
Parallels  here  can  be  made  with   the  work  of  Henri  Bergson.  Bergson’s  
work   can   help   to   illuminate,   from   a   philosophical   perspective,   the   body’s  
influence  on  cognition.  Although  Bergson  rarely  addressed  the  cinema  directly  
in  his  writing,  his  work  on  perception,  affect  and  sensation  can  offer  key  insight  
into  the  physical  nature  of  the  cinemagoing  experience.  His  work  also  proved  to  
be   a   great   influence   on   the   philosophy   of   Gilles   Deleuze,   and   is   especially  
significant  in  Cinema  1:  The  Movement-­Image  (1992)  and  Cinema  2:  The  Time-­
Image  (1989),  in  which  Deleuze  outlines  his  philosophy  of  the  cinema.  In  Matter  
and  Memory   (2004),  Bergson  states:   ‘nothing   really  new  could  happen  except  
through  the  medium  of  certain  particular  images,  the  type  of  which  is  furnished  
me   by   my   body’   (2004:   3).   Bergson   questions   the   hierarchical   Cartesian  
dichotomy  of  mind  and  body,  which  is  fundamental  for  approaching  cinema  from  
an  understanding  that  is  outside  linguistics  and  Saussurean  semiotics.  Bergson  
problematizes  the  notion  that  to  perceive  is  to  know,  and  notes  that  affects  and  
representations  are  different  in  degree  rather  than  in  kind  (2004:  17).  This  is  a  
key  recognition  for  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality,  as  representation  and  affect  
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do  not  need   to  be  considered  as  separate,  distinct  and  diametrically  opposed  
ontological   units.   For   Bergson,   consciousness   is   aware   of   external   sites   of  
affect   through   sensation.   However,   this   sensation   is   not   dependent   upon  
cognitive   recognition,   but   operates   alongside   consciousness,   allowing   the  
perception  of  the  continual  flow  of  affects  to  recede  and  become  known  again  at  
intermittent   intervals.   The   continual   flow   of   affective   sensations   occurs  
throughout  the  duration  of  a  film,  acting  on  the  body  of  the  spectator  at  both  a  
conscious  and  an  unconscious  level.  For  example,  the  change  of  light  levels  as  
a  figure  moves  from  the  inside  of  a  building  to  the  exterior,  or  a  change  in  colour  
in  the  mise  en  scène  of  a  shot,  produces  affective  sensations  that  often  operate  
at  an  unconscious  level,  whereas  the  affective  sensation  that  is  produced  by  the  
sudden  emergence  of  a  monstrous  figure  in  a  horror  film  is  quickly  recognized  
at   a   conscious   level.   This   play   of   affect   and   sensation   is   central   to   the  
emergence  of  the  affective  tone  of  a  cinematic  narrative.    
The  work   of   phenomenologist  Maurice  Merleau-­Ponty   is   of   use   for  my  
research,  as  his  philosophy  pays  much  attention   to   the  body   in   relation   to   the  
understanding  of  the  world.  His  monograph  The  Primacy  of  Perception  (1964a)  
is   a   significant  work   for   this   reason,   as   he   calls   into   question   the  hierarchical  
Cartesian  dichotomy  of  mind  and  body.  The  link  between  subject  and  object  is  
not  simply  a  cognitive  one,  but  has  its  roots  in  bodily  experience.  For  Merleau-­
Ponty,  meaning  is   inseparable  from  embodied  experience,  and  mental  thought  
is   tied   to   perception   and   the   body’s   encounters   with   the   physical   world.   This  
idea  is  key  to  the  formation  of  a  concept  of  cinematic  affective  tone  and  the  role  
this   tone  plays   in   the  production  of   narrative.   If   the  mind   is   linked   to   physical  
experience,   then   it   is   possible   to   approach   narrative   cinema   and   the  
understanding  of   this  cinema   from   the  perspective  of   the  play  of   rhythms  and  
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sensations   that   emerges   from   the   film   and   affects   the   body/mind   of   the  
spectator.    
Merleau-­Ponty  argues  that  for  an  audience  to  derive  meaning  from  a  film,  
the  film  must  be  taken  into  account  as  a  whole.  Helen  A.  Fielding  supports  this  
position,  stating  that  the  meaning  of  one  shot  depends  on  the  preceding  shots  
(2009:   82).   To   conceptualize   how   affect   and   formal   cinematic   elements  
influence  the  understanding  and  experience  of  a  film,  a  consideration  of  the  film  
as  a  whole   is  essential.   In   this   regard   the  experience  of  a   film   is  equal   to   the  
sum   of   its   component   parts.   Merleau-­Ponty   also   makes   the   important  
observation   that   the   senses   do   not   operate   in   separation   from  each   other.   In  
Sense  and  Non-­Sense  Merleau-­Ponty   refers   to   the   ‘normal’  subject’s  ability   to  
speak  of  the  feeling  of  colours  and  sounds,  as  though  they  were  perceived  by  
more  than  the  one  sense  at  any  one  time.  He  states:  ‘I  perceive  in  a  total  way  
with  my  whole  being;;   I  grasp  a  unique  structure  of   the   thing,  a  unique  way  of  
being,  which  speaks  to  all  of  my  senses  at  once’  (1964:  50).  To  move  from  the  
perception   of   a  moving-­image   work   to   the   understanding   of   its   structure   and  
narrative   form   is  a  process   that   involves   the   relation  of   the  whole  body  of   the  
spectator  to  the  whole  body  of  the  film.  The  role  of  the  body  and  the  senses  in  
cognition   is   widely   accepted   in   the   broad   field   of   film   studies,   but   the  
relationship  of  the  body  to  the  understanding  of  narrative  is  an  area  that  has  yet  
to   be   fully   explored.   Helen   F.   Fielding   presents   a   Merleau-­Pontian  
phenomenological  account  of  the  experience  of  the  cinema  that  is  counter  to  an  
understanding   of   cinema  built   around   concepts   of   representation:   ‘all   parts   of  
the   film—for   example   dialogue,   music   and   shots—should   work   not   towards  
translating  emotions  but  towards  giving  them  an  existence  in  our  own  bodies.  In  
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fact,   film   as   art   does   not   replicate   or   represent   reality;;   rather,   in   creating,   it  
brings  new  meanings  into  being’  (2009:  86).    
  
Merleau-­Ponty   aligned   cinema   with   the   formal   aspects   of   poetry   and  
literature,  yet  despite   this  he  still  expressed   the  notion   that   the   ‘meaning’  of  a  
film  ‘is  incorporated  into  its  rhythm’  (1964:  57).  The  cinema  of  affective  tonality  
aims   to   use   the   formal,   rhythmic   elements   of   cinema   to   bring   emotions   into  
existence  in  our  own  bodies.iv  
A   dominant   framework   in   structuralist   and   post-­structuralist   image  
analysis  has  been  semiotics,  and  it  is  necessary  to  examine  different  modes  of  
semiotic   analysis   in   relation   to   cinema   in   order   to   understand   the   role   of  
affective   tonality   in   producing   narrative.   Ferdinand   de   Saussure   posited   the  
theory  of  the  nature  of  the  linguistic  sign  (1983)  in  which  language  is  not  just  a  
naming  system,  but  a  system  of  signs  that  unite  ‘a  concept  and  a  sound  image’  
(1983:  65).  He  termed  the  linguistic  sign  the  ‘signifier’,  and  the  concept  that  the  
sign  represents  the  ‘signified’.  For  Saussure,  the  link  between  the  signifier  and  
the   signified   is   arbitrary,   and   has   little   to   do   with   phonetic   qualities.   A  
Saussurean   semiotic   approach   to   film   theory   has   been   widely   used   within  
academia,  but   it  has   its   limitations,  as  highlighted  by  Shaviro  (1993),  Kennedy  
(2000)   and   Frampton   (2006).   Shaviro   points   out   that   linguistic   modes   of  
semiotics  trap  film  studies  within  the  didactic  and  reductive  paradigms  of  post-­
Enlightenment   and   structuralist  modes   of   thought   (1993:   ix).   The  Saussurean  
approach,   despite   its   merits,   limits   the   study   of   film   to   the   linguistic,   and   to  
representation.   It   is   in   effect   a   Cartesian   approach   that   does   not   take   into  
account  the  role  of  the  body  and  the  senses,  and  that  privileges  a  cognitive  and  
textual  approach  to  analysis.    
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Charles  Sanders  Peirce  put   forth   the  concept  of   the  non-­linguistic  sign,  
divisible  into  three  types:  icon,  index  and  symbol  (1960:  135).  An  icon  is  a  sign  
that  refers  to  an  object  by  virtue  of  the  character  of  the  particular  sign.  An  index  
is  a  sign  that  has  no  relationship  to  its  object,  but  has  a  direct  relationship  with  
physical  space.  As  Peirce  states:   ‘If  A  points  his   finger  at   the  fire,  his   finger   is  
dynamically  connected  with  the  fire…  while   it  also  forces  the  eyes  of  B  to  turn  
that  way’  (1960:  170).  The  indexical  sign  of  A’s  finger  is  an  affective  sign,  rather  
than  a   linguistic  one.   It  not  only  operates  on  a  cognitive   level,  but  also  affects  
bodies  physically   in  space.  A  symbol   is  a  sign  that  constitutes  another  sign  by  
cultural  agreement.  The  triadic  nature  of  Peirce’s  semiotics  is  important  for  my  
research,  as  it  opens  the  way  for  filmic  markers  such  as  light,  sound,  movement  
and   colour   to   be   approached   as   affective   signs.   The   triad   also   disrupts   the  
binary  relations  of  the  representational  sign,  allowing  the  film  to  be  approached  
outside  of  culturally  defined  paradigms  of  meaning.    
In   The   Responsibility   of   Forms   (1985)   Roland   Barthes   identifies   three  
levels   of   meaning   within   a   cinematic   image:   a   level   of   communication,   a  
symbolic   level,   and   a   third,   signifying   (signifiance)   level   that   transcends  
meaning  (1985:  42).  The  latter  is  a  meaning  that  Barthes  also  terms  ‘obtuse’  in  
that   it   is   greater   than   narrative   meaning   and   ‘extends   beyond   culture,  
knowledge,   information’   (1985:   44).  Barthes’   third  meaning   is   significant,   as   it  
too   opens   up   the   filmic   plane   to   an   interpretation   that   is   not   dependent   on  
representation.   If,   for   example,   a   ray   of   light   that   hits   the   rim   of   a   glass   in   a  
frame  of  film  or  video  can  be  seen  as  an  obtuse,  non-­signified,  element  of  the  
image,   it   is   then   possible   to   begin   to   look   at   this   element   of   the   image   as   a  
filmic/affective  note  forming  part  of  a  composition  that  can  be  described  as  part  
of   the   affective   tone   of   a   film,   with   the   capacity   to   alter   the   ontology   of   the  
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spectator.  Barthes  too  had  an   interest   in   the  body’s  role   in   the  perception  and  
understanding  of  cinema.  For  Barthes,  however,   the  body’s  response  to  a  film  
hinders  a  pure  relationship  with  the  mind  and  ‘text  as  sign’  (Gardner,  2009:  111).  
Despite  Barthes’  semiotic,  systematic  approach   to   the  analysis  of   film  as   text,  
there   are   elements   of   his   work   that   are   particularly   useful   for   an   affective  
approach  to  the  understanding  of  cinema  as  an  art  form.  I  refer  in  particular  to  
the   ‘third   meaning’   in   his   semiotic   system:   that   obtuse   image,   the   signifier  
without  the  signified.    
To  return  to  Deleuze,  Cinema  1:  The  Movement-­Image  (1992)—his  first  
major   work   on   cinema,   in   which   cinema   is   approached   as   a   new   mode   of  
philosophical   thought—is   important   to  my  research  due   to  Deleuze’s   theory  of  
affect  and  his  attempts  to  mobilize  philosophy  through  cinema.  Through  my  own  
research  practice   I   attempt   to  produce  a   film   that  becomes   theory   through   its  
physical   interaction  with   a   spectator.   The   practice   component   of  my   research  
incorporates  an  emergent  theoretical  position,  specifically  that  film  can  become  
thought  and   influence  the  thought  process  through  the   juxtaposition  of  various  
affective   elements   within   the   filmic   plane.   Deleuze’s   concept   of   affect,   and  
cinema’s  ability  to  be  affective,  is  key  to  questioning  ideas  of  representation  and  
mimesis  in  film.  Affect,  for  Deleuze,  happens  beyond  all  morality  and  cognition.  
In   this  case   it   is  an  act  of   violence   to  which   the  body,  which   incorporates   the  
mind,  is  subjected  when  it  is  placed  in  front  of  the  cinema  screen.  Light,  colour,  
sound   and  movement   are   not   solely   sites   of   representation,   but   are   affectual  
characters  of  varying   intensity  acting  across  a   filmic  plane.  By   freeing  cinema  
from   theories   of   representation,   Deleuze   has   opened   up   a   space   in   which  
cinema  can  become  theory  whilst  narrative  can  emerge  from  affect.    
  
	   33  
A  rejection  of   three-­act  structure  and   linearity  can  be   found   in  narrative  
cinema   through  what  Warren  Buckland   terms  complex   storytelling  and  puzzle  
films   (2009),   as   well   as   through   films   that   privilege   affect   and   sensation.  
Buckland   argues   that   the   fragmented   experience   of   consuming   new  media   is  
mirrored   in   “Contemporary   Puzzle   Films”   (1:   2009).   The   edited   collection,  
Puzzle  Films:  Complex  Storytelling   in  Contemporary  Cinema   (Buckland,  2009)  
presents   a   cycle   of   films   beginning   in   the   1990s   that   go   beyond   Aristotelian  
linearity  and  Aristotle’s  concept  of  the  complex  plot.  For  Buckland,  puzzle  films  
“blur   the   boundaries   between   different   levels   of   reality,   are   riddled  with   gaps,  
deception,  labyrinthine  structures,  ambiguity,  and  overt  coincidences”  (2009:  6).  
The  films’  narrators  are  often  unreliable,  due  to  schizophrenia,  memory  loss  or  
death,  and  these  puzzle  films  “cut  across  traditional  filmmaking  practices”  (ibid).    
These  films  complicate  the  viewing  experience,  and  result  in  a  more  cognitively  
attuned  engagement  with  narrative  cinema.  Whilst  Buckland  identified  a  cycle  of  
puzzle   films   emerging   in   the   1990s,   Martine   Beugnet   identified   a   cycle   of  
French   films   that   privileged   affect   and   sensation,   which   emerged   during   the  
same  period.   In  her  monograph,  Cinema  and  Sensation:  French  Film  and   the  
Art  of  Transgression  (2007)  Beugnet  examines  a  series  of  filmmaking  practices  
that  give  precedence  to  cinema  as  a  medium  of  the  senses.  She  has  identified  
an  “emergence  of  a  contemporary  cinema  of  sensation…  evidenced  by  a  batch  
of   films  which  betray  a  characteristic  sensibility   to  and  awareness  of  cinema’s  
sensuous   impact  and   transgressive  nature”   (2009:  14).  She  argues   that   these  
films  allow  the  spectator  to  “open  oneself  to  sensory  awareness  and  let  oneself  
be   physically   affected   by   an   art   work”   (2009:   3),   and   that   this   experience   is  
inherently   transgressive,   as   one   ceases   to   attempt   to   gain   mastery   over   the  
narrative,  and  to  understand  the  plot.  Similarly,  in  Carl  Plantinga’s  monograph,  
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Moving   Viewers:   American   Film   and   the   Spectator’s   Experience   (2009)   the  
author   considers   the   importance   of   affect   in   mainstream   American   narrative  
fiction  films  (2009:  6).  He  terms  cinema  “the  sensual  medium”  (112),  and  argues  
against   terminology   that   suggests   films   are   “read”   (ibid).   However,   Plantinga  
values   cognitive  methods   in   affectual   analysis,   and   he   does   not   consider   the  
two  methods  to  be  dialogically  opposed.  He  calls  his  theory  of  affect,  “cognitive-­
perceptual”  in  order  to  bring  theories  of  cognition  into  affect  studies  (2009:  8).  In  
this   regard,   Plantinga’s   approach   to   narrative   cinema   bridges   Buckland’s  
analysis  of  complex  narratives  and  Beugnet’s  engagement  with  sensation  and  
transgression.   Plantinga   argues   that   emotions   are   an   aspect   of   a   spectator’s  
affective  response  to  cinema,  which  is  elicited  through  the  structural  features  of  
the  film  (2009:  11).  All  three  authors  examine  a  range  of  contemporary  narrative  
films   that  either  employ  complex  structures   that  go  beyond  Aristotle’s  analysis  
of   narrative,   affective   narratives   that   are   concerned   with   sensation   over  
narration,  or  as  Plantinga  argues,  that  the  response  to  a  film  is  dependent  upon  
(at  least)  a  combination  of  context  and  stimuli  (2009:  16).  The  films  produced  in  
conjunction  with   this   thesis   do  not   employ  what  Buckland  would   call   complex  
storytelling,  but   they  do  present  a  narrative  that  has  to  be  unlocked.  However,  
Practice  i-­iv  have  to  be  unlocked  through  the  body  and  an  engagement  with  the  
senses,   rather   than   through   cognitive   interpretation.   That   is   not   to   say   that   a  
cognitive   interpretation   is   not   possible.   The   papers   presented   in   Buckland’s  
edited   collection   offer   a   comprehensive   exploration   of   narrative   structure   and  
comprehension  outside  of  traditional  linearity,  and  these  methods  may  well  offer  
an  alternate  entry  point  into  my  own  practice.        
Films  that  appear  to  privilege  affect  over  traditional  narrative  storytelling  
are   in  existence  and  have  been   for   some   time.  The   films  of   Jean  Epstein,  as  
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well   as   the   films   of   Jean   Vigo,   epitomise   a   style   of   filmmaking   in   which   an  
affective,   tonal  quality   is  key   to   the  experience  of  cinema.  As  noted,  Epstein’s  
notion   of   photogénie   emerges   through   his   own   practice.      The   films   of  
Michelangelo  Antonioni  and  Andrei  Tarkovsky  are  famed  for  their  privileging  of  
mood   and   atmosphere.   More   recently,   Lucy   Bolton   has   identified   Jane  
Champion,   Lynne   Ramsey   and   Sofia   Copola,   as   filmmakers   who   express  
female   consciousness   through   a   phenomenological   lens   (2011).   Derek  
Jarman’s  Blue  is  an  example  of  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality  in  which  the  image  
is  reduced  to  an  extreme,  basic  component,  a  single  block  of  colour.  The  titular  
blue  of   the   film   is,  however,  accompanied  by  a   rich  and  complex  soundscape  
that   is   capable   of   evoking   many   images   in   the   body   of   the   viewer.   Andrew  
Wilson  describes   the  visuals  of   the   film  as  consisting  of  a  single  static  shot  of  
the   colour   blue   (2013).   The   experience   of   watching   the   film   does   not  
correspond   so   neatly  with  Wilson’s   description,   however.   Sobchack  writes   on  
the   experience   of   her   graduate   students   whilst   watching   Blue   (2012).   She  
describes  the  changes  to  the  quality  of  the  image  which  occur  over  of  the  film’s  
duration,   arguing   that   “[t]he   tonal   and   affective   qualities   and   the   depth   or  
flatness   of   the   blue   field   change   with   the   music”   (2012:   198).   Viewers   of  
Jarman’s  film  see  differing  colours  and  the  eye  plays  tricks,  and  the  vibration  of  
the  screen  and   the  scratches  on   the   film   take  on  a   life  outside  of   themselves  
(ibid).  The  blue  in  Jarman’s  film  is  not  static,  but  alive,  pulsing,  almost  in  rhythm  
with   the   constitution   of   the   viewer.   Jarman   is   not   a   filmmaker  who   is   easy   to  
categorise.  His  films  shot  on  super-­8mm  film  would  fairly  be  described  as  artist  
film,   but   some   of   his  most   famous   works,   Jubilee   (1979),  Caravaggio   (1986)  
and   Wittgenstein   (1993)   are   works   of   narrative   cinema.   Michael   O’Pray  
describes   him   as   simply   as   a   filmmaker,   but   also   a   “writer   of   distinction,   an  
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important  painter,  a  music  video  maker,  an   instillation  artist,  a  set  designer,  a  
champion  of  the  gay  community  and  an  original  gardener”  (1996:  7).  There  are  
elements   of   narrative   drive   to   Blue,   but   it   would   be   best   described   as   an  
instillation   film,   despite   its   screening   in   cinemas.   However,   Jarman’s   film   is  
perhaps   the   purest   expression   of   what   I   would   consider   to   be   a   cinema   of  
affective  tonality.  
There  are  many  directors  working  in  narrative  cinema  who  employ  forms  
and  styles  that  challenge  linear  narratives  and  focus  on  affective  cinema.  Noted  
directors  working  in  the  21st  Century,  such  as  Shane  Carruth,  Harmony  Korine,  
Apichatpong  Weerasethakul,  Andrea  Arnold   and   Joanna  Hogg  are   all  making  
films  that  I  would  categorise  as  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.  Sobchack  evokes  
the   “kinetic,   redolent,   resonant,   and   sometimes   even   taste-­full   descriptions   of  
the  film  experience”  (2004:  54)  found  in  writing  on  film  in  the  popular  press  as  
an   entry   point   to   discussing   her   affective,   bodily   experience   of   engaging  with  
the  cinema.  Similar  descriptions  can  be  found  of  the  work  of  the  contemporary  
filmmakers  mentioned  above.  Critics  and  viewers  of  Carruth’s  work  often  voice  
their   difficulties   in   comprehending   the   stories   and   narrative   presented   in   the  
films,  whilst  they  highlight  the  sensual  and  affective  qualities  of  the  film.  Writing  
on   Upstream   Color   (2013),   Peter   Bradshaw   comments   on   the   “affectless  
mystery   and   chill…   with   woozy,   dreamlike   passages”   (2013),   and   Jonathan  
Romney   describes   it   as   “an   intensely   strange   and   seductive   film”   (2013:   51).  
Writing  on  the  work  of  Apichatpong  Weerasethakul,  Adrian  Martin  states  that  his  
films  have  a  magic   logic,  and   that   the  stories   “repeat,  start  over,   loop  around,  
forming  a  striking  pattern”   (2010:  17),  whilst  Romney  describes  his  work  as  a  
“semi-­abstract  bath  of  feelgood  reverie”  (2010:  77).  Joanna  Hogg’s  films,  on  the  
other  hand,  are  less  abstract  than  Weerasethakul’s  films,  at  least  for  a  western  
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audience,  but  equally  as  affecting.  Critics  define  Hogg’s   films  as  middle  class  
dramas  (Roddick,  2011:  13,  Tracy,  2014,  62),  or  in  relation  to  Unrelated  (2007),  
“a   finely   tuned   study   of   bourgeois   manners”   (Wheatley,   2008:   10).   Hogg’s  
thematic   concerns   are   easily   identifiable,   and   her   characters   are   categorised  
first   and   foremost   in   terms   of   class.   The   narrative   drive   of   her   work   is   more  
opaque,  however.  Bradshaw  describes  Exhibition  (2013)  as  an  enigma  (2014),  
echoing   the   language   used   in   Buckland’s  Puzzle   Films   (2009).   As   Bradshaw  
notes,  the  film  is  “uninterested  in  the  structural  conventions  of  narrative”  (ibid).  
Hogg’s  steady  camera,  measured  pacing  and  perfectly  balanced  compositions  
evoke   a   feeling   of   unease   and   oppressive   quietude.   Bradshaw   goes   on   to  
describe   the   film  as   “glacial”  and   “refrigerated”   (ibid),  whilst  Romney   imagines  
the  film  as  a  mixed  media  artwork  in  a  gallery  setting  composed  of  “light,  space,  
sound,   desperation,   quietness”   (2014:   43).   The   sharp   lines   of   the   house   in  
which   the   film   is   set   frame   the   characters,   but,   as   Chris   Darke   argues,   “the  
surfaces  and   lines  of   the  house   itself…  becomes  a  character   in   its  own   right”  
(2013:   61).   Hogg   describes   her   motivation   for   directing   films   as   a   desire   to  
express  feelings,  stating  that  before  she  started  directing  feature  films  that  she  
hadn’t  “expressed  those  feelings  I  feel  very  intensely”  (Adams,  2014),  and  it   is  
through   the   affective   resonance   of   her   films   that   these   intense   feelings   are  
communicated  to  the  spectator.    
The   characters   populating  Andrea  Arnold’s   films   come   from   a   different  
social   class,   and   her   roving,   kinetic   camera   is   the   antithesis   to   Hogg’s   calm,  
measured   lens.  Arnold’s   first   three   feature   films,  Red  Road   (2006),  Fish  Tank  
(2009),  and  Wuthering  Heights  (2011)  all  express  a  bodily  engagement  with  the  
characters.   In   Red   Road,   Jackie   (Kate   Dickie)   monitors   security   cameras  
looking  over  the  Red  Road  estate  in  Glasgow.  The  video  images  display  images  
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of   bodies   spitting,   urinating   and   copulating,   and   the   low   resolution   analogue  
images   evoke   what   Marks   terms   haptic   visuality,   in   which   the   viewer’s,   both  
Jackie’s  and  the  spectator’s,  tactile  vision  moves  over  the  surface  of  the  image,  
invited   to   graze   rather   than   gaze   (Marks,   2000:   161).   This   visuality   is  
accentuated   through   the   cinematography   in   which   the   CCTV   screens   are  
framed   in   extreme   close-­up,   as   the   camera  moves   across   the   surface   of   the  
image.   Fish   Tank’s   protagonist,   Mia   (Katie   Farvis)   moves   through   her   milieu  
with   intensity,   and   the   camera   follows  with  a  dynamic  urgency   to  match.   Lisa  
Mullen   describes   her   as   a   shark,   “swimming   in   frustrated   circles”   (2009:   16).  
Heathcliff   (Solomon  Glave/	   James  Howson)  and  Cathy   (Shannon  Beer/	   Kaya  
Scodelario)   move   through   the   rugged,   countryside   landscape   of   Arnold’s  
Wuthering   Heights   with   an   intensity   equal   to   Fish   Tank’s   Mia.   Kate   Stables  
considers  the  landscape  to  be  a  character  in  the  film  (2011:  82),  but  unlike  the  
ordered,  distant  landscape  in  Hogg’s  Exhibition,  this  is  a  wild  landscape  framed  
in  extreme  close-­up,  macro  photography.  The  accompanying  wind  and  birdsong  
emanating  from  the  soundtrack  seems  to  seep  through  the  lens,  as  the  extreme  
shallow   focus   makes   it   difficult   to   pick   out   details   clearly.   The   skin   of   the  
characters  is  framed  in  a  similar  style,  making  the  spectator  viscerally  aware  of  
the   movement   of   bodies   in   the   frame.   The   narratives   of   Arnold’s   films   are  
coherent  and  clear,  but  the  movement  and  tone  of  the  films  invite  the  spectator  
to  experience  them  through  the  body.    
In  Spring  Breakers   (2012)  Harmony  Korine  sends  his  young  characters  
through   a   neon   landscape   that   Michael   Chaiken   describes   as   a   “spiraling,  
intoxicated   dream”   (2013:   31).   The   intoxicating   feel   of   watching   the   film   is  
evoked   through   the  colour  pallette  of   luminous  pinks,  greens  and  purples,   the  
floating  stedicam  cinematography  and  a  structure  and  editing  style  that  Steven  
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Shaviro   has   termed   post-­continuity   (2012).   Korine   describes   the   narrative   as  
liquid,  tonal  and  about  a  culture  of  surfaces,  despite  the  film  having  a  clear  plot  
(2013).  The  director  states  that  he  wanted  to  make  a  film  that  could  be  a  post-­
narrative,   “something   that   is   inexplicable…more   like  a   feeling”   (ibid).  Shaviro’s  
conceptualisation  of  post-­continuity  is  a  style  that  privileges  immediate  effects  of  
any  kind  of  continuity  “whether  on  the  immediate  shot-­by-­shot   level,  or  on  that  
of  the  overall  narrative”  (2012).  Jason  Lariviere  describes  the  application  of  this  
editing   technique   in  Spring  Breakers  as  a   “premonitory   trance   [that]  privileges  
the   immediate   effect/affect   of   shots   at   the   expense   of   global   narrative  
considerations”  (2013).  Spring  Breakers   follows  many  conventions  of   the  heist  
genre  film,  including  a  classical  three  act  structure,  but  the  overall  affective  tone  
produced  over   the  duration  of   the  film  creates  a  hallucinatory   feel,  which   is   its  
most  distinctive  feature.    
The   films  discussed  above   can  be   considered  difficult   for   audiences   to  
comprehend,  but,   because  of   the  varied   formal   techniques  used,   they  can  be  
experienced   through   the   body.   Martin   describes   Weerasethakul’s   oeuvre   as  
“hard   and   demanding   on   many   run-­of-­the-­mill   filmgoers”   (2010:   16).   This   is  
because  the  films’  narratives  are  difficult   to  decode  within  a  classical  narrative  
framework.  Sobchack  also  describes  Upstream  Color  as  a  difficult  film,  but  this  
is  so,  only  because  we  try  to  make  sense  of  the  film.  She  explains  that  “we  are  
used   to  most  narrative   films  adding  up,  meaning  something  and  giving  us   the  
wherewithal   to  answer   the  question:  "What  was   it  all  about?"”   (2014:  50).  She  
goes  on  to  clearly  describe  narrative  meaning  in  contemporary  western  culture:    
Narrative   meaning   in   our   culture   is   thus   generally   understood   as   a  
cognitive   and   cumulative   enchaining   of   events   through   cause   and   effect  
that  is  ultimately  reflective-­that  is,  an  after-­the-­fact  mode  of  making  sense.  
In   film   narrative,   given   dominant   conventions,   we   tend   to   expect   such  
meaning   to   be   generated   not   only   by   dramatized   and   consequentially  
linked   plot   events   (whether   ordered   sequentially   or   not),   but   also   by  
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characters,  whose  actions  and  dialogue  are  understood  as  psychologically  
motivated  (2014:  52).  
  
For  Sobchack,  problems  arise  when  approaching  Upstream  Color  as  a  narrative  
when   it   is  more   like  verse,  driven  as   it   is   “by  ellipses   -­  by  discrete  sequences  
that   condense  moments   in   time   -­   and   the   associational   and   rhythmic   logic   of  
poetry   (53).  Carruth  himself   is   interested   in  pushing   the   form  of  narrative,  and  
that  he   “hates  even   the   idea  of  a  synopsis”   (Lim,  2013).  Sobchack   recalls   the  
Q&A  session  after   the   film’s  premiere  at   the  Sundance  Film  Festival   “when  a  
viewer  asked  Carruth,  "What   is  your  movie  about?"  his  sincere  answer  was:  "I  
don't  know."”  (2014:  51).  The  director’s  inability  to  define  the  film  neatly  in  words  
echoes  Plantinga’s  argument  that  “reading  a  film”  mischaracterizes  the  viewing  
process   as   literary,   with   the   effect   of   distracting   us   from   the   medium’s  
sometimes  disavowed  quality,  namely,  that  film  is  a  powerful  sensual  medium”  
(2009:   112).   A   filmmaking   practice   that   privileges   affective   tonality,   or   what  
Sobchack  described  as  a  poetry,  is  to  be  felt,  rather  than  read.    
One  of  the  central  concerns  for  affect  studies  is  the  response  of  the  body  
to  external   stimuli,   a   concern   that   has   influenced   the   fields  of   philosophy,   the  
humanities   and   the   social   sciences.   The   effect   of   art   on   the   brain   is   also   of  
concern   in   the   natural   sciences.   The   neuroscientist   Simir   Zeki   takes   a   keen  
interest  in  the  arts  in  his  monograph  Inner  Vision:  An  Exploration  of  Art  and  the  
Brain   (1999).   Here,   Zeki   argues   that   all   work   on   aesthetics   must   take   into  
account   the  role  of   the  brain.  For  Zeki,   ‘all  visual  art   is  expressed   through   the  
brain   and   therefore   must   obey   the   laws   of   the   brain,   whether   in   conception,  
execution  or  appreciation,  and  no   theory  of  aesthetics   that   is  not  substantially  
based  on  the  activity  of  the  brain  is  ever  likely  to  be  complete  without  it’  (1999:  
1).   Zeki   notes   that   the   brain   responds   differently   to   different   stimuli.   Certain  
	   41  
areas  of  the  brain  will  respond  to  the  colour  red,  for  example,  whilst  other  areas  
of   the  brain  will   respond  to  green,  blue,  etc.   It   is  also  worthy  of  note   that  Zeki  
finds  it  necessary  to  comment  on  the  discovery  of  opponency,  in  which  certain  
cells  in  the  visual  brain  will  be  excited  by  black  but  inhibited  by  white,  excited  by  
red  but   inhibited  by  green,  or  excited  by  blue  but   inhibited  by  yellow,  and  vice  
versa.   Zeki   states   that   different   parts   of   the   human  brain   respond   to   different  
external   stimuli   in   different   ways.   ‘A   [visual   brain]   cell  might,   for   example,   be  
selective  for  colour,  responding  to  red,  but  not  to  other  colours’  (Zeki,  1999:  60).  
Zeki’s   research   into   the  responses  of   the  brain  gives  an   insight   into  how   light,  
colour,  sound,  etc.  can  be  used  in  cinema  to  stimulate  the  brain  in  a  certain  way  
in  order  to  provoke  a  specific  physical  response,  akin  to  using  certain  colours  to  
play  certain  notes  on  the  musical  instrument  that  is  the  human  nervous  system.  
This  knowledge  has  repercussions  for  the  concept  of  affective  tonality  within  the  
cinema,  and  for  the  working  methods  of  practitioners  within  the  field  of  moving  
image.  The  potential  of  Zeki’s  science   to   influence   film   theory  was  highlighted  
by   Barbara   Kennedy   in   Deleuze   and   Cinema:   The   Aesthetics   of   Sensation  
(2000),  albeit  only  in  a  footnote.  Kennedy’s  work  takes  into  account  the  role  of  
affect  and  the  body  in  understanding  cinema,  but  it  does  not  look  at  how  affect  
works   holistically   across   the   duration   of   a   film,   or   at   how   this   relates   to   the  
understanding  of  the  experiential  nature  of  narrative  cinema.    
Kennedy’s   application   of   research   within   the   field   of   natural   sciences,  
albeit  minor,   is   characteristic   of   a  move   towards   a   desire   for   an   exchange   of  
ideas   between   the   fields   of   film   studies   and   natural   sciences,   which   is  
characteristic   of   both   Bergson   and   Massumi,   and   which   found   a   structured  
outlet   in   the   emergence   of   the   humanities-­based   journal   Projections:   The  
Journal   for  Movies  and  Mind   in  2007.  The  aim  of   the   journal   is   to   ‘facilitate  a  
	   42  
dialogue   between   people   in   the   sciences   and   the   humanities,   and   bring   the  
study   of   film   to   the   forefront   of   contemporary   intellectual   debate’   (Berghahn  
Journals  Projections,   2016).   A   key   paper  was   published   in   the   summer   2008  
volume   entitled   Neurocinematics:   The   Neuroscience   of   Film,   in   which   the  
authors  attempt   to  bring   together  cognitive  neuroscience  and   film  studies   in  a  
way   that   assesses   brain   activity   during   the   process   of   watching   a   film.   The  
authors   argue   that   this   interdisciplinary   method   will   provide   a   quantitative  
assessment  of   the  effects  of  certain   types  of   films.  Their   findings  demonstrate  
that  certain   formal  methods  of   film  practice,  such  as  framing  and  editing,  yield  
greater   control   over   brain   activity   than   others,   and   they   believe   that   these  
findings  can  have  positive  uses  for  film  studies  and  industrialized  filmmaking.    
Brian  Massumi,  writing  on  movement,   affect   and   sensation   in  Parables  
for  the  Virtual  (2002),  made  a  similar  claim,  but  this  time  for  the  importance  of  
science   in   the   humanities,   stating   that   ‘poaching’   from   the   sciences   whilst  
respecting  the  affect  of  science  can  force  a  change  in  the  humanities,  the  point  
being   ‘to  borrow  from  science   in  order   to  make  a  difference   in   the  humanities’  
(2002:  20–21).  Here  Massumi  is  referring  to  the  affective  turn  in  the  humanities  
(from  which  this  research  project  stems)  and  the  way  in  which  science  may  offer  
insights   into   the   body’s   relation   to   cognition   and   experience.   The   use   of  
research   from   the   hard   sciences   has   positive   ramifications   for   understanding  
the   concept   of   affective   tonality.   The   field   of   neuroscience   has   offered  many  
useful  insights  into  the  field  of  affect,  illuminating  for  the  arts  and  humanities  the  
ways   in   which   the   brain   responds   to   external   stimuli   and   how   this   affects  
cognition.    
Gilles  Deleuze   incorporates   the  empiricism  of  Bergson   into  many  of  his  
own   ideas  on   the  cinema.  His  major  work  on  Bergson,  Bergsonism   (Deleuze,  
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1991),  is  intended  as  a  return  to  and  re-­examination  of  the  philosophy  of  Henri  
Bergson.   Deleuze   identifies   three   main   features   that   he   considers   to   be   of  
greatest  import  for  a  return  to  Bergson:  intuition,  science  and  metaphysics,  and  
multiplicities   (1991:   115).   Deleuze   highlights   the   importance   of   intuition   as   a  
method  that  would  provide  a  basis  for  identifying  false  problems  in  order  to  find  
the   underlying   nature   of   problems,   ‘which   leads   to   the   proper   posing   of   a  
problem,   in   such  a  way   that   the  solution   itself   depends  on   it’   (Deleuze,  1991:  
116).  Deleuze   then   points   to   the   role  metaphysics   can   play   in   science,   citing  
Bergson’s  consideration  of  Einstein’s  theory  of  relativity  for  his  work  in  Duration  
and  Simultaneity:  Bergson  and   the  Einsteinian  Universe   (Bergson,   1999).  For  
both  Bergson  and  Deleuze,  philosophy  can  illuminate  the  natural  sciences  in  a  
way   that   adds   an   extra   dimension   that   would   otherwise   be   lacking—that   of  
intuition  (Deleuze,  1991:  117–118).    
The   link   between   the   natural   sciences   and   the   humanities   is  
strengthened   further   through   the   publication   of   three   monographs   by   clinical  
neuroscientist   Antonio   Damasio:   The   Feeling   of   What   Happens:   Body   and  
Emotion   in   the   Making   of   Consciousness   (1999),   Looking   for   Spinoza:   Joy,  
Sorrow,  and   the  Feeling  Brain   (2004),  and  Descartes’  Error:  Emotion,  Reason  
and  the  Human  Brain  (2006).  Whereas  Zeki’s  work  prioritizes  the  brain’s  role  in  
vision   and   the   perception   of   art,  Damasio’s  work   conceptualizes   emotion   and  
affect   in  the  process  of  cognition.  For  Damasio,  a  person’s  emotions  and  their  
ability   to   comprehend   the  affective  nature  of   the  world   are  essential   facets   of  
consciousness:   if   these   embodied   experiences   are   impaired,   then   it   will   no  
longer   be   possible   for   an   individual   to   form   conscious   thought   patterns.   This  
theory  is  at  the  centre  of  Descartes’  Error  (2006),   in  which  Damasio  questions  
René  Descartes’   dualism   (1996)   and   the  dominance  of   the  cogito   in   both   the  
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natural  sciences  and  the  humanities.  Damasio  begins  to  outline  this  idea  in  The  
Feeling   of   What   Happens   (1999),   in   which   he   argues   that   consciousness   is  
consciousness  of   feeling,  and   that  being  arises  out  of  emotion.   In  Looking   for  
Spinoza   (2004)  Damasio  mobilizes   the  philosophy  of  Baruch  Spinoza   in  order  
to   explore   the   nature   of   feelings   from   a   neurological   perspective.   Damasio  
demonstrates  how  emotion  and  the  role  of  the  senses  play  a  part  in  the  ability  
to  reason,  and  how  a   lack  of  emotion  seriously   impairs  this  ability,  stating  that  
emotion  is  in  fact  a  ‘direct  sensing  of  our  own  body  states’  (1994:  96).  This  is  a  
theory   that   has   direct   implications   for   the   concept   of   affective   tonality   within  
narrative  cinema.   If,   for  example,  a   film  can  be  described  as  either  uplifting  or  
depressing   on   an   emotional   level,   it   is   necessary   to   examine   how   these  
emotions   are   produced.   The   question   is   how   to   describe   such   emotions   in   a  
language  different  from  textual  patterns.  Following  Damasio,  I  will  put  forth  the  
argument   that   these   emotions   (depression,   joy,   emotions   in   between,   or   a  
combination   of   emotions)   are   a   sensing   of   body   states   caused   by   a   bodily  
synergy  with  the  affective  elements  of  the  film  itself.  
The   preoccupation   with   the   body   in   the   natural   sciences   has   been  
mirrored  in  the  humanities  in  what  Brian  Massumi  has  termed  the  affective  turn  
(2002:  1–5).  For  Michael  Hardt  (2002)  the  affective  turn  marks  a  shift  in  cultural  
studies   from   a   concern   with   language   to   issues   of   the   body   and   emotions,  
which  was  first  extensively  explored  in  feminist  theory  and  queer  theory  before  
being   explored   in  many   other   areas   of   the   humanities   and   the   arts,   including  
film   and   moving-­image   studies.   In   How   a   Film   Theory   Got   Lost,   and   Other  
Mysteries  in  Cultural  Studies  (2001)  Robert  Ray  notes  that  film  theory  emerged  
out  of  two  traditions,  photogénie  and  fetishism.  The  first  of  these  two  traditions  
has  a  concern  with  what  Jean  Epstein  described  as   ‘the  purest  expression  of  
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cinema’  (1988:  138–139),  in  which  power  and  meaning  are  held  in  the  beauty  of  
the   image.   Fetishism,   on   the   other   hand,   considers  meaning   from   a  mimetic,  
language-­based  point  of  view,  and  is  more  closely  aligned  with  psychoanalytic  
film  theory.  I  position  my  research  closer  to  the  tradition  of  photogénie,  as  I  am  
researching  the  physical,  affective  nature  of  the  image  in  an  area  that  Theodor  
Adorno  described  as  the  ‘the  crossroads  of  magic  and  positivism’  (1980:  129).    
As   shown   above,   the   role   of   affect   and   the   body   in   film   theory   and  
analysis  has  been  well  documented  and  discussed.  What   is  apparent   is  that  a  
holistic   play   of   affect   across   the   body   of   a   film   is   missing   from   the   debate.  
Moreover,   there   is   little  discussion  of  how  affect  can   inform  film  practice.  Mica  
Nava  comments  on  the  importance  of  affect  for  practitioners:  ‘The  specificity  of  
affect  could  well  prove  a  useful  concept   for  practitioners  attempting   to  explain  
the  significance  of  their  own  work  because  what  it  offers  is  a  way  of  theorizing  
what   we   do   not   understand—the   unpredictable,   incalculable,   corporeal,  
palpable  effects  of  texts’  (2005:  183).  
Nava’s   framing   of   affect   is   valuable   to   practitioners,   but   it   does   not  
consider  how  affect  can  shape  the  work  before  consumption.  I  am  attempting  to  
understand  how  I  can  use  my  own  body,  and  my  own  affective  response  to  the  
act   of   film  practice,   in  order   to   shape   the  making  of   cinema.  The  body  of   the  
filmmaker  will  be  considered  alongside  the  body  of  the  film  in  the  pursuit  of  the  
conceptualization  and  production  of  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
  
A  taxonomy  of  affect  
Film   theory   has   convincingly   set   out   an   alternative   to   semiotic   and   linguistic  
frameworks   in   the   form   of   affect   theory.  However,   the   theoretical   frameworks  
that   inform   film  practice   do  not   take  affect   into   account.   The   language  of   film  
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practice,   drawing   on   single   units   (shots),   the   motion   of   the   camera   (zooms,  
pans,  tilts  and  tracks)  and  the  language  of  the  screenplay,  does  not  fully  allow  a  
consideration   of   affect.   One   cannot  move   from   linguistics   to   affective   tonality  
without  a  new  language  with  which  to   think   film  and  film  practice.  The  starting  
point  for  rethinking  affect  as  a  tool  for  practice  is  a  taxonomy  of  affect.  For  the  
taxonomy,  elements  of  the  image  have  been  broken  down  into  three  categories:  
macro,  reverberatory  and  micro.  This  categorization  begins  to  facilitate  thinking  
through  affect  for  film  practice.  These  elements  will  be  further  conceptualized  in  







Composition   Major,  localized  
movement  within  
specific  parts  of  the  
frame  (usually  stemming  
from  characters)  
Light  and  shade  
Changes  in  exposure  
levels  
Editing   Dialogue   Broad  movement,  
encompassing  the  
whole  frame  
Music   Colour   Elemental  traces  (formal  
elements  arising  from  
the  mode  of  production  
that  have  left  their  mark  
on  the  film)  
Figure  3:  The  taxonomy  of  affect  
  
My  conception  is  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  as  a  digital  form.  The  
footage  was  shot  on  digital  cameras  and  edited  on  Final  Cut  Pro  7,  a  non-­linear  
digital  editing  software  application.  The  use  of  digital  equipment  is  important  for  
this  project  for  several  reasons.  Firstly,  accessibility:  digital  equipment  is  readily  
available,  and  is  cheaper  to  produce  in  comparison  with  analogue  film  cameras  
and  film  stock.  The  practice  work  was  made  on  a  low  budget  out  of  design  and  
necessity.  Working  without  a  large  budget  allowed  the  level  of  creative  freedom  
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and  experimentation  necessary  for  the  production  of  this  type  of  work.  The  films  
are  experiments  in  that  they  are  designed  to  test  ideas  and  produce  concepts.  
In   this   sense,   my   practice   has   much   in   common   with   avant-­garde   and  
experimental   film   and   video   in   ethos   and   practice,   if   not   in   form   and   style.v  
Secondly,  my  physical  relationship  with  the  camera  and  the  digital  image  whilst  
shooting   is   important.   The   digital   image,   which   appears   on   an   LCD   screen  
whilst   filming  or   framing,   is  a  closer  approximation  of   the  final   image  than  one  
would   get   whilst   shooting   on   film.   Film   cameras   traditionally   use   an   optical  
viewfinder,  which  allows  the  camera  operator  to  see  what  the   lens  sees  whilst  
presenting  a  larger  field  of  view  than  is  eventually  exposed  onto  the  film  frame.  
An  optical  viewfinder  works  very  well  for  framing  and  focus,  but  it  excludes  other  
elements  of   the   image  that  are  crucial   to  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality,  such  
as   how   the   colour   will   be   rendered,   grain   or   picture   noise,   and   nuances   of  
exposure.  Whilst  viewing  an  LCD  screen  I  was  able  to  respond  to  the  affective  
elements  presented  and  make  creative  decision  based  on  this.  The  capturing  of  
sound   and   image   for   a   cinema   of   affective   tonality   is   not   a   case   of   filming   a  
script  or   telling/interpreting  a  story   that   is  already  written;;   it   is  about  capturing  
forces.  A  low-­budget  digital  shoot  facilitated  this  method,  in  that  I  could  respond  
quickly   and   easily   change   direction,   should   the   body   of   the   camera   and   the  
body  of  the  filmmaker  be  so  moved.    
  
The  films  
I  have  produced  four  films,  which  I  have  titled  Practice  i,  Practice  ii,  Practice  iii  
and   Practice   iv.  The   first   three   films   produced   comprise   a   loosely   connected  
trilogy,   and   the   fourth   film   is   a   reconceptualization   of   the   previous   films.   The  
films   feature   the  same  central  character,  a  man   in  his   late   twenties  played  by  
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actor   and   filmmaker   Harry   Macqueen.   His   character   is   nameless,   and   is  
referred   to   as   simply   The   Man.   The   films   each   have   a   different   form   and  
shooting  style,  with  the  intention  of  highlighting  and  experimenting  with  different  
affective  elements.  These  first  three  films  are  experiments,  testing  grounds  and  
theoretical  exchanges  of   ideas,  which  help   to  develop   the  concept  of  affective  
tonality.  The  fourth  film   is  made  up  of   footage  from  the  first   three  films,  and   is  
the   final   and   most   complete   example   of   what   I   consider   to   be   a   cinema   of  
affective  tonality.    
  
Practice  i    
Practice   i   is   the   first   film   in  a   loosely  connected   trilogy  of   films   that  comprises  
my  practice.  The  film  is  comprised  of  a  single  shot  played  out  over  nine  minutes,  
and   the  narrative  concerns   the   lead  actor’s  attempt   to   throw  a  bullseye  whilst  
playing  a  game  of  darts   in  an  English  pub.   I  will  argue   that   this   first   film  does  
have  a  narrative  structure,  although  on  the  surface  it  may  appear  closer  to  non-­
narrative  artist  film  and  video.  The  dart  thrower  is  framed  from  behind,  and  the  
camera  focuses  on  the  dartboard.  The  film  privileges  the  rhythm  and  movement  
within   the   frame  over   representational  modes  of  signification.  This   is  achieved  
through  duration.  The  production  of  this  film  allowed  me  to  consider  the  use  of  
the  long  take  as  an  affective  device  rather  than  a  technique  aligned  with  realism.  
It   also   allowed   a   consideration   of   the   relationship   between   affect   and  
representation.  
  
Practice  ii    
Practice   ii   has   a   more   conventional   narrative   structure.   The   film   is   fifteen  
minutes   long,  and   the  main  narrative  drive  concerns  a   first  date  between  The  
	   49  
Man  and  an  unnamed  woman  played  by  Imola  Gaspar.  The  date  takes  place  in  
the   same   pub   as   featured   in  Practice   i.  We   do   not   know   anything   about   the  
characters,  such  as  where  they  have  come  from  or  where  they  are  going.  We  
glean  some  information,  and  the  film  gives  the  impression  that  they  know  each  
other  or  have  met  before.  They  are  at  best  casual  acquaintances.  They  seem  to  
be   lonely,   and   they   would   like   to   find   some   comfort   in   each   other,   but   their  
exchanges  are  difficult,  awkward  and  at  times  quite  painful.  Despite  this,  there  
is   tenderness   and   good  humour   between   them,   and   it   is   the   brief  moment   of  
affection   that   I   attempt   to   capture   in   order   to   allow   the   audience   the   same  
fleeting  experience.    
  
Practice  iii  
Practice  iii  captures  The  Man’s  home  life  and  his  (non)-­relationship  with  a  new  
character  who  breaks   into  his  back  garden.  The  new  character,   referred   to  as  
The  Stranger  and  played  by  Csaba  Krisztik,  seems  to   take  contents   from  The  
Man’s   home   and   place   them   in   his   shed.   By   the   end   of   the   film   The  Man   is  
pictured  alone,  living  in  his  shed.  The  character  of  The  Stranger  is  ghostlike  in  
his  presence.  His  whole,  complete  figure   is  never  seen;;  his  body   is  broken  up  
into  smaller  parts  by  the  camera.  He  comes  in  and  out  of  the  frame  quite  quickly.  
He  is  there,  but  not  there.  The  Man  senses  his  presence,  but  he  is  never  quite  
sure  whether  he  actually  sees  him  or  if  the  character  is  a  trick  of  his  imagination.  
There   is   no   dialogue   in   the   film,   as   I   wanted   to   move   further   away   from  
language  and  to  focus  on  non-­linguistic  sound  and  image.    
  
Practice  iv       
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The   final   film   combines   footage   from   the   first   three   films   in   order   to   further  
disrupt  the  linearity  of  the  previous  narratives.  This  final  piece  of  practice  has  a  
cyclical  structure.  The  film  begins  and  ends  on  an  image  of  The  Man  throwing  
darts.  It  is  an  extension  and  development  of  the  ideas  and  concepts  developed  
in  Practice   i   in   that   the   film   presents   a   cycle   that   cannot   really   end.   The   film  
does   not   have   closure,   and   the   storyline   and   characters’   relationships   are  
ambiguous.  The  final  film  calls  for  less  narrative  decoding,  and  privileges  feeling  
over  understanding  at  a  cognitive  level.    
The   chapters   that   follow   are   structured   around   the   films   produced   and  
my   theoretical   engagement   with   my   experimental   process.   The   aim   of   each  
chapter,   as  well   as   each  piece  of   practice,   is   to   explore   different   elements   of  
affective   tonality   and   different   formal   techniques.   Each   piece   of   practice   is  
progressively  more  formally  complex  than  the  last.  The  filming  process  allows  a  
better   understanding   of   the   taxonomy   of   affect   and   the   cinema   of   affective  
tonality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i  The  development  of  the  screenplay  has  an  economic  and  historic  lineage,  which  is  detailed  in  
Chapter  4:  Practice  iii:  A  Valiant  Failure,  Practice  iv:  The  Cinema  of  Affective  Tonality.  
ii  A  detailed  analysis  of  the  structure  of  Hollywood  cinema  can  be  found  in  Robert  McKee’s  
Story:  Substance,  Structure,  Style  and  the  Principles  of  Screenwriting  (1999).  
iii  The  screenplay  and  the  process  of  screenwriting  has  become  an  area  of  study  in  and  of  itself,  
as  can  be  seen  in  Intellect’s  publication  of  the  Journal  of  Screenwriting  (2010  to  present).  
iv  The  concept  of  affect  that  frames  this  thesis  is  drawn  from  the  work  of  Deleuze.  The  radical  
empiricism  of  Cinema  1:  The  Movement-­Image  is  somewhat  opposed  to  the  phenomenology  of  
Merleau-­Ponty  (Deleuze,  1992:  57).  However,  in  ‘The  Immersive  Spectator:  A  
Phenomenological  Hybrid’,  Maria  Walsh  finds  in  Merleau-­Ponty  an  ‘embodiment  that  is  
strangely  commensurate  with  aspects  of  the  subjectless  subjectivity  that  Deleuze  explores  in  his  
two  cinema  books’  (2004:  170).  Similarly  to  Walsh,  I  find  that  elements  of  Merleau-­Ponty’s  work  
complement  Deleuze’s  affective  reading  of  cinema.    
v  Detailed  histories  of  avant-­garde  cinema  can  be  found  in  Avant-­garde  Film:  Forms,  Themes  
and  Passions  (O’Pray,  2003)  and  A  History  of  Experimental  Film  and  Video  from  the  Canonical  
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CHAPTER  2:  
PRACTICE  I:  FINDING  THE  TARGET:  AFFECT  AND  REPRESENTATION—  
A  DIFFERENCE  IN  DEGREE,  NOT  IN  KIND  
  
In   this   chapter   I   will   begin   to   map   out   the   concept   of   affective   tonality   as   a  
method  of  understanding  narrative.  I  will  do  so  through  my  own  film  practice  as  
research.  Practice  i   is  a  short  experimental  narrative  film  that  encapsulates  the  
narrative  modes  of  Aristotelian   linearity   through  simple   ‘plotting’,   and  which   is  
set  around   the  British  pub  game  of  darts.   I  also  draw  upon  concepts  of  affect  
and   sensation   developed   by  Gilles   Deleuze,   as   well   as   his   concept   of   minor  
literature   developed   with   Félix   Guattari,   in   order   to   begin   to   conceptualize  
affective  tonality—a  concept  which  can  be  used  as  a  tool  for  understanding  the  
holistic   cinematic   experience—and   to   explore   how   this   concept   can   then   be  
used   to   understand   the   physical,   somatic   mechanisms   of   narrative   cinema.   I  
envision   this   chapter   less   as   an   analysis   of   my   practice   and   more   as   a  
conversation   between   the   film   itself   and   its/my   theoretical   and   conceptual  
underpinnings.    
I  argue  that  the  spectator  experiences  narrative  in  Practice  i  through  the  
affective   rhythm   created   by   the  movement   within   the   frame,   the   variations   of  
light  and  colour  on  screen,  and   the  measure  of   the  diegetic  sound  heard,  and  
that  this  experience  is  as  important  to  understanding  the  narrative  as  character  
identification   and   linearity.   The   film   is   an   expression   of   the   banal   and   the  
everyday   that   does   not   lend   itself   to   grand   historical   events.   The   banal   in  
Practice  i  is  not  a  signifying,  representational  reproduction  of  banality:  the  banal  
is   embodied   in   the   film   itself,   and   through   the   affective   tone   of   the   film   it  
becomes  embodied  in  the  spectator.     
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A   moving-­image   work   is   comprised   of   a   series   of   images   and   audio  
tracks.   Rhythm   and   tone   can   be   built   throughout   the   film   through   the   use   of  
editing   and   montage.   Changes   of   pace   and   the   duration   of   individual   shots  
throughout   the  running  time  of   the  film  influence  the  perception  of   the   images,  
which   combine   with   various   sounds   to   produce   an   overall   affective   tone.  
However,   the   individual   images   can   be   broken   down   further,   into   their  
component  parts.  Each  shot  is  made  up  of  several  affective  markers,  or  sites  of  
affect,   which   are   in   the   process   of   happening   throughout   the   film.   As   stated  
previously,   I   propose   that   the   affective   elements   that   comprise   a   cinematic  
image  can  be  divided  into  three  categories.  Each  category  operates  at  differing  
intensities,  which  combine  to  make  up  the  affective  tone  of  an  image;;  as  such,  
they  serve  to  make  up  the  film  as  a  whole.  Sites  of  affect  can  be  developed  on  
three   planes:   the   macro,   the   reverberatory   and   the   micro.   The   affective  
elements  of   the   film  are  not  necessarily   representational.  Although  parts  of  an  
image   are   likely   to   have   representational   elements,   there   are   several  
components  of  a   film   image   that  do  not   lend   themselves  so  easily   to  semiotic  
analysis.    
The   first   plane   consists   of   aspects   of   the   film   in   which   affect   is   most  
dominant  or  noticeable  (and  thus  most  likely  to  be  cognitivized  or  noticed).  This  
plane  consists  of  what  I  have  termed  macro-­affective  elements.  I  include  in  this  
category  the  following  elements:  composition  (the  position  of  people  and  objects  
within  the  frame);;  editing  (or  lack  thereof),  which  relates  to  shot  length,  which  in  
turn  has  a  direct  relationship  with  the  spectator’s  experience  of  time  and  rhythm,  
montage  in  Eisenstein’s  (1961)  sense,  Deleuze’s  (1992)  movement-­image,  and  
continuity   editing;;   and   the   final   element   in   this   category,   sound—mainly   the  
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musical  soundtrack,  if  used,  but  also  any  sound  that  dominates  the  soundtrack,  
such  as  explosions  or  screams.  
The  second  plane  comprises  affective  markers  that  have  a  direct   link  to  
the   first   plane.  The  affective   elements   of   the   second  plane  emanate   from   the  
affective   elements   of   the   first   plane.   These  affective   elements   emerge  on   the  
screen  like  ripples  on  a  pond.  The  affective  elements  of  the  first  plane  play  the  
role  of   the  stone   in   this   imaginary  water   feature.  The  affective  elements  of   the  
second  plane  behave  like  the  circles  that  flow  out  or  move  away  from  the  stone  
that   is   dropped   into   water.   I   have   termed   the   second   plane   reverberatory-­
affective  elements.  They  consist  of  major  localized  movements  within  the  frame,  
colour  (or   lack  of  colour)  and  diegetic  sound.  Major   localized  movement  within  
the  frame  often  stems  from  the  movement  of  the  characters,  but  can  consist  of  
any   movement   of   objects   within   the   frame,   or   the   parallax   that   can   occur  
through  camera  movement.  The  colour   relates   in   the   initial   stages   to  whether  
the  film  is  in  colour  or  black  and  white,  although  there  can  be  a  mix  of  the  two  
modes.  The  Wizard  of  Oz  (Fleming,  1939)  provides  a  famous  example  of  a  film  
that   switches   from   the   state   of   black   and  white   to   a   state   of   colour   (with   the  
moment  of  changing   from  one  state   to   the  other  producing  a   large  ontological  
shift   in   the   film   and   the   spectator).   Steven  Spielberg’s  Schindler’s   List   (1993)  
provides   another  well-­documented   example   of   a   film   that   deploys   both   black-­
and-­white  and  colour  photography  within  the  same  frame,  in  the  case  of  the  ‘girl  
in  the  red  coat’.  Dominant  colours  within  a  single  frame  would  also  come  under  
the   category   of   reverberatory-­affective   elements.   Striking   examples   of   this  
feature   can   be   found   in   Jean-­Luc   Godard’s   use   of   red   and   blue   within  
compositions   in  Pierrot   le   fou   (1965),   or  Michelangelo   Antonioni’s   use   of   red  
within  the  frames  of  Il  deserto  rosso  (1964),  for  example.  I  would  also  consider  
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diegetic   sound  and  dialogue   to  belong   to   the  second  plane.  Dialogue   is  often  
decoded  by   the  spectator  on  a  conscious   level,  but   in   the  cinema  of  affective  
tonality   dialogue   should   not   be   used   to   give   information   concerning   plot   or  
narrative,  nor  should  it  be  used  for  an  expository  function.  Dialogue  in  this  case  
becomes   part   of   an   overall   soundscape   designed   to   give   an   impression   of   a  
moment,  and  to  impress  a  moment  upon  the  spectator.    
The  third  plane  of  affective  elements  operates  on  an  unconscious  level,  
affecting   the  body   in  ways   that   the  spectator  often  does  not   recognize.  Here   I  
write   of   what   I   call  micro-­affective   elements.   I   am   referring   to   formal   aspects  
such  as  contrast  within  a  given  shot  or  scene,   the  change   in   light  and  shade,  
broad   movement   that   encompasses   the   whole   frame,   changes   in   exposure  
levels,  colour  hue  often  deriving  from  lighting,  colour  correction/timing  or  texture  
derived   from   the   specificity   of   the   film   stock/digital   image   sensor,   and   what   I  
term  elemental   traces.   I  define  elemental   traces  as   formal  elements   that  arise  
from  the  mode  of  production  and  that  have  left   their  mark  on  the  film,  such  as  
the   flicker  produced  by   frames  passing   through   the  projection  gate,   scratches  
on  the  film,  sudden  changes  in  exposure  that  occur  at  the  ends  of  reels,  digital  
picture  noise,  or  film  grain.  
Thus   if   stage   three   comprises   micro-­affective   elements,   stage   one  
comprises   macro-­affective   elements,   with   stage   two   bridging   these   two  
extremes.  It  can  be  perceived  that  at  any  given  time  during  the  duration  of  a  film  
a  complex  composition  of  affective  elements   is  affecting   the  spectator’s  bodily  
and   conscious   experience   of   the   film.   It   is   the   combination   of   these   affective  
elements   that   culminates   in   the   production   of   the   affective   tone   of   the   film.  
Understanding   the  affective   tone  of  a   film   is  key   to  understanding   the  creative  
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mechanisms   of   the   cinema   of   affective   tonality,   and   the   way   in   which   a  
spectator  experiences  narrative  in  this  mode  of  filmmaking.    
Practice   i   is  a  short  experimental  narrative   film   that  comprises  many  of  
the   sites   of   affect   listed   above.   The   term   experimental   here   serves   two  
purposes.   Firstly,   it   expresses   my   desire   to   test   and   explore   the   theoretical  
concept   of   affective   tonality   and  how   it   can  be  pushed   to   the   foreground   in  a  
moving-­image  work.  Secondly,  it  positions  the  formal  characteristics  of  the  film  
outside  what  can  be  termed  classical  narrative  cinema,i  which  presents  a  drama  
told  through  a  series  of   juxtaposed  images  and  dialogues  in  which  narrative   is  
privileged   over   formal   construction   and   style.   In   the   classical   mode   of  
filmmaking,  the  drama  is  often  played  out  over  ninety  minutes,  and  the  dramatic  
structure  originates  from  Greek  antiquity,  specifically  as  identified  by  Aristotle  in  
Poetics   (2013).  Through  the  dominance  of  Hollywood  cinema   in  contemporary  
film   culture,   this   form   of   filmmaking   has   come   to   be   considered   the   standard  
structure  for  narrative  cinema.  By  terming  Practice  i  experimental  I  mark  the  film  
as  a  deviation  from  the  practice  of  classical  narrative  cinema.  
The  film  depicts  a  man  playing  darts  alone   in  a  pub,  and  his  attempt   to  
throw  a  bullseye.  The  narrative  follows  a  simple  line  of  linear  action,  but  it  also  
can   be   experienced   through   an   affective   rhythm   created   by   the   movement  
within  the  frame,  the  variations  of  light  and  colour  on  screen,  and  the  measure  
of   the  diegetic  sound  heard.  This  experience   is  as   important   to  understanding  
the  film  as  character  identification  and  linearity.  The  experience  of  the  affective  
tone  determines  our  understanding  of  the  work  through  experience  rather  than  
representation,  cognitivism  or  character  identification,  as  would  be  expected  by  
followers  of  what  Robert  B.  Ray  has  described  as   the  Bordwell   regime  (2001:  
35).   David   Bordwell   and   Noël   Carroll’s   edited   collection   Post-­Theory:  
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Reconstructing   Film   Studies   (1996)   presents   a   critique   of   what   Bordwell  
describes  as  the  ethereal  speculations  of  Grand  Theory  comprising  approaches  
derived   from   psychoanalysis,   post-­structuralism   and   Marxism,   which   became  
dominant   in   Anglo-­American   film   theory   in   the   1970s.   The   book   offers   in  
response  a  series  of  essays   that  define  a  problem,  and   then  attempt   to  solve  
the   problem   through   empirical   research   or   logical   reflection   (Bordwell   and  
Carroll,  1996:  xiv).  Ray  compares  the  differing  approaches  of  Theory  and  theory  
to   the   opposition   between   the   classical   and   the   baroque   in   art   history,   citing  
Roland  Barthes:  ‘on  the  one  side  the  “thought”,  object  of  the  message,  element  
of   knowledge,   transitive   or   critical   force;;   on   the   other,   the   “style”,   ornament,  
province  of  luxury  and  leisure  and  thus  futility’  (Barthes,  1977:  193  in  Ray,  2001:  
33).   For   Ray,   Bordwell   represents   a   classical   approach   positioned   in   direct  
opposition  to  the  Screen  tradition  of  Lacanian  psychoanalysis  and  Marxism,  as  
well  as  to  theories  derived  from  post-­structuralist  schools  of  thought.  I  will  begin  
to   argue   here   that   the   distinction   between   the   classical   and   baroque  
approaches  to  the  analysis  of  moving  images  is  too  reductive  to  be  a  useful  tool  
through  which   to  understand  affective   tonality  and   the  working  mechanisms  of  
cinema.   Seymour   Chatman   states   that   for   Italian   film   director   Michelangelo  
Antonioni,  the  form  of  the  film  cannot  be  separated  from  the  content  (2008:  11).  
In   this   regard,   the   content   or   narrative   of   the   film   is   experienced   through   the  
form   that   it   takes.   This   is   an   important   statement   for   understanding   affective  
tonality,  as  it  is  a  cinema  in  which  the  form  is  the  content.  
Despite  its  experimental  form,  Practice  i  can  be  considered  a  film  with  a  
linear   narrative.   The   protagonist   of   the   film   has   a   goal,   which   is   to   throw   a  
bullseye.  He  has  to  use  his  skill   to  achieve  this  goal.  The  rules  of  the  game  of  
darts   act   as   an   obstacle   to   be   overcome,   and   with   the   last   dart   thrown   the  
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protagonist   achieves   his   goal.   He   throws   a   bullseye!   In   this   respect   the   film  
follows  the  structure  of  classical  Hollywood  cinema,  albeit  reduced  to  base  and  
banal  elements.  However,  the  protagonist’s  goal  is  an  insignificant  one  in  terms  
of  understanding   the  nature  of   the   film,  as  well  as   the  general  milieu   in  which  
the   central   character   is   placed.   The   film   ends   with   the   freezing   of   action   or  
movement,   and   thus   the   freezing   of   time.   The   goal   has   been   achieved,   but  
nothing  has  changed  in  the  sociocultural  conditions  of  the  protagonist’s  life,  or  in  
the  conceptualization  (cogito)  of   the  world  of   the  protagonist  by   the  spectators  
that   have   experienced   the   film.   At   the   end   of   the   film,   when   time   stops,   the  
question  that  may  be  asked  is:  what  is  next?  What  is  next  for  the  protagonist  of  
Practice  i?  As  I  see  it,  the  protagonist  has  two  options:  stop  playing,  or  continue  
to  play;;  finish  with  the  darts,  stop  throwing,  stop  playing,  or  begin  again,  return  
to   the  game  and  try  once  more  to   throw  a  bullseye.  The  two  options  that   face  
the   protagonist   are   reductive:   to   stop   playing   is   to   cease   to   exist,   yet   to   play  
again  is  to  simply  resume  a  cycle  that  can  never  end.    
In   effect,  Practice   i   is   a   film   that   resists   resolution,   as   resolution   is   not  
possible  for  a  film  that   is  concerned  with  the  banal.  The  banal   is  constant  and  
unchanging;;   it   resists   the   Aristotelian   tropes   of   linear   narrative   or   character  
transcendence   and   revelation.   The   banal   is   an   event   that   exists   outside   of  
specificities   of   historicized   space   and   time.   Steven   Shaviro   mobilizes   Alfred  
Whitehead’s  example  of  Cleopatra’s  Needle  in  order  to  explain  how  a  seemingly  
solid  object  is  a  series  of  events  or  a  multiplicity  (2009:  17–20).  For  Whitehead  
and   Shaviro,   Cleopatra’s   Needle   is   more   than   an   object   to   which   grand  
historical   events   occur,   such   as   the   creation   of   the   monument   in   Egypt,   the  
moving  of  the  monument  to  London  in  1877,  and  the  eventual  future  destruction  
or   disintegration   of   the   monument.   Cleopatra’s   Needle   is   a   constant   site   of  
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events:  from  the  movement  of  molecules  and  electrons  within  the  construction,  
to   the   accretion   of   dirt   from   the   city   surroundings   and   its   being   cleaned   by  
Westminster   council   employees,   the   monument   is   ever-­changing,   constantly  
happening  (2009:  17–20).  Practice  i  is  an  expression  of  the  event  of  the  banal,  
which  does  not  lend  itself  to  grand  historical  events.  It  is  an  event  that  does  not  
‘stand   for’,   reflect   or   represent   bigger   political,   social   or   cultural   concerns  
outside  itself,  despite  the  fact  that  the  image  is  open  to  interpretation  or  analysis  
using   a   socio-­historical   framework.   The   event   of   the   banal   exists   within   the  
image  itself:  it  is  embodied  within  the  frame,  and  through  the  experience  of  the  
affective   tone  generated  by   the   image   it   becomes  embodied   in   the   spectator.  
Whilst   the  borders  of   the   frame  are  static,  within   the  borders   there   is  constant  
movement,   and   there   is   constant   change.   No   two   frames   are   the   same.   The  
character  of  the  darts  player  is  always  moving  through  the  frame;;  digital  picture  
noise   is  a  constant  and  ever-­changing  presence;;  darts  bisect   the  frame;;  holes  
are  created  in  the  dartboard.  All  of  these  are  events  and  moments  of  becoming.  
These   are   not   events   to   which   major   ideological   or   symbolic   value   can   be  
ascribed.  If  there  is  a  major  event  in  the  film,  it   is  the  throwing  of  the  bullseye,  
although   as   I   have   stated   above,   achieving   a   bullseye   does   not   result   in   any  
change  in  state  for  the  protagonist.  The  event  does  not  occur  in  any  competition,  
and  no  prize  is  at  stake.  For  the  protagonist  there  is  no  change  in  the  nature  of  
his  existence.  This  is  the  banal  in  Practice  i,  and  it  is  manifest  in  the  rhythm  and  
tone  of  the  film.    
In   this   respect   the   film   can   be   seen   as   an   example   of   what   Gilles  
Deleuze  and  Félix  Guattari  describe  as  minoritarian  (1987),  in  both  its  form  and  
its   content.   The   protagonist   is   playing   darts   in   a   pub,   a   sport   and   location  
typically   associated   with   the   working   class   of   the   United   Kingdom.   The   film  
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eschews  the  style  of  Hollywood  cinema  as  identified  by  Bordwell  et  al.  (1985),  
whilst  retaining  some  of  its  features.  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  ‘a  determination  
different   from  that  of   the  constant  will   therefore  be  considered  minoritarian,  by  
nature   and   regardless   of   number’   (1987:   117).   Rather   than   expressing  
hegemonic   ideals,   Practice   i   is   a   film   that   is   open   to   becoming,   eschewing  
standards  and  ideas.  In  other  words,  the  film  rejects  cognitive  interpretations  in  
favour  of  affect  and  tone.  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  state:  ‘That  is  why  we  must  
distinguish  between:   the  majoritarian  as  a   constant   and  homogenous   system;;  
minorities   as   subsystems;;   and   the   minoritarian   as   a   potential,   creative   and  
created,  becoming’  (1987:  117).  Practice  i  does  not  reinforce  dominant  ideas  of  
power,   race,   gender   or   class;;   it   alters   perception   through   the   affective   tone  
generated  by   the   film,  which   leads   to  a  becoming   in   the  spectator,  and  a  new  
way  of  existing  in  the  world.  The  affective  tone  is  not  power,  but  force.  To  quote  
Brian  Massumi:  ‘Force  in  its  wild  state  arrives  from  outside  to  break  constraints  
and  open  new  vistas.  Power  builds  walls’  (1992:  6).  The  spectator,  affected  by  
the  rhythm  and  tone  of  the  film,  is  faced  with  a  different  way  of  seeing  and  being  
once  the  film  is  finished,  the  nature  of  which  is  not  fixed.  An  ontological  shift  is  
experienced  by  the  spectator,  who  has  the  potential  to  become  again  something  
new.    
Practice   i  might   invite  comparisons  with  a  mode  of   filmmaking   that  has  
been   described   as   contemplative   cinema,   in   which   the   purpose   is   to   ‘paint   a  
state  of  mind’  rather  than  tell  a  story,ii  in  a  cyclical  film  that  captures  a  moment  
in   a   never-­ending   cycle.   John   Updike   notes   that   the   ‘unfinished’   is   a  
characteristic  of  the  literature  of  Franz  Kafka:  ‘Kafka  was  obsessed  with  building,  
with  work  that  is  never  done,  that  can  never  be  done,  that  must  always  fall  short  
of  perfection…  Incompletion  is  a  quality  of  his  work’  (1983:  3).  In  this  sense,  to  
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avoid   completion   and   resolution   is   to   open   up   to   affect   and   a   bodily   way   of  
experiencing  cinema  that  can  be  taken  in  many  different  directions.  Perfection  is  
a   closed,   concrete  state   that,   like   the  order  word   in  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  A  
Thousand   Plateaus:   Capitalism   and   Schizophrenia   (1987),   results   in   death.  
There   is   constant  movement,   change  and  speed   in  Practice   i,   but   there   is  no  
evolution  or  development,  only  becoming.  The  character  does  not  transcend  or  
reach   a   new   state   of   peace   or   a   Todorovian   ‘new   equilibrium’   in  which   fresh  
majoritarian   regimes  are   implemented.  The   film,   through   rhythm  and  duration,  
presents   a   deterritorialization   of   the  male   body,   of   notions   of   sport,   success,  
class   and   achievement.   In  Kafka:   Toward   a   Minor   Literature   (1986)   Deleuze  
and  Guattari   reconceptualize   the   literature  of  Franz  Kafka   in  order   to  express  
their   concept  of   a  minor   literature   in  which  dominant  power   structures  can  be  
subverted   from   within.   Language   is   not   used   metaphorically   or   to   signify   in  
minor   literature;;   language   has   an   intensity   of   its   own   that   is   free   from  major  
signifying  practices.  
There  is  no  longer  man  or  animal,  since  each  deterritorializes  the  other,  in  
a  conjunction  of  flux,   in  a  continuum  of  reversible  intensities...  The  animal  
does  not  speak  ‘like’  a  man  but  pulls  from  the  language  tonalities  lacking  in  
signification;;   the   words   themselves   are   not   ‘like’   the   animals   but   in   their  
own  way  climb  about,  bark  and  roam  around,  being  properly  linguistic  dogs,  
insects,   or  mice.  To  make   the   sequences   vibrate,   to   open   the  word  onto  
unexpected  internal  intensities—in  short,  an  asignifying  intensive  utilization  
of  language.    
(Deleuze  and  Guattari,  1986:  22)  
  
The   banal   in   Practice   i   is   not   a   signifying,   representational,   mimetic  
reproduction  of  banality;;  the  banal  is  embodied  in  the  film  itself,  and  through  the  
affective   tone  of   the   film   it   becomes  embodied   in   the   spectator.   Jon  Beasley-­
Murray  discusses  the  films  of  the  Italian  neorealist  movement  and  their  ability  to  
render  extraordinary  what  Hollywood  normally  considers  boring,  thus  saving  the  
cinema   from  the   ‘death  schemes  of  closure  premised  upon  action’   (1997:  49).  
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Beasley-­Murray  references  David  Overbey’s  realization  that  the  most  important  
characteristic  of  neorealism  is  the  directors’  discovery  that  the  need  to  use  story  
was   just  a  way   to  mask  defeat   in   the   face  of   reality   (Overbey,  1979:  67).  For  
Beasley-­Murray,   resisting   cinematic   closure   opens   up   new   possibilities   for  
exploring  reality  through  what  Michael  Taussig  describes  as  contact-­sensuosity  
(1993:  27).  This   is  accentuated   through   the  use  of   the   long   take,   in  which   the  
bodily  sensation  of  time  is  prioritized  over  narrative  decoding  (Beasley-­Murray,  
1997:  49).  It  is  through  duration  and  rhythm  that  Practice  i   is  experienced,  and  
this  duration  and  rhythm  is  interpreted  through  an  embodied  encounter  with  the  
banal.  It   is  a  becoming-­minor  of  the  banal,  and  by  its  very  nature  it   is  political.  
As  Reda  Bensmaia   states   in   his   foreword   to  Deleuze   and  Guattari’s   book   on  
Kafka,   an   author’s   style   is   a   total   and   energetic   investment   of   their   political  
being-­in-­the-­world  (1986:  xxiii).  Practice   i   is  not  political  because   it  speaks   the  
political   or   represents   political   ideas;;   it   is   political   in   its   becoming,   its  
anonymizing,  and  its  shedding  of  majoritarian  forms,  as  will  be  further  discussed  
later.    
Practice   i’s   narrative   encapsulates   the   banal   nature   of   everyday   life,  
which  finds  its  reflection  in  the  modern  construction  of  the  factory  assembly  line,  
the  houses  built  on  building  sites,  the  structure  of  the  week  and  the  activities  of  
the  weekend.   In  Practice   i,   the   repetition   of   the   action   of   throwing   the   dart   is  
pacifying,   for  both   the  thrower  and  the  spectator.  The  process  of  watching  the  
film   is   nullifying,   and   a   feeling   of   inertia   is   manifest   in   the   bodies   of   the  
spectators  as  the  film  draws  to  a  close.  This  is  the  practice  of  everyday  life,  the  
anonymous  repetition  of  inconsequential  action.  All  of  this  is  expressed  through  
the  affective  tone  of  the  film.    
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Practice   i   is  a   film  captured   in  a  single   take.  The  spatial  coordinates  of  
the   frame   do   not   change,   and   the   angle   of   the   shot   remains   the   same  
throughout  the  duration  of  the  film:  one  shot  held  for  a  total  of  nine  minutes  and  
thirty-­two  seconds.  It  is  the  duration  of  the  shot,  linked  to  the  number  of  edits  in  
relation   to   the  overall   running   time  of   the   film,   that   is  one  of   the  key   factors   in  
determining  the  affective  tone  of  this  film.  The  choice  to  hold  the  same  shot  for  
a  long  period  of  time  foregrounds  the  internal  rhythm  of  the  shot,  created  by  the  
movement   within   the   frame   and   the   continuous  monotony   of   the   soundtrack.  
The   film   begins   with   a   shot   of   a   man   in   his   twenties   throwing   darts   at   a  
dartboard,  in  a  setting  that  looks  like  a  pub.  It  is  an  image  that  is  accompanied  
by  many  sociocultural  connotations  relating  to  class,  gender  and  sexuality.  The  
sound  of   the  darts  hitting   the  board  and   the   repetition  of  movement  are  quite  
phallic,  and  are  open   to  psychoanalytic   interpretations.   It   is  a   representational  
image,  but  this   is  not  a  fixed  state.  Over  the  duration  of  the  shot  the  dominant  
elements   of   the   image   move   from   representation   to   affect,   and   from   the  
figurative  to  the  figural.  Following  Bergson,  it  is  important  to  note  that  affect  and  
representation   exist   along   the   same   plane   of   experience.   Between   the   two  
states  is  a  difference  in  degree  rather  than  in  kind.  Bergson  gives  the  example  
of  contact  with  a  pin.  For  Bergson:    
There  is  hardly  any  perception  which  may  not,  by  the  increase  of  the  action  
of   its   object   upon  our   body,   become  an   affection,   and,  more   particularly,  
pain.   Thus   we   pass   insensibly   from   the   contact   with   a   pin   to   its   prick.  
Inversely  the  decreasing  of  pain  coincides  with  the  lessening  perception  of  
its  cause,  and  exteriorises  itself,  so  to  speak,   into  a  representation  (2004:  
53).  
  
When   the   affective   properties   of   perception   and   representation   are  
increased,   they  will   inevitably   reach   the  point  at  which  pain   is  experienced.  At  
this   point   representation   ceases   to   be   perceived,   and   what   is   experienced   is  
pure   affect.   For   example,   a   red   traffic   light   at   a   certain   brightness   would   be  
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perceived  and  understood  as  a  traffic  light,  and  as  a  sign  to  stop  in  a  Western  
context;;  but   if   the  brightness  or   intensity  of   this   traffic   light  were  to   increase,   it  
would  shift  away  from  the  concept  of  a  traffic  light  and  become  at  first  a  bright  
red  light—no  longer  a  sign  to  be  decoded,  but  more  an  experience  of  redness  to  
the  one  that   looks  upon  it—before  reaching  an  intensity  that  would  cause  pain  
to  those  that  looked  upon  it,  forcing  one  to  look  away  or  risk  permanent  damage  
to   the   retina.   To   follow   again   Bergson’s   example,   the   process   of   increasing  
intensity  could  be  reversed,  and  the  bright  red   light  would  move  from  a  site  of  
pure  affect  to  one  of  representation,  an  object  that  becomes  represented,  so  to  
speak.   The   same  example   could   be   applied   to   sound.   The   threshold   for   pain  
caused  by  sound  is  120dB  (Goodman,  2010),  and  prolonged  exposure  to  sound  
at  this  level  causes  permanent  damage  to  hearing.  If  a  certain  sound  increases  
in  volume,  it  will  over  time  cease  to  be  a  sound  that  can  be  linked  to  an  image  
or  representation  and  become  pure  affect,  and  vice  versa.  This  is  why  I  say  that  
affect  and   representation  are  different   in  degree,  not   in  kind.  Any  percept  can  
become  a  represented  image  (in  the  Bergsonian  sense)  or  a  site  of  pure  affect,  
depending  on   intensity  and  duration.  The  nature  of   the   thing   is  not   fixed.   It   is  
possible  to  witness  the  changing  of  state  from  representation  to  pure  affect  by  
correlating   intensity   with   duration.   To   quote   Bergson,   ‘external   perception   is  
formed  by  projecting  into  space  a  perception  that  has  become  harmless’  (2004:  
53).  Narrative   signs   in   the   cinema  act   as   facilitators   through  which  affect   can  
emerge.  To   return   to  Practice   i,  over   the  duration  of   the   film   the   image  of   the  
man  throwing  darts  moves  from  one  in  which  representation  is  dominant  to  an  
image  that  privileges  affect.    
The   major   social   and   cultural   signs   that   are   attributed   to   the   image  
become  less  dominant  over  the  duration  of  the  film.  The  film  becomes  about  the  
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rhythm  and  the  movement,  about  the  banal.  It  is  a  becoming-­minor  of  the  image,  
in   which  majoritarian   norms   are   shed.   In   effect   it   becomes   about   affect,   and  
through  the  affective  tone  of  the  film  it  is  possible  for  the  spectator  to  experience  
the   banal   and   the   everyday,   rather   than   have   it   represented   to   them.   The  
pacifying  inertia  that  the  character  experiences  through  the  playing  of  darts  has  
not   been   explained   to   the   spectator;;   this   inertia   is   embodied   in   the   spectator  
through  the  experience  of  the  affective  tone  of  Practice  i.    
Experimenting  with  the  use  of  the  long  take  in  relation  to  affect  and  tone  
allowed   the   beginnings   of   a   reconceptualization   of   representation   and   affect.  
The  simplicity  of  the  structure  of  the  film  stripped  away  any  illusion  that  a  story  
was  being  told,  and  it  helped  me  to  consider  the  long  take  as  a  technique  that  is  
not  only  linked  to  realism.  This  film  has  been  a  starting  point  for  thinking  through  
affect  whilst  situated  behind  the  camera  or  in  front  of  an  editing  machine.  Whilst  
deciding  on  the  length  of  the  film,  and  by  implication  the  length  of  the  shot,  I  had  
to  listen  to  my  body  for  the  first  time  whilst  editing.  The  out-­point  for  the  edit  was  
practically  predetermined,  as  the  film  was  to  end  when  a  bullseye  was  thrown.  
This   presented   an   unusual   situation   for   an   editor:   the   length   of   the   shot   was  
determined   from   when   it   should   start,   rather   than   when   it   should   end.  
Traditionally,  the  first  decision  one  makes  when  cutting  is  to  decide  on  a  shot’s  
in-­point,  i.e.  the  frame  in  which  the  shot  will  begin.  In  the  case  of  Practice  i  I  was  
given  cause  to  work  backwards,  which  enabled  a  change  in  thinking  about  the  
edit,  and  also  a  change  in  feeling  for  the  edit.  I  had  to  respond  to  the  inertia  in  
my   own   body,   and   use   this   feeling   as   a   guiding   principle   when   deciding   on  
when  to  cut  in  to  the  shot.  My  aim  for  Practice  ii  was  to  develop  this  further  and  
use  the   long  take   in  a  more   traditional  narrative   form.  This   is  discussed   in   the  
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next   chapter,   as   well   as   my   further   development   of   the   cinema   of   affective  
tonality.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i  The  most  thorough  overview  of  this  mode  of  filmmaking  can  be  found  in  The  Classical  
Hollywood  Cinema:  Film  Style  and  Mode  of  Production  to  1960  (Bordwell  et  al.,  1985).  
ii  Definition  of  contemporary  contemplative  cinema  by  Harry  Tuttle  on  the  blog  Unspoken  
Cinema  (2007).  A  further  discussion  of  this  style  of  cinema  can  be  found  in  ‘Filming  a  
Miracle:  Ordet,  Silent  Light,  and  the  Spirit  of  Contemplative  Cinema’  (Warner,  2015).  

	   67  
CHAPTER  3:  
PRACTICE  II:  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  TAXONOMY  OF  AFFECTIVE  TONALITY  
IN  PRODUCING  A  NARRATIVE  
  
The   purpose   of   this   chapter   is   to   outline   and   further   develop   a   taxonomy   of  
affect,  and  to  explore  the  application  of  the  taxonomy  to  my  own  practice  whilst  
employing  a  more  traditional  narrative  form.  Certain  components  of  the  image  in  
Practice  ii  will  be  isolated  and  discussed  in  relation  to  their  affective-­operational  
function.   These   components   are   termed   ‘affective   elements’.   This   isolation   is  
done  in  order  to  help  us  to  understand  how  certain  affective  elements  operate  
as  a  whole  across  the  duration  of  Practice  ii.  Different  affective  elements  have  
been  isolated  in  order  to  illuminate  their  usage  in  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality.  
In  the  introduction  to  this  thesis  the  affective  elements  that  comprise  a  film  were  
compared   to   a   tapestry   in   which   colour,   movement,   light   and   sound   can   be  
approached   as   part   of   an   overlapping   collage   of   affect   and   sensation.   This  
comparison   is   an   important   starting   point   for   this   chapter.   A   tapestry   is  
comprised  of  a  series  of  threads  that  combine  to  make  a  whole  that   is  greater  
than  the  sum  of  its  parts.  It  is  possible  to  focus  on  individual  threads,  and  to  do  
so  tells  us  something  of  the  nature  of  the  tapestry  as  a  whole.  However,  once  it  
is  part  of  a  tapestry  the  individual  thread  can  only  be  fully  understood  in  relation  
to   the  other   threads   in   the  system  and  the  complete   tapestry.  So   it   is  with   the  
cinema  of  affective  tonality  and  the  affective  elements  that  comprise  the  totality  
of  the  film.  In  this  chapter,  individual  affective  elements  will  be  isolated  in  order  
to  understand  how  they  work  holistically  over  the  duration  of  the  film.  
Deleuze   in   Cinema   1   makes   reference   to   Hitchcock’s   fondness   for  
comparing  cinema  to  tapestry.  Deleuze  states:  ‘action,  and  also  perception  and  
affection,   are   framed   in   a   fabric   of   relations’   (1992:   199).   The   concept   of  
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affective   tonality   allows   a   consideration   of   a   film   as   one   image.   The   singular  
image  that  is  the  film  makes  a  mark  on  the  viewer.  The  affective  tone  of  this  one  
image,  the  film,  is  transferred  to  the  spectator.  However,  closer  inspection  of  the  
singular   image   reveals   a   ‘fabric   of   relations’   in   the   form   of   smaller   units   or  
affective   elements.   To   understand   how   these   elements   operate   it   is   useful   to  
turn   to   C.   S.   Peirce’s   conceptualization   of   the   sign.   Peirce’s   invention   of  
semiotics   conceives  of   signs  as   combinations  of   images   (Deleuze,   1989:   30).  
The   affective   elements   described   in   this   chapter   operate   as   a   collection   of  
images   in   a   Peircian   sense.   To   borrow   again   from   Deleuze,   the   affective  
elements   discussed   below   are   ‘nodes   of   abstract   relations’   (1992:   204).  
Affective   elements   can   exist   on   their   own,   but   it   is   only   through   their  
combination  that  they  produce  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
The   triadic   nature   of   the   sign   is   a   useful   way   to   consider   the   flow   of  
affective   images   in   a   cinematic   narrative.   For   Peirce,   a   sign   does   not   exist  
independently.   It   is  made   up   of   a   series   of   signs   that   exist   historically   in   the  
mind   (body)   of   the   interpreter.   By   using   the   form  of   the   triad   to   open   up   and  
disrupt   the  dualistic  nature  of   the  sign,  Peirce  posits   the  possibility  of  multiple  
and   infinite   readings   of   the   sign.   John   K.   Sheriff   notes   that   ‘any   sign   or  
collection  of   signs   that   a   person  has  experienced   in   the  past   can  become  an  
object   in   the   representamen-­object-­interpretant   relationship,   i.e.,   to   have  
meaning,   to   be   thought   about’   (1994:   37).   Affective   elements   exist   within   the  
work   to   build   up   a   picture   of   the   whole,   a   larger,   singular   image.   It   is   what  
Sheriff   describes   as   a  quali-­consciousness:   ‘Any   number   of   qualities   or   ideas  
may  merge  (generalize),  but  when  they  do  so  they  lose  their  individual  identities  
and  become  part   of   the  new  quali-­consciousness  or   idea’   (1994:   39).   Just   as  
‘signs  signify  because  of   their  qualities  and   their   relations’   (Sheriff,   1994:  41),  
	   69  
the  affective  elements  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  are  only  fully  actualized  
in   relation   to   each   other.   Thus   it   is   important   to   understand   the   qualities   of  
affective  elements  and  their  relations.  
The   taxonomy   of   affective   tonality   proposed   in   the   introduction,   which  
was  also  used  as  a  structuring  device  for  Practice  i,  will  be  expanded  upon  here.  
The   taxonomy   of   affective   tonality   can   act   as   a   toolbox   for   filmmakers   to  
consider  structure  and  narrative  from  the  position  of  affect.  The  taxonomy  also  
enables   a   language   for   practitioners   and   theoreticians   to   think   through   the  
triangle  of  affect/narrative/cinema.    
   Practice   ii   is   a   short   film   that   makes   use   of   a   very   simple   narrative  
structure.  The   film   is   fifteen  minutes   long,   and   the  narrative   is   centred  on   the  
meeting   of   two   characters.   In   terms   of   narrative   structure,   it   is   my   most  
conventional  of  piece  of  practice.  The  story  is  as  follows:  a  woman  meets  a  man  
in   a   pub   for   a   first   date.   It   is   implied   that   the   two   people   know   each   other,  
possibly   from  work.  The  male  protagonist   arrives   in   the  area   from  elsewhere.  
The   female   protagonist   lives   in   the   area.   She   is   an   immigrant   from   Eastern  
Europe,  and  he   is  an  English  man.  She   is   in  her  mid-­forties,   and  he   is   in  his  
mid-­twenties.  They  meet  in  a  pub,  have  a  drink  and  then  leave.  They  pick  up  a  
bottle  of  wine   from   the   local   shop  and  go  back   to  her  house.  She  shares   the  
house  with  several  other  people,  renting  one  room  only.  They  go  to  her  room,  
drink  wine,  talk  nervously  and  have  sex.  When  they  have  finished,  he  dresses  
and  leaves.  The  film  ends  with  her  turning  her  back  to  the  camera.  Cut  to  black.  
If  the  film  were  to  be  dissected  in  terms  of  traditional  narrative  structure,  
it  could  be  said  that  the  film  has  two  ‘acts’:  the  first  act  concerns  the  meeting  in  
the  pub,   the  second  act   takes  place  at   the  woman’s  house.  There  are   turning  
points   in   the  narrative,  such  as   the  meeting  of   the   two  central  characters  and  
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the  decision  to  leave  the  pub  and  go  back  to  the  woman’s  house,  but  these  plot  
points   are   not   grand   events   in   the   Aristotelian   or   McKeeian i   sense.   The  
narrative   of   the   film   is   not   concerned   with   character   arcs,   discoveries   or  
reversals   (Aristotle,   2013:   30).  The   film   is   concerned  with   the  mood  and   tone  
created  by  the  space,  and  the  actions  of  the  characters  within  the  space.  Both  
characters  are  lonely.  They  both  feel  out  of  place  in  their  surroundings,  and  they  
are  looking  for  a  connection  with  another  human  being.  The  themes  and  ideas  
that  drive  the  narrative  again  draw  comparisons  to  John  Updike’s  commentary  
on  the  work  of  Franz  Kafka.  
The  century  since  Franz  Kafka  was  born  has  been  marked  by  the  idea  of  
‘modernism’—a   self-­consciousness   new   among   centuries,   a  
consciousness  of  being  new.  Sixty  years  after  his  death,  Kafka  epitomizes  
one   aspect   of   this   modern   mind-­set:   a   sensation   of   anxiety   and   shame  
whose  center  cannot  be  located  and  therefore  cannot  be  placated;;  a  sense  
of  an  infinite  difficulty  within  things,  impeding  every  step;;  a  sensitivity  acute  
beyond  usefulness,  as  if  the  nervous  system,  flayed  of  its  old  hide  of  social  
usage   and   religious   belief,   must   record   every   touch   as   pain.   In   Kafka’s  
peculiar   and   highly   original   case   this   dreadful   quality   is   mixed   with  
immense   tenderness,   oddly   good   humor,   and   a   certain   severe   and  
reassuring  formality.    
(1983:  3)  
    
The   images   in   Practice   ii   carry   with   them   an   awareness   of   the   characters’  
anxiety  and  an  acute  recognition  that  touch  brings  pain,  yet  despite  the  pain  and  
the  anxiety   there   is  an  overwhelming  desire   for   tenderness  and   intimacy.  The  
aim  of   this   short   film   is   to   impart  a   feeling   to   the  spectator,  and  perhaps  shift  
perception  in  order  to  make  the  spectator  feel  and  think  and  see  in  new  ways,  
even  if  this  new  way  of  feeling  is  temporary.  The  intention  of  the  film  is  to  impart  
(a)  feeling(s)  rather  than  tell  a  story.  The  process  of  imparting  feelings  is  the  aim  
of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
The   characters   in   the   film   are   anonymous.   They   remain   unnamed  
throughout   the   film.  Like  many   in   the  modern  city,   they   look   for   connection   in  
each  other,   yet   it   can  be  observed   in   their   reactions   that   they  are   aware   that  
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closeness  can  bring  pain.  Their  lives,  like  the  images  in  the  film,  are  fragmented,  
but  this  dark  quality  of   life   is  mixed  with  tenderness  and  humour.  It   is  the  brief  
moment   of   affection   that   the   film   aims   to   capture,  while   it   tries   to   bestow   the  
same   fleeting   experience   upon   the   spectator.   Rather   than   tell   a   story   using  
linguistic   techniques   and   audio-­visual   language   alone,   the   film   uses   tonal  
techniques  with  which  to  affect  the  spectator  and  evoke  a  certain  response  that  
has  some  symbiotic  resonance  with  the  characters  in  the  film.  The  story  in  this  
sense   is   not   derived   from   the   progression   of   plot   points   or   character  
development,   but   rather   the   narrative   is   embodied   in   the   spectator.   The  
spectator   understands   the   condition   of   the   characters   not   through   a   purely  
cognitive  deconstruction  of  a  plot  told  through  a  visual  and  auditory  language  of  
cinema,  but  through  an  affective  state  shared  with  the  characters  at  the  end  of  
the  film.    
   The  film  was  shot  using  the  video  camera  function  on  an  iPhone  4,  which  
gives  the  image  a  low-­fi  aesthetic.  The  iPhone  4  produces  images  that  could  be  
seen  to  be  analogous  to  Super  8  analogue  film.  No  filmmaker  or  cinephile  with  a  
trained  eye  would  mistake  the  two  formats,  but   there   is  a   low-­fi  quality   to  both  
images   that   makes   them   kindred   spirits   in   aesthetics.   There   is   a   limit   to   the  
amount   of   detail   that   Super   8   film   can   capture   compared  with   larger   formats  
(such   as   16mm   and   35mm   film)   due   to   its   small   frame   and   lower   resolution  
(Kodak:  Super   8mm  Film  General  Tips,   no  date).   In   the   right   hands,  Super   8  
films  can  exude  a  dreamlike  aesthetic,  as  can  be  seen,  for  example,  in  the  films  
of  Derek  Jarman  (O’Pray,  1996).ii  The  relatively  lower  resolution  of  the  iPhone  4  
and  the  saturation  levels  of  the  colour  rendition  imbue  the  images  with  a  distant,  
almost  ethereal  quality.  The  images  produced  for  Practice  ii  never  really  fall  into  
full  abstraction,  but  to  view  the  film  is  to  look  through  smog  at   images  that  are  
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recognizable  and  yet  somehow  slightly  removed  from  reality.  This  is  the  reason  
for  choosing  to  shoot  the  film  on  an  iPhone  4.  
  Film   and   digital   moving-­image   acquisition   is   getting   better   and   better.  
Although   the   term   ‘better’   is  quite  a  subjective   term,   the   fidelity  of   the  modern  
digital   image   is   very   high.   Film   stocks   are   often   virtually   grainless,   especially  
after  undergoing  a  digital   intermediate  process.  Digital  cameras  are  producing  
cleaner  images  in  relation  to  digital  picture  noise.  The  DSLRs  that  shoot  motion  
have  a  very  crisp  and  clinical  look.  Digital  Cinema  cameras  also  produce  a  very  
clean  and  clear   image.  The  images  are  sharp,  and  if   the  sensors  are  exposed  
correctly   they   produce   very   little   picture   noise,   even   at   high   ISOs.iii  Practice   ii  
has  a  dirtier   look,  and  is  far   less  clinical  than  a  standard  high-­definition  image.  
This  matches  the  tone  of  the  film.  The  images  are  not  overly  clean  and  sharp.  
Noise  and  the  occasional  digital  artefact  muddy  up  the  picture.  These  artefacts  
break  up  the  digital  image,  and  give  the  film  a  texture  that  can  evoke  what  can  
be  described  as  haptic  visuality,  in  a  mix  of  Marks’  Deleuzian  conceptualization  
and  Alois  Riegl’s  distinction  (Marks,  2000:  161).  The  haptic  visuality  evoked  by  
the  texture  of  the  film  is  ‘more  inclined  to  move  than  to  focus,  more  inclined  to  
graze  than  to  gaze’  (Marks,  2000:  161)  in  a  Rieglian  sense.  Digital  picture  noise  
and   grain   have   a   life,   and   give   an   image   a   texture   that   is   both   opaque   and  
sensual.   This   matches   the   tone   and   narrative   of   the   film,   which   is  
simultaneously  ambiguous  and  tender.  John  Bailey  ASC  notes  that  grain  has  a  
unique,   random  structure   that   is   ‘organic,  alive,  vibrant’   (Maltin,  2013).  Picture  
noise  resides  on  the  surface  of  the  film,  like  an  extra  layer.  Watching  Practice  ii  
is  like  looking  at  the  world  reflected  in  a  dirty  mirror.iv    
Unlike  Practice  i,  a  screenplay  was  written  for  Practice  ii.  In  a  traditional  
screenplay  one  page  is  equated  to  one  minute  of  screen  time  (King,  2005:  33,  
	   73  
Field,  2006:  44).  Thus  a  ninety-­page  screenplay  should  result  in  a  ninety-­minute  
film.  However,  the  screenplay  for  Practice  ii  is  only  seven  pages  long,  whilst  the  
finished  film  is  fifteen  minutes  in  length.  The  process  of  filmmaking  in  this  sense  
aims   to   eschew  or   subvert   traditional   narrative   filmmaking   technique   in  which  
the   screenplay   is   the   base   for   practice.   The   filmmaking   process   is   usually  
informed  by   the  word  on   the  page,  but   in   this   instance   the   latter   is  seen  as  a  
guide   rather   than   a   blueprint.   The   spoken   word,   or   dialogue,   is   almost  
completely  absent  from  the  screenplay  for  Practice  ii.  Only  the  last  two  lines  of  
dialogue  were  written   in   the  original   screenplay.  The  major   chunk  of   dialogue  
that   occurs   in   the   film  when   the   two   central   characters  meet   in   the   pub  was  
completely   improvised   by   the   actors   themselves.   The   intention   here   was   to  
capture   the   awkward   nature   of   first-­date   exchanges.   Approximately   forty  
minutes   of   dialogue   in   total   were   filmed,   with   about   five   minutes   of   dialogue  
included  in  the  finished  scene.  This  allowed  a  lot  of  experimentation  and  led  to  
spontaneous   results.   In   the   finished   scene   there   are   moments   in   which   the  
characters  struggle  to  hold  a  conversation,  which   leads  to  several  moments   in  
which  no  dialogue  occurs.  The  characters,  and  the  spectators,  are  left  listening  
to  the  general  noise  of  the  pub.  It  is  during  these  moments  of  non-­conversation  
that  I  become  aware  of  my  own  body,  as  both  an  editor  and  a  spectator.  During  
these  moments  of  silence  I  stop  decoding  the  language  being  spoken,  and  I  am  
left  alone  with  the  characters.  The  affective  tone  of  the  film  seems  to  seep  out  
through   the   cracks   in   the   conversation,   between   the   stutters   and   the   pauses.  
This  is  further  accentuated  through  the  use  of  the  long  take.    
  The  principle  established   in   the   first   piece  of   practice,   that   of  meaning  
being   derived   through   rhythm   and   duration,   is   taken   further   in   Practice   ii.  
Whereas  Practice   i  has   the   form  of  an  experimental  piece,  Practice   ii   is  more  
	   74  
clearly   recognizable   as   a   short   narrative   film.   There   are   several   moments   in  
which   extended   shot   length   is   used   to   privilege   duration   and   rhythm,   and  
ultimately  affect.  The  most  extreme  use  of  the  long  take  occurs  at  approximately  
the  midpoint   of   the   film,   in  which   the   couple  dance   for   just   over   two  minutes.  
Whilst   this   is   a   less   extreme   version   of   the   nine-­minute-­and-­thirty-­two-­second  
shot  in  Practice  i,   it   is  still  a  particularly  long  shot  in  relation  to  the  average  for  
classical   narrative   cinema.   The   average   shot   length   in   classical   or  Hollywood  
narrative   cinema   fluctuated   between   eight   and   eleven   seconds   in   the   period  
between  1930  and  1960,  whereas  the  average  shot  length  of  many  films  fell  to  
below   five   seconds   between   1960   and   2004   (Bordwell,   2006:   121–123).   The  
long  take  is  a  more  common  feature  of  European  art  cinema  and  what  Matthew  
Flanagan  refers  to  as  slow  cinema  (2012),   in  which  average  shot   lengths  tend  
to   be   a   lot   longer.   In   extreme   cases   average   shot   lengths   can   exceed   ninety  
minutes,   as   seen   in   Russian   Ark   (Sokurov,   2002)   and   Birdman:   Or   (The  
Unexpected  Virtue  of  Ignorance)  (Iñárritu,  2014),v  but  it  is  more  common  to  see  
shot  lengths  averaging  between  30  seconds  and  three  minutes,  as  in  the  films  
of   established   and   canonical   art-­house   directors   such   as   Andrei   Tarkovsky,  
Michelangelo   Antonioni,   Béla   Tarr,   Abbas   Kiarostami   and   Carlos   Reygadas,  
amongst  many  others   (Flanagan,  2012).  The   long   take   in  art-­house  cinema   is  
often  associated  with  a  cinematic  realism.    
The  key  instigator  of  a  theory  of  the  long  take  in  relation  to  realism  is,  of  
course,  André  Bazin  (2005).  The  last  line  of  André  Bazin’s  essay  ‘The  Evolution  
of   the   Language   of   Cinema’   is   telling.   Bazin   states   that   ‘the   film-­maker   is   no  
longer  the  competitor  of  the  painter  and  the  playwright,  he  is,  at  last,  the  equal  
of  the  novelist’  (2005:  40).  This  comment  is  symptomatic  in  that  Bazin  implies  a  
hierarchy  among  the  four  art  forms.  Cinema  here  is  linked  closely,  and  for  Bazin  
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favourably,  with  an  art  form  primarily  concerned  with  telling  stories  through  the  
use  of  a   linguistic  system.  Bazin  also   famously  ends  a   re-­edit  of  his  essay  on  
the  ontology  of   the  photographic   image  with   the  phrase   ‘on   the  other  hand,  of  
course,   cinema   is   also   a   language’   (2005:   16).   In   his   introduction   to  What   is  
Cinema?  (2005)  Dudley  Andrew  notes  that  this  famous  phrase  was  added  later,  
years   after   the   original   essay   was   written.   Nonetheless,   this   statement   does  
cement   Bazin’s   position   as   a   theorist   who   privileged   cinema’s   linguistic  
properties.  This  is  supported  by  Bazin’s  later  essays,  particularly  ‘The  Evolution  
of   the   Language   of   Cinema’.   Bazin   draws   comparisons   through   implication  
between  the  long  take  and  Walter  Benjamin’s  notion  of  aura  (1968).  For  Bazin,  
the  long  take  brings  us  closer  to  the  real,  and  is  thus  privileged  over  montage.  
To   reinforce   this   point   of   view   he   states   that   ‘the   beauty   of   a   copy   is   no  
substitute   for   the  authenticity  of  a  Vermeer’   (2005:  46).  Nevertheless,   the   long  
take   in  Practice   ii   is  not  about   the  authenticity  of   representation   in  a  Bazinian  
sense.  Rather,  the  long  take  is  approached  through  the  bodily  sensation  of  time,  
as   conceptualized   by   Jon   Beasley-­Murray   (1997:   49).   The   rhythm   and  
movement   within   the   image   act   in   a   similar   way   to   the   affectual   image   in  
Practice   i,   in   that   the  shot  privileges  sensation  and  embodied  experience.  The  
shot  is  not  particularly  realist,  although  the  style  of  the  film—with  its  use  of  long  
takes  and  naturalistic  settings,   its  preference   for  medium  and  wide  shots,  and  
its  working-­class  characters—could  be  described  as  realist,  at  least  in  spirit.    
The  shot  itself  occurs  outside  the  traditional  narrative  space  of  the  film.  It  
is  a  sequence  that  breaks  up  the  narrative  and  signals  a  move  from  one  state  to  
another,   that   of   the   formal   date   and   the   more   intimate   setting   of   the   female  
protagonist’s   home.   It   is   an   undefined   space,   and   it   could   be   described,  
following   Deleuze,   as   ‘an   any-­space-­whatever’.   For   Deleuze,   an   any-­space-­
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whatever  exists  outside  the  traditional  mode  of  action  (1992:  111).  Shadows  are  
a   key   element   of   the   any-­space-­whatever,   as   is   the   lack   of   distinct   spatial  
markings.  These  elements  are  present  in  the  dance  sequence,  which  functions  
as   an   affective   moment.   The   background   of   the   image   is   dark,   and   the  
characters  are  picked  out  by  a  spot  of   light.  The  location  is  unknown,  and  it   is  
difficult   to   identify   what   kind   of   space   it   is.   The   shot   exists   outside   of   the  
temporal  and  spatial  logic  of  the  narrative,  and  it  is  a  moment  in  which  there  is  
little  plot  progression.  In  this  sense  the  image  opens  itself  up  to  affect.  Duration  
here   is   important,  and   the  continual  movement  over   time  allows   the  spectator  
the   opportunity   to   cease   decoding   the   image.   The   dance   is   not   strictly  
representational   in  this  manner;;   it   is  not  accompanied  by  music,  as  one  would  
expect  in  a  traditional  dance  sequence,  and  it  does  not  occur  in  the  usual  space  
for   dancing,   that   of   a   dance   hall   or   disco/nightclub.   The   two   protagonists   are  
also  alone  in  this  moment.  They  are  away  from  people,  and  the  background  is  
shrouded   in   shadow,   separating   the   two   dancers   from   any   clearly   identifiable  
location.  The  sequence  is  not  solely  about  the  culturally  defined  ritual  of  dancing,  
but  is  more  about  the  rhythm  and  movement  of  bodies  through  space.  Tiago  de  
Luca  notes  that  a  sparse  and  empty  mise  en  scène  affords  the  spectator  relief  
from   the   scanning   of   an   image   in   search   of   narrative   cues,   and   privileges   a  
‘viewing  experience  through  a  sensuous  contact  with  material  reality’  (2014:  10),  
free   from   narrative   interaction   in   a   traditional,   linear,   Aristotelian   sense.   The  
image  is  accompanied  by  sounds  of  the  pub,  which  includes  the  rhythmic  beat  
of   bar  maintenance.   This   beat   operates   in   a   similar   way   to   the   sound   of   the  
darts  hitting  the  dartboard  in  Practice  i.  The  beat  helps  to  accentuate  the  rhythm  
of  the  movement.    
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There   is  of  course  a  representational  element   to   the  sequence.  Despite  
the  lack  of  music,   it  should  be  clear  that  the  couple  are  dancing.  It   is  the  most  
intimate  moment  of  the  film  so  far.  The  couple  are  close,  and  the  lack  of  music  
serves  to  accentuate  this  closeness.  Up  until  this  moment  the  couple  have  been  
exchanging  words  in  a  conversation.  This  conversation  is  inevitably  leading  to  a  
more   intimate  exchange,  which  both  characters  desire.  That  conversation   is  a  
symbolic  or  metaphorical  verbal  slow  dance.  However,  the  dance  sequence  on  
which  the  narrative  of  the  film  hinges  is  not  metaphorical.    
There  are  no  metaphors  in  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
The  dance  sequence   is  a   rhythmic  moment,  which  allows  an  embodied  
experience  of  both  the  banality  of  the  situation,  as  in  Practice  i,  and  the  intimacy  
of   the   relationship   between   bodies.   The   moment   stands   for   itself,   as   an  
expression   of   physicality.   The   banal   is   present   in   the   ongoing   conversation,  
which   is   an   extension   of   the   moment   in   the   pub   in   which   inconsequential  
opinions   on   beverage   preference   and   local   knowledge   are   shared.   The  
conversation  that  has  been  taking  place  is  a  non-­conversation  of  sorts,  but  the  
intimate  exchange  of   the  dance   is   very  much   real.  There   is  a  pressure   in   the  
shot,  as  there  is  tension  in  the  pub,  which  is  only  relieved  when  the  characters  
leave  the  frame.  In  Sculpting  in  Time,  Andrei  Tarkovsky  discusses  filmic  rhythm  
as  created  through  the  time  pressure  running  through  shots  in  a  film  (1986:  114).  
For   Tarkovsky,   time   is   directly   imprinted   on   a   shot,   and   it   is   the   pressure  
created   by   the   imprint   of   time   that   creates   the   rhythm   of   the   film.   This   time  
pressure   is   felt   keenly   in   the   shot   of   the   couple   dancing.   The   shot   reaches  
breaking   point   as   the   camera   pans   to   the   right   and   stops   on   a   row   of   wall-­
mounted   lights.  The  pressure  and  rhythm  felt   in   the  shot  do  not  end  when  the  
film  cuts   to   the  subsequent   image.  The   rhythm  and  vibration  of   this  shot,  and  
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others   before   it,   are   felt   in   the   shots   that   follow.   The   affective   tone   of   this  
moment  is  felt,  and  it  resonates  after  the  shot  ends  in  the  same  way  that  ripples  
flow  out   from  a  stone   thrown   into  water  after   the  stone  has  disappeared   from  
view.   It   is   thus   somewhat   disingenuous   to   write   of   individual   shots   as   if   they  
were   somehow   autonomous   entities.   The   affective   timbre   of   each   shot   is  
dependent  upon  the  shot(s)  that  come  before  and  the  shot(s)  that  follow.    
Preceding   the   dance   sequence   is   a  wide   angle   of   the   pub.   The   deep-­
focus  sequence  shot  pans  approximately  270  degrees,  from  the  table  at  which  
the  couple  are  speaking  to   the   jukebox   in   the  corner,  surveying  as   it  does  the  
pool   table,   the  bar  and   the  dartboard   (seen   in  Practice   i).  This  preceding  shot  
could  be  described  as  an  example  of  temps  mort.  Temps  mort,  or  dead  time,  is  
described   by   András   Bálint   Kovács   as   moments   in   the   narrative   that   are   a  
‘representation   of   a   time   sequence   in   the   protagonist’s   life,   where   nothing  
happens,  for  example,  transitions  from  one  location  to  another,  waiting,  having  
nothing  to  do’  (2008:  156).  In  the  270-­degree  pan  the  spectator  is  removed  from  
the  spatial  proximity  of  the  characters,  as  the  position  of  the  camera  pushes  the  
characters  into  the  background.  The  characters  are  filmed  simply  talking  about  
nothing   of   particular   importance.   The   camera   pans   to   reveal   the  world   of   the  
pub  as   it  continues   to  exist  without   regard   to   the  unfolding  narrative.  The   fruit  
machine   flashes,   and   anonymous   men   sit   silently   on   stools   at   the   bar.   The  
camera   finally   comes   to   a   stop  at   a   jukebox,  which   is   not   playing  any  music.  
The   late   Greek   filmmaker   Theo   Angelopoulos   describes   temps   mort   as   an  
evocation  of  musical  pauses  which  allow  ‘the  viewer  to  grasp  the  sense  of  the  
entire  sequence’  (2001:  26  cited  in  Flanagan,  2012:  97).  The  panning  shot  that  
surveys   the   whole   pub   allows   time   for   the   rhythm   of   the   preceding   dialogue  
sequence   to   resonate   with   the   spectator,   whilst   also   enabling   a   moment   of  
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quietude  before   the  dance  sequence.  The  moment  of   temps  mort   leads   into  a  
newly   emerging   affective   rhythm,   thus   allowing   the   body   to   adjust   to   the  
changing  somatic  field.    
The   shot   that   follows   the   dance   sequence   is   shorter   than   the   two  
preceding  shots,  lasting  six  seconds,  and  it  is  more  abstract  in  nature.  The  shot  
itself   is  a   low  angle  on  a  streetlight,  although   the   light   is  difficult   to   identify  on  
first  viewing.  Due  to  the  relatively  low  dynamic  rangevi  of  the  digital  sensor  and  
the  position  of   the  source   light   facing  directly   into   the   lens  of   the  camera,   the  
image  of  the  lamp  is  overexposed.  A  bright  white  light  cuts  through  the  centre  of  
the   frame,   splitting   the   image   in   two   and   thus   obscuring   the   representational  
quality   of   the   image.   Considering   Bergson’s   (2004)   adage   that   the   difference  
between  the  qualities  of  affect  and  representation  is  a  difference  of  degree  and  
not  of  kind,  the  image  that  follows  the  dance  sequence  is  closer  to  the  quality  of  
pure  affect  than  to  that  of  representation.  Following  the  dance  sequence  with  a  
purely   affective   image   allows   a   gestation   of   affect.   The   affective   tone   of   the  
moment   is  elongated.   It   is  a  pause   in   the  rhythm  of   the   film   that  has  a  similar  
function  to  that  of  the  preceding  temps  mort.  Thus  the  intensity  of  the  long  take  
is   increased  and  preserved.  The   long   take   in  Practice   ii   signifies   a   change   in  
affective   register,   and   signals   a   new  movement   in   the   tone  of   the   film.   It   is   a  
simple  technique  that  is  used  to  accentuate  the  tonal  nature  of  the  narrative  of  
the  film.    
Practice  ii  features  several  prominent  close-­up  shots.  The  film  opens  with  
three   close-­up   or   medium   close-­up   shots.   These   three   shots   serve   several  
functions   in   the   affective   tone   of   the   film,   as   well   as   helping   to   establish   the  
affective  key  in  which  the  film  will  be  played.  The  film  begins:  
Black  screen,  cut  to:    
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Close-­up:  a  face  of  a  woman.  She  is  dressed  in  black,  lit  from  the  right  of  
frame  by  daylight  coming  in  through  the  window.  She  smokes.  She  is  framed  by  
shadow   and   the   dark   black   of   her   hair.   She   exhales   smoke,  whilst   tilting   her  
face  up  to  the  right.  The  light  catches  the  left  of  her  neck,  which  is  tense  from  
the  movement  of  her  head.  
Cut  to:  
A   hand   holds   a   cigarette   above   an   ashtray.   The   cigarette   is   rolled  
through   the   fingers  before  being  stubbed  out  with  pressure.  The  hand  pushes  
down  on  the  cigarette  stub  several  times.  Each  time  pressure  is  exerted  on  the  
stub,  the  hand  becomes  tense,  changing  state.  There  is  light  coming  in  from  the  
right  of  frame.  The  light  hits  the  top  right  of  the  hand.  It  is  a  soft  light,  but  it  still  
highlights   the  muscles  and  bones  of   the  hand  as   it  becomes   tense.  Once   the  
cigarette   is   extinguished,   the   fingers   of   the   hand   flick   out   briefly,   causing   the  
shape  of  the  hand  to  change.  
Cut  to:  
A  man’s   face   in  profile.  The   face   is  surrounded  by  a  sea  of  bright   lime  
green.  The  features  of  the  face  are  sharp.  The  chin  and  nose  are  clearly  defined  
against  the  bright  green  background.  By  virtue  of  the  choice  of  framing,  the  top  
of   the   man’s   head   is   cut   off,   which   serves   to   highlight   the   sharpness   of   the  
features   further.  The  body  of   the  man  sways  slightly,  as  his  head   tilts  up  and  
down.  He  looks  directly  out  of  the  right-­hand  side  of  the  frame.    
The   images   that   open   the   film   do   not   serve   a   direct   narrative   purpose  
when   they   first  meet   the  spectator   (although  a   retrospective  narrative  analysis  
could  be  applied).  They  do  not  exist   to  establish   the   theme  of   the   film,  nor  do  
they   build   or   contribute   to   characterization.   The   images   collide   violently,   and  
they   lack   any   clear   spatial   or   temporal   link.   These   three   images   are   affective  
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studies   of   facial   and   bodily   tension,   and   they   will   be   interpreted   against   the  
following   theoretical   concepts:   the   third   meaning   (Barthes),   the   punctum  
(Barthes),  photogénie  (Epstein)  and  the  affection-­image  (Deleuze).  
The   punctum,   ‘the   moment   that   pricks   me’   (Barthes,   1993:   27)   for  
Barthes,   is   the   element   of   an   image   that   exists   outside   a   traditional   semiotic  
reading   and   does   not   need   to   be   culturally   decoded.   It   exists   for   Barthes   in  
photography,   and   appears   by   accident   rather   than   design.   Barthes   describes  
the   punctum   as   an   element   that   shoots   out   of   a   picture   like   an   arrow   which  
pierces  the  viewer.  As  Barthes  describes  it,  the  punctum  is  also  a  ‘sting,  speck,  
cut,   little   hole’   (Barthes,   1993:   27).   Just   like   the   invisible   and   poignant  
atmosphere   that   exists   in   the   films   of   Tarkovsky   as   attested   by   Robert   Bird  
(2008),   the   punctum   is   difficult   to   describe   in  words.   The   punctum   is   a   sharp  
feeling.  It  could  be  deemed  desirable  to  begin  a  film  of  affective  tonality  with  a  
sharp  feeling.    
The  work  of  French  filmmaker  and  theoretician  Jean  Epstein,  as  well  as  
elements   of   Deleuze’s   work   on   cinema,   helps   to   flesh   out   the   use   of   the  
punctum  in  the  opening  close-­ups  of  Practice  ii.  The  punctum  is  similar  to  what  
Barthes  terms  the  obtuse  or  third  meaning  in  cinema.  The  third  meaning  can  be  
located,   but   not   described.   It   is   significance   that   is   important.   Barthes   notes:  
‘The   filmic   is   that   in   the   film   which   cannot   be   described,   the   representation  
which  cannot  be  represented’  (1977:  64).  Barthes  writes  on  a  scene  from  Sergei  
Eisenstein’s  Ivan  the  Terrible  Part  1  (1945),  decoding  the  image  by  noting  down  
an   informal   and   symbolic   level   of   signification.   Barthes   also   identifies   a   third  
level  of  signification,  which  is  harder  to  pin  down  (1977:  53).  The  third  meaning  
for  Barthes  is  that  part  of  the  image  which  holds  the  viewer’s  attention  despite  a  
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clear   lack  of  symbolic  significance,  which  perhaps  exists  outside  of  knowledge  
and  culture.    
As   stated   earlier,   Practice   ii   opens   with   a   close-­up,   which   lasts   for  
approximately  sixteen  seconds.  Shot   length   is   important  here  also.  The  act  of  
holding   the  close-­up  allows  a  privileging  of   the   third  meaning.  The   image  of  a  
woman   in   a   kitchen   smoking   a   cigarette   exists   without   context.   She   is  
anonymous,   as   she   remains   throughout   the   film.   She   has   no   backstory,   no  
history,   and   there   are   few   signs   to   decode.   The   spectator   is   allowed   to   look  
upon  the  image  without  being  prompted  to  work  at  a  cognitive  level.  The  image  
does   not   ask   questions,   nor   does   it   function   to   set   up   a   narrative.  Whilst   the  
shot   is  not  especially   long,   it  does  run   for   longer   than  one  would  expect  of  an  
average  shot   in  narrative  cinema.  The  shot   is  a  study  of   light   falling  across  a  
face,   the   movement   of   the   face   and   the   exhaling   of   smoke.   These   three  
elements   of   the   image   are   designed   to   evoke   an   emotional   and   affective  
response  in  the  spectator.    
Barthes’   third   meaning   has   parallels   with   Epstein’s   photogénie.  
Photogénie   has   been   defined   by   Paul   Willemen   as   ‘a   fleeting   moment   of  
experience  or  emotional   intensity,  a  sensation   that   the  viewer  cannot  describe  
verbally  or  rationalise  cognitively’  (1994).  Photogénie  is  not  easy  to  describe  or  
quantify,  but   it   is   something   that   seems   to  exist.   It   is  a  moment  of  movement  
inside   the   body   that   emerges   from   a   collision   between   the   image   and   the  
spectator.  It  is  an  affect,  but  not  one  that  comes  directly  from  an  easily  identified  
and  localized  touch,  as  in  the  pin  pricking  the  finger;;  instead  it  is  an  affect  that  
comes  as  if  from  the  air,  like  a  slight  breeze  that  washes  over  the  skin  and  then  
resides  within  as  a  vibration.  It  is  a  feeling  that  you  cannot  locate,  but  you  know  
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it   is   there.   This   is   the   feeling   elicited   by   the   three   elements   of   the   opening  
image:  light,  skin  and  movement.  
Jean   Epstein   describes   photogénie   as   ‘the   art   of   cinema’   (2012:   293).  
For  Epstein  and  Delluc  the  ability  to  elicit  such  a  feeling  is  one  of  cinema’s  most  
unique  properties,  and  serves  to  elevate  it  to  an  art  form.  Epstein  describes  the  
photogenic  as  ‘any  aspect  of  things,  beings,  or  souls  whose  moral  character  is  
enhanced  by  filmic  reproduction’  (2012:  293).  It   is  a  sentiment  that  is  indirectly  
echoed  by   director  Robert  Bresson  when  he   notes   that   cinema   should   ‘make  
visible  what,  without  you,  might  never  have  been  seen’  (1977:  39).  The  opening  
shot  allows   the  spectator   to   look  at   a   face,  and   to   study   the  play  of   light   and  
movement   in   a   way   that   would   not   normally   be   expected   or   accepted   in  
everyday   life.   The   opening   shot   is   a   moment   that   reveals   the   face   to   the  
spectator  in  a  Bressonian  sense.  The  spectator  is  allowed  to  look  upon  the  face  
as  though  seeing  it  for  the  first  time,  free  from  concept.    
Drawing   on   Deleuze’s   notion   of   the   affection-­image,   the   close-­up  
deterritorializes  a   face  or  object   (1992:  97),   taking   it  out  of   its  spatial-­temporal  
setting  and  distancing  it  from  social  function  (Bogue,  2003:  76).  Deleuze  states:  
‘[as]   soon   as   we   consider   complex   shots,   which   go   beyond   the   simplistic  
distinction  between  close-­up,  medium  shot  and   long  shot,  we  seem  to  enter  a  
“system  of  emotions”  which  is  much  more  subtle  and  differentiated,  less  easy  to  
identify,  capable  of  producing  non-­human  affects’  (1992:  110).  Both  Epstein  and  
Delluc   write   of   an   element   of   the   cinema   that   exists   outside   narrative   but  
touches  the  spectator,   like  Barthes’  punctum  or  third  meaning.  The  photogenic  
element  exists  outside  narrative,  but  not  necessarily  outside  meaning.  The  act  
of  pricking  the  spectator  creates  meaning  and  adds  to  the  tone  of  the  film.  The  
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opening  shot  of  Practice  ii  is  like  the  opening  note  of  a  musical  composition,  in  
that  it  sets  the  key  in  which  the  film  will  be  played.    
   The  two  shots  which  follow  the  opening  close-­up  serve  a  similar  purpose  
in   that   they   are   establishing   an   affective   rhythm   which   is   to   be   continued  
throughout  the  film.  The  second  close-­up  continues  the  close  study  of  skin  and  
light  established   in  shot  one.  The  hand   in   the  second  shot  could  be  described  
as   what   Nathaniel   Dorsky   calls   a   devotional   object.   In   Devotional   Cinema,  
Dorsky  writes:    
If  you  have  ever   looked  at  your  hand  and  seen   it   freshly  without  concept,  
realized  the  simultaneity  of  its  beauty,  its  efficiency,  its  detail,  you  are  awed  
into   appreciation.   The   total   genius   of   your   hand   is   more   profound   than  
anything   you   could   have   calculated   with   your   intellect.   One’s   hand   is   a  
devotional  object.  If  a  film  fails  to  take  advantage  of  the  self-­existing  magic  
of  things,   if   it  uses  objects  simply  to  mean  something,   it  has  thrown  away  
one  of  its  greatest  possibilities.    
(2005:  38)  
  
The  shot  of  the  hand  also  allows  a  study  of  light  and  skin,  and  muscle  and  bone.  
The  hand  too  is  deterritorialized,  as  through  framing  it  is  cut  off  from  its  owner.  It  
is  an  anonymous  hand,  an  orphan  hand.  The   image  of   the  cigarette   links   it   to  
the   woman   in   the   opening   frames,   but   the   two   entities   have   not   had   the  
opportunity   to  meet.   It   is  a  hand,   not  her  hand.   In   fact,   it   could   be   the   hand,  
seen  afresh,  as  the  face  was  previously.  The  affective  note  of  the  second  shot  
is   similar   to   the   first,   although   the   intensity   is  higher.  The   tension   in   the  hand  
evokes   a   different   affective   response   in   the   spectator.   This   is   accentuated  
through  the  final  frames  of  the  shot,  in  which  the  fingers  of  the  hand  flick  out  in  a  
violent   motion.   This   final   flick   is   a   sharp   end   to   a   peaceful   introduction.   The  
movement  of  the  hand  propels  the  spectator  into  the  next  shot,  the  cut  to  which  
is  quite  a  violent  one.  
   The  tension  of  shot  two  is  carried  into  shot  three  in  several  ways.  In  shot  
three  we  are  presented  with  another   face,   this   time  male.  The  deterritorialized  
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image  of  the  face  is  a  Deleuzian  affection-­image.  It  is  again  a  study  of  the  face,  
but  this  time  it  is  different.  There  is  of  course  a  change  of  gender,  and  a  change  
of  age,  but   the  most  striking  difference   is   the  change  of  perspective.  The  man  
looks   through   the   frame   from   left   to   right.   He   is   shot   in   profile,   which  
accentuates   the   sharp   detail   of   his   features.   His   face   is   tense,   and   his  
movements  are  tentative  and  unbalanced.  This  is  quite  a  stark  contrast  with  the  
soft   image   of   the   face   in   shot   one.   There   is   also   a   significant   luminance   and  
colour   change  between   shot   two  and   shot   three.   Large  areas   of   the   frame   in  
shot  two  are  dark  or  completely  black,  and  there  is  little  use  of  colour  in  the  take,  
save   for  a   few  dull   red  and  brown   tones   in   the  background  of   the   image.  The  
major  colour  in  the  frame  is  the  hand’s  skin  tone,  which  is  quite  pale.  Shot  three  
introduces  a  large,  bright  block  of  colour  in  the  form  of  the  green  wall.  This  block  
of  colour  encompasses  over  half  the  frame.  The  abrupt  nature  of  the  cut  and  the  
significant   changes   in   the   physical   properties   of   the   image   present   a   small  
shock  to  the  nervous  system  of  the  spectator.  The  pupils  of  the  eye  are  forced  
to  quickly  adjust  to  the  brightness  of  the  image,  causing  a  miosis  or  constriction  
of   the   pupils.   Different   synapses   in   the   visual   cortex   of   the   brain   are   also  
stimulated  due  to  the  introduction  of  a  new  colour  (Zeki,  1999:  3,  Rogers,  2010:  
30).   Thus   the   affective   rhythm   of   the   sequence   has   taken   a   new   turn.   It   is   a  
sharp  ending  to  the  opening  sequence,  which  is  reflected  in  the  length  of  shot  
three.   The   last   shot   in   the   sequence   is   the   shortest   at   approximately   five  
seconds.   It   is   the  visual  equivalent  of  a  symbol  crash  at   the  end  of  a  musical  
movement.  This  is  accentuated  once  more  by  the  cut  to  a  predominantly  black  
screen  at   the  end  of   the  sequence,  sending   the   film  back   into  a  more  relaxed  
state.  Close-­ups  in  this  opening  sequence,  and  in  the  rest  of  the  film,  are  used  
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as  affective  studies.  In  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality,  the  close-­up  is  not  used  
to  give  information;;  rather  it  is  a  carrier  of  specific  sensations.  
  The   three   initial   shots   work   together   to   create   an   opening   sequence  
which  is  about  establishing  the  affective  tone  of  the  film.  It  is  a  rhythmic  opening  
of  physical  elements,  rather  than  one  which  focuses  on  semantic  narrative.  This  
rhythm  continues  into  the  sequences  or  movements  which  follow.  Close-­ups  are  
used   sparingly   throughout   the   rest   of   the   film.   They   are   used   at   intervals   to  
return  to  the  opening  notes  of  the  establishing  moments.  Seven  minutes  into  the  
film  there  is  an  image  of  the  woman.  This  time  the  image  is  concerned  with  the  
movement  of   the  eyes,  as   the  character  switches   from  a  state  of  avoiding   the  
gaze   to   an   act   of   looking.   This  movement   is   repeated   twice   in   an   attempt   to  
capture  the  look  in  action.  Towards  the  end  of  the  film  there  is  also  a  series  of  
close-­ups  in  a  return  to  the  opening  rhythm,  only  this  time  in  a  slightly  different  
key.  When  the  two  characters  enter  the  woman’s  home  we  are  presented  with  a  
close-­up  of  a  young  boy  in  the  hallway,  followed  by  a  reverse  shot  of  the  man  
returning  the  boy’s  look.  This  shot-­reverse-­shot  serves  no  purpose  in  the  plot  of  
the  film,  but  the  contrast,  and  the  uneasy  nature  of  the  exchange,  disrupts  the  
logic  and  the  tone  of  the  moment.    
There   are   also   other   uses   of   the   close-­up   which   occur   outside   the  
narrative  flow  of  the  film.  These  moments  or  images,  such  as  the  close-­up  of  a  
glass  of  gin  and  tonic,  result   in  brief  rhythmic  pauses  in  the  flow  of  the  film.  In  
the  case  of  the  gin  and  tonic,  the  camera  focuses  on  the  bubbles  which  rise  to  
the   top  of   the  glass.  The  movement  and   flow  of   the  bubbles   is   the   key   focus  
here.  There   is  a  shot  of  a  green  pool   table  and  a   red  carpet,  which  deal  with  
light  and  shadow  as  well  as  colour,  which  will  be  considered  next.  The  use  of  
framing   and   shot   size,   specifically   the   close-­up   or   medium   close-­up,  
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accentuates   the   photogenic   qualities   of   images   within   the   film.   These   are  
moments  of  heightened  affective  resonance.    
   David   Bordwell   and   Kristin   Thompson   write   on   the   use   of   colour   as   a  
signifying   form   in   cinema   in   Film   Art:   An   Introduction   (2008),   although   the  
authors  do  not   spend  much   time  discussing   the   topic.   In   their   comprehensive  
examination  of   the   formal  elements  of  cinema,  colour  plays  a  marginal   role   in  
the   discussion.   David   Batchelor   argues   that   colour   has   been  marginalized   in  
Western   culture   for   centuries   in   discussions   of   art   practice,   cultural   theory   or  
philosophy   (2000).   Colour   in   classical   narrative   cinema   is   often   used   as   a  
signifying  or  symbolic  tool.  Colour  can  be  used  as  a  metaphor  for  the  theme  of  
the   film,  or   to  signify   the   internal  state  of   the  character  or  certain  aspects  of  a  
character’s   personality.   Colour   can   also   be   used   to   highlight   an   important  
element  in  the  frame,  and  to  draw  the  eye  of  the  spectator.  Certain  colours  can  
also   be   associated   with   certain   genres   of   narrative   cinema   (Bordwell,   2006,  
Bordwell   and   Thompson,   2008).   The   practice   of   using   colour   for   signification  
does  not  take  into  account  the  affective  qualities  of  colour,  which  are  the  most  
important   elements   of   a   cinema   of   affective   tonality.   Looking   towards  
experimental  and  art  cinema  brings  us  closer  to  an  affective  reading  of  colour.  
Filmmaker   Derek   Jarman’s   book  Chroma:   A   Book   of   Colour   (1995)   contains  
some  useful  insights.  The  book  opens  with  a  poem:  
     
Chroma  
Brilliant,  gorgeous,  painted,  gay,    
Vivid,  flaunting,  tearaway,    
Glowing,  flaring,  lurid,  loud,    
Screaming,  shrieking,  marching,  proud,    
Mellow,  matching,  deep  and  sombre,    
Pastel,  sober,  dead  and  dull,  
Constant,  colourful,  chromatic,    
Party-­coloured  and  prismatic,    
Kaleidoscopic,  variegated,    
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Tattooed,  dyed,  illuminated,    
Daub  and  scumble,  dip  and  dye,    
High-­keyed  colour,  colour  lie.  
(Jarman,  1995:  1)  
  
The  range  of  adjectives,  verbs  and  nouns  used  all  evoke  the  affective  quality  of  
colour.  The  words  suggest  emotion,  vibration,  rhythm,  tone  and  movement.  The  
opening   of   the   book   prompts   the   reader   to   think   of   colour   as   a   force,   not   a  
symbol.   Throughout   the   book   Jarman   writes   about   or   alludes   to   the   physical  
properties   of   colour.   For   Jarman,   colour   has   smell   and   taste;;   it   bristles   and  
pricks   the   skin.   The   cinematographer   Christopher   Doyle   takes   a   similar  
approach  to  Jarman  in  his  relationship  with  colour.  For  Doyle,  colour  is  energy  
and   emotion,   and   colour   is   directly   linked   to   feeling.   Doyle   studies   colour  
through  engaging  with  his  emotional  responses  to  colour  in  space  (Doyle,  2005,  
2007,  2014).    
The  use  of  colour  plays  an  important  role  in  the  affective  tone  of  the  film.  
The  colour  scheme  in  all   three  practice  pieces  revolves  around  red  and  green  
with   elements   of   blue.   There   are   several   examples   of   blocks   of   colour   being  
used   throughout   the   film.   The   main   colours   used,   red   and   green,   appear   in  
blocks   in   several   places   throughout   the   films.   The   two   central   characters   are  
wearing   red  and  green   coats.  The  male   character   also  wears  green   trousers.  
The   decor   of   the   pub   includes   large   areas   of   red,   such   as   the   table   and   the  
chairs  and  sofa  areas.  The  walls  of  the  female  character’s  bedroom  are  green.  
Her   bed   linen   is   red   and   her   mattress   is   green.   This   colour   choice   is   based  
around  opponents   rather   than  a   palette   decided  upon  because  of   a   theme  of  
semiotic  significance.    
     In   all   practice   pieces   colour   is   used   for   its   affective   intensity.   The  pure  
sensation  of  colour  as  an  affective  image  is  employed  for  its  vibratory  qualities  
	   89  
rather   than   its   representational   or   metaphorical   qualities.   To   draw   again   on  
Deleuze’s   concept   of   the   affection-­image,   colour   is   what   Ronald   Bogue  
describes   as   ‘decontextualized   affects-­in-­themselves’   (2003:   81).   There   are  
several  moments  in  which  blocks  of  colour  encompass  the  whole  screen.  In  the  
first   few   moments   of   entering   the   pub,   the   spectator   is   presented   with   two  
blocks  of  colour.  Two  shots  follow  each  other:  the  first  is  a  patterned  red  carpet,  
and  the  second  is  an  image  of  the  bright  green  felt  of  a  pool  table.  The  red  and  
green   colour   pattern   was   chosen   for   its   physiological   opponency.   Red   and  
green   are   oppositional   colours,   existing   at   polar   ends   of   the   colour   scale.  
Leonardo  da  Vinci   famously  noted   that  colours   that  work   in  opposition  are   the  
most  pleasing.  Thus  red  and  green,  orange  and  blue,  and  yellow  and  purple  are  
pairings  of  colours  that  work  well  together.  The  neuroscientist  Semir  Zeki  notes  
that  oppositional  colours  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  visual  cortex  in  the  brain.  In  
his  book  on  the  brain’s  response  to  art,  Inner  Vision:  An  Exploration  of  Art  and  
the  Brain  (1999),  he  expands  upon  da  Vinci’s  maxim  by  mobilizing  findings  from  
neuroscience:  ‘Cells  in  the  visual  system  that  are  excited  by  red  are  inhibited  by  
green,  those  that  are  excited  by  yellow  are  inhibited  by  blue  and  those  that  are  
excited  by  white  are   inhibited  by  black   (or   vice   versa   for   each)’   (1999:   3).  By  
making  use  of  the  affective  properties  of  colour,  the  filmmaker  is  able  to  excite  
and   inhibit   certain   parts   of   the   brain   and   engender   a   physiological   response.  
Alfred  Hitchcock  was  aware  of  cinema’s  ability  to  affect  properties  in  the  brain.  
Screenwriter  Ernest  Lehman   recalls  a  moment  during   the  making  of  North  by  
Northwest   (Hitchcock,   1959)   in   which   Hitchcock   talked   of   the   nature   of   the  
filmmaking  process  and  audience  response:    
‘Ernie,  you  know,  we’re  not  making  a  movie.  We’re  constructing  an  organ,  
the  kind  of  organ   that  you  see   in  a   theatre.  And  we  press   this  chord  and  
now  the  audience  laughs.  And  we  press  that  chord,  and  they  gasp.  And  we  
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press  these  notes,  and  they  chuckle.’  He  said,  ‘Someday  we  won’t  have  to  
make  the  movie.  We’ll   just  attach  them  to  electrodes  and  play  the  various  
emotions  for  them  to  experience  in  the  theatre.’    
(Lehman  in  Destination  Hitchcock)  
  
Colour   is   a   vital   component   in   the   formation  of   affective   tone.  Zeki   notes   that  
colour   is   recognized   in   the   brain   before   form  or  movement   (1999:   58   cited   in  
Kennedy,   2000:   179).   There   is   a   sensorial   primacy   to   colour,   which   can   be  
harnessed  by  the  filmmaker  when  considering  the  construction  of  affective  tone.    
   The  final  elements  of  the  taxonomy  of  affective  tonality  to  be  considered  
in   this   chapter   are   elemental   traces   and   texture.   These   are   elements   of   the  
image  that  the  spectator  will  not  necessarily  experience  at  a  cognitive  level,  and  
which  have  no  representational  value.  These  elements  of  the  image  do  not  form  
a  part  of  a  system  of  semiology  under  any  current  conceptual  framework.  These  
elements  do  not  stand   for  anything  other   than   themselves.  They  do,  however,  
have   a   life   of   their   own,   and   they   are   a   key   component   of   the   image.   These  
elements   consist   of   film   grain,   digital   picture   noise,   and   fluctuations   and  
vibrations  of  light.  
   Film  grain  and  vibrations  are  very  much  part  of   the  viewing  experience,  
yet  most   technical  considerations  of  grain  or  picture  noise  seem  to  view  these  
elements   as   a   defect   of   the   image,   and   as   problems   to   be   solved.   Upon  
releasing  a  new  film  stock,  Kodak  will  often  boast  about  the  low  levels  of  grain.vii  
In   the   cinema   of   affective   tonality   these   elements   are   not   defects,   but   a   vital  
component   of   the   texture   of   an   image.   Experimental   filmmaker   Norman  
McLaren  famously  wrote:  ‘if  I  find  a  film  dull,  I  find  it  infinitely  more  entertaining  
to  watch  the  scratches’  (cited  in  Barker,  2009:  23).  Whilst  the  spectator  may  not  
explicitly   notice   the   texture   of   an   image,   there   is   no   doubt   that   it   affects   the  
viewing   experience.   Chris   Marker’s   La   jetée   (1962)   is   an   interesting   film   to  
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consider  in  this  respect.  As  every  critic  or  commentator  on  Marker’s  seminal  film  
will   tell   you,  La   jetée   is   a   film   composed  almost   entirely   of   still   images,   apart  
from  one  moving  image  of  a  woman  waking  from  sleep.  The  use  of  the  phrase  
‘still   image’   to   describe  Marker’s   photo   roman   is   accurate   and   yet   somewhat  
misleading.   The   film   is   comprised   of   photographs,   but   these   images   are  
anything  but  still.  Anybody  who  has  seen  La   jetée   knows   that   the   images  are  
erratic.  These  still  images  shake  on  the  screen,  almost  as  though  they  are  trying  
to  escape  the  confines  of  the  frame.  They  ripple,  shake  and  vibrate  through  the  
frame.  Layers  of  grain  dance  on   the  surface  of   the   image.  The  grain   is  barely  
perceptible,  present  but  not  present.  One  cannot  grasp  or  hold  onto  this  picture  
grain,   as   it   disappears   as   quickly   as   it   appears.   They   work   as   a   team,   the  
ethereal  grain.  They  only  have  a  life  as  a  group,  as  individually  they  would  not  
be  perceived  at  all.  The  vibrations  of   the   images  and   the  picture  grain  help   to  
give  life  to  the  image.  One  could  also  consider  a  documentary  feature,  such  as  
Robert   Flaherty’s  Man   of   Aran   (1934).   The   images   in   Flaherty’s   film   have   a  
poetic  beauty,  but  just  as  the  sea  off  the  coast  of  Aran  shimmers  in  the  sun,  so  
does   the   film   stock   as   minute   exposure   levels   change   from   frame   to   frame.  
These  micro-­elements  of  the  image  are  often  overlooked  by  the  filmmaker/critic,  
but  they  are  a  vital  component  of  a  film’s  affective  make-­up,  and  grain  or  lack  of  
grain  contributes  significantly  to  the  tone  of  the  film.  
Several  film  theorists  have  engaged  with  the  idea  that  images  on  screen  
have  a  textural  quality.  In  Texture  in  Film,  Lucy  Fife  Donaldson  investigates  this  
property  of  film.  For  Donaldson,  texture  can  refer  to:    
The  tactile  quality  of  a  surface,  the  way  a  surface  is  changed  by  light,  paint  
or  other  materials,   the  composition  of   fabric  or  narrative  (as   in   the  root  of  
the  word,  to  make/weave),  the  pattern  of  sound  (rhythm  and  register)  and  
the  ‘concrete’  properties  of  language  (metre,  diction,  syntax).    
(2012)    
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Ian   Garwood   also   refers   to   texture   in   his   monograph   The   Sense   of   Film  
Narration   (2013),   in   which   he   examines   texture   in   the   films   of   Alejandro  
González   Iñárritu,   John  Lasseter,   Todd  Solondz,   Johan  Grimonprez  and  Paul  
Thomas  Anderson.viii  As  well  as  these  formal  elements,  there  is  also  the  ‘quality  
of  the  image’.  Quality  in  this  instance  refers  to  the  elemental  nature  of  the  image,  
such  as  contrast,  sharpness,  digital  noise  or  film  grain.    
The   images   in  Practice   ii   consist   of   a   lot   of   digital   noise.   The   images  
could   be   described   as   grainy.   The   colours   are   also   saturated,   but   they   lack  
sharpness  due  to  the  slightly  lower  resolution  (1280  x  720,  rather  than  the  1920  
x   1080   of   full   HD)   and   the   digital   noise.   This   serves   to   increase   the   textural  
feeling  of  the  image  itself.  There  is  an  ethereal  or  uncanny  quality  to  the  image,  
which   places   it   at   a   distance   from   the   viewer.   It   lacks   fidelity,   and   it   appears  
almost   as   though   the   screen   is   dirty.   This   is   a   narrative   element   of   the   film,  
although  it  works  through  experience  rather  than  story  or  character.  It  allows  the  
audience  to  experience  the  nature  of  the  place  represented  and  simultaneously  
be   affected   by   the  micro-­movements   of   the   noise   on   the   screen.   This   relates  
closely  to  the  mood  of  the  film.  The  texture  of  the  image  is  a  central  harmonic  
element  of  the  film,  always  present  but  just  out  of  reach.    
In  Practice   ii   the   process   of   narrative   film   production   employed   formal  
affective  elements  in  order  to  create  a  narrative  film  that  was  structured  around  
rhythm,   tone   and  mood   rather   than   classical   narrative   structure.   The   film  and  
the   filmmaker   took   advantage   of   pre-­existing   affective   states,   which   were  
captured   in   the  camera  and  reshaped   through   the  edit   to  be  released   into   the  
wild   to   alter   the   affective   state   of   the   spectator   through   the   experience   of  
watching  the  film   itself.  Vincanne  Adams,  Michelle  Murphy  and  Adele  E.  Clark  
describe  the  condition  of  living  under  modern  capitalism  as  an  affective  state  of  
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anticipation   (2009:  247).  This  affective  state  of  anticipation  dominates  modern  
life   through   the   act   of   living   in   a   constant   state   of   uncertainty   whilst   one  
prepares  for   the  potential  of  experiencing  future  trauma.  This  affective  state  of  
anticipation  brings  the  future  forward  in  order  to  colonize  the  present.  The  act  of  
watching  a  film  in  this  instance  is  a  moment  of  decolonization  in  which  the  future  
is   unfolded   from   the   present  moment   and  new  affective   regimes  may  persist.  
Sarah  Ahmed  notes  that  through  the  act  of  stubbing  one’s  toe  on  a  table  leg  an  
impression  of  the  table  leg  is   left  on  one’s  body.  This  impression  exists  on  the  
toe  itself,  but  also  in  the  movement  away  from  the  object  and  the  audible  noise  
made.   For   Ahmed   this   is   a   flow   of   sensations   and   feelings   which   become  
consciousness  of  pain  (2004:  29).  Just  as  the  table   leg   leaves   its  mark  on  the  
toe,  the  film  also  leaves  its  mark  on  the  body.  However,  with  the  act  of  watching  
the  film,  the  flow  of  sensation  is  not  so  specifically  localized  as  it  is  in  the  case  
of   Ahmed’s   toe   or   Bergson’s   finger.   The   flow   of   affective   elements   emerges  
from  varying   temporal  points,   yet   they  do  not   leave  one  specific  mark.   In   fact  
they   do   not   leave   a   visible  mark   at   all,   but   they   do   result   in   a   change   of   the  
normative  affective  state.    
The   key   objective   for   the   cinema   of   affective   tonality   is   to   provoke   a  
change   in   normative   affective   states   through   the   use   of   various   affective  
elements.  These  affective  elements  are   the   filmic  equivalent  of  musical  notes.  
They  can  be  used  in  different  ways  in  order  to  create  a  composition  which  may  
be  played  on  the  body  of  the  audience,  thus  shaping  their  affective  relationship  
with  the  content  of  the  film  and  the  world  around  them  once  they  finish  watching  
the  film  and  drift  off  into  other  affective  encounters.    
   Practice   ii   has   allowed   experimentation   with   different   elements   of   the  
taxonomy   of   affective   tonality,   and   a   further   consideration   of   the   body   of   the  
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filmmaker   in   the   process   of   production.   The   taxonomy   of   affective   tonality  
informed  all  levels  of  production.  At  the  level  of  pre-­production,  costume  choices  
and   location  were   determined   through   a   consideration   of   colour.   The   camera  
choice  and  the  shooting  style  were  also  informed  by  the  taxonomy,  as  were  the  
editing   decisions   in   post-­production.   The   biggest   shift   in   the   approach   to  
practice   occurred   during   the   production   process.   As   mentioned   in   the  
introduction,  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  is  a  digital  form,  as  one’s  affective  
relationship  with  the  camera  and  the  location  acts  as  a  guiding  principle  in  the  
process  of  image  creation.  During  the  production  process  I  was  able  to  respond  
to   fluctuations  of   light,   changes   in  contrast  and  colour,  and  arbitrary  meetings  
between  actors  and  the   location  (such  as  actors  standing   in  a  specific  area  of  
light   or   colour),   and   capture   these  moments   on   camera   quite   spontaneously.  
The   recordings   of   these   moments   were   not   intended   to   capture   footage   to  
forward  a  plot.  Rather,  the  filming  and  audio-­recording  was  a  case  of  collecting  
notes  in  order  to  later  form  an  affective  composition.    
   In   the   following   chapter   I   will   reflect   upon   the   production   of  Practice   iii  
and  Practice  iv,  whilst  putting  together  the  final  pieces  of  the  cinema  of  affective  
tonality.  Practice   ii   is   the  most   conventional  piece  of  work   I   have  produced   in  
terms  of  narrative  cinema.  There   is  a  plot,  which   is  easily   followed,  and  whilst  
the  character  motivations  are  ambiguous,  it  is  possible  to  logically  interpret  their  
actions.  Practice  iii  and  Practice  iv  are  my  attempts  to  move  away  from  the  clear,  
linear   logic   of   classical   narrative   cinema  and  move   towards  a  pure   cinema  of  
affective  tonality.  The  chapter  includes  an  explanation  of  the  techniques  used  to  
achieve   this   goal,   and   an   addition   to   the   taxonomy  of   affect,  which   takes   the  
form  of  a  list  of  five  conditions  for  the  production  of  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.  
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i  Robert  McKee  is  the  author  of  the  bestselling  screenwriting  book  Story:  Substance,  Structure,  
Style,  and  the  Principles  of  Screenwriting  (1999),  which  is  often  said  to  be  essential  reading  for  
filmmakers  interested  in  narrative  (particularly  Hollywood)  cinema  (Parker,  2003,  Zinoman,  2009,  
Baer,  2013).  McKee  was  famously  depicted  by  actor  Brian  Cox  in  Spike  Jonze’s  Adaptation  
(2002),  a  film  concerning,  amongst  other  things,  the  screenwriting  process.    
ii  A  comprehensive  examination  of  Jarman’s  work  can  be  found  in  Michael  O’Pray’s  Derek  
Jarman:  Dreams  of  England  (1996).    
iii  Digital  Cinema  cameras  such  as  the  Canon  C500,  C300  Mark  II  and  C100  Mark  II  boast  a  top  
ISO  of  102,400  (Cinema  EOS  Cameras—Digital  Cinema—Canon  UK,  2015).  
iv  This  mirror  is  very  much  not  of  the  Lacanian  persuasion.    
v  Birdman  is  an  Oscar-­winning  Hollywood  production,  but  director  Alejandro  González  Iñárritu  
certainly  comes  from  an  art-­house  tradition,  having  directed  the  Spanish-­language  films  Biutiful  
(2010)  and  Amores  Perros  (2000),  as  well  as  the  polyphonic  Babel  (2006).    
vi  In  cinematography,  dynamic  range  refers  to  the  amount  of  light  a  film  stock  or  digital  sensor  is  
able  to  capture,  measured  in  camera  stops.  More  information  can  be  found  in  Kodak  
http://motion.kodak.com/motion/About/The_Storyboard/4294971099/index.htm    
vii  The  product  blurb  for  the  Vision  3  500T  Color  Negative  film  states  that  ‘our  proprietary  
advanced  Dye  Layering  Technology  (DLT)  gives  you  noticeably  reduced  grain  in  shadows’  
(Kodak  Vision3  500T  Color  Negative  Film  5219/7219,  no  date).    
viii  Specifically,  Amores  Perros,  Toy  Story  2,  Palindromes,  Double  Take  and  Magnolia.    

	   97  
CHAPTER  4:  
PRACTICE  III:  A  VALIANT  FAILURE,  
PRACTICE  IV:  THE  CINEMA  OF  AFFECTIVE  TONALITY  
  
   In   the   previous   two   chapters   I   have   made   an   attempt   to   map   out   a  
taxonomy   of   affect   in   order   to   create   a   toolbox   for   filmmakers   to   use   in   the  
production  of   the  cinema  of  affective   tonality.   I  have  written  about   the  body  of  
the  film,  and  the  body  of  my  ideal  spectator.  However,  there  is  a  missing  body:  
the   body   of   the   filmmaker.   My   own   embodied   response   to   the   filmmaking  
process  is  a  vital  component  in  the  production  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  
from   the   perspective   of   film   practice.   In   what   follows   I   will   reflect   upon   my  
decision-­making   process   and   the   role   of  my   relationship  with   the   body   of   the  
camera  and  the  body  of  the  edit.    
Practice  iii   is  a  twenty-­one-­minute-­long  film  which  looks  at  the  home  life  
of   the  central   character   featured   in   the   first   two  pieces  of  practice.  Practice   iv  
brings  together  the  three  previous  films  through  a  re-­edit.  Practice  iv  represents  
an   archetype   for   the   production   of   a   cinema   of   affective   tonality.   In   all   four  
pieces  of  practice  I  have  made  an  attempt  to  understand  the  world  of  the  central  
character   through   an   embodied   relationship   with   the   images   on   screen.   The  
process  of  producing  Practice  iv  was  the  most  complex  of  all  my  practice  work,  
and   I  achieved   the   final   results   through  an  engagement  with  and  reflection  on  
my  own  subjective  relationship  with  the  material  gathered.  In  this  case  ‘material’  
refers  to  the  rushes  produced  during  filming.  I  shaped  the  material  through  the  
shooting   specifically,   but   also   through   the   editing   of   the   footage   in   order   to  
produce   a   finished   film.   However,   the   life   of   the   material   at   times   drove   the  
process.   It   is   the   affective   relationship   between   the   screen   of   the   editing  
machine   and   the   body   of   the   editor   that   I   will   be   reflecting   upon   later   in   this  
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chapter.   The   results   of   the   edit   for  Practice   iii   led   to   a   need  on  my  part   as   a  
filmmaker   to  disrupt   the  spatial  and   temporal  continuity  not  only  of  Practice   iii,  
but  also  of  Practice   i  and  Practice   ii.   I   feel   that   this  disruption  of  continuity   led  
me  closer  to  achieving  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
   In  my   third  practice  piece   I  wanted   to  continue  observing   the   life  of   the  
unnamed  man  from  the  first  two  films.  This  time,  I  wanted  to  observe  him  in  his  
home,   and   I  wanted   to   introduce   a   third   character;;   this   character  would   be   a  
stranger  who  disrupts  the  daily  routine  of  the  man.  The  film  also  has  a  story  or  
plot;;  this  story  is  more  ambiguous  than  that  found  in  the  second  film,  albeit  still  
closer  to  a  traditional  narrative  film  than  that  presented  in  Practice  i.  In  terms  of  
structure,  Practice   iii   sits   somewhere   between  Practice   i   and  Practice   ii.   The  
third  practice  piece  has  a  beginning,  middle  and  end,  in  that  order.  The  central  
character   does   go   through   a   change   in   that   he   moves   from   one   location   to  
another  (his  house  to  his  shed),  and  his  life  is  changed  by  the  introduction  of  an  
outside   force.  He  does  not  have  a  goal   in   the  sense  of  a   traditional  narrative,  
and   he   is   a   passive   rather   than   an   active   character.   The   role   of   the   central  
character   differs   in   this   regard   from   Practice   i   and   Practice   ii,   in   which   the  
unnamed  man  is  both  active  and  goal-­oriented.  His  goals  in  those  films  can  be  
considered   simple   and   his   journey   mundane,   but   he   does   have   goals   and  
objectives.  He  wants  to  throw  a  bullseye,  and  he  wants  to  connect  with  another  
human   being   (perhaps   the   second   goal   is   not   so   simple,   but   the   journey   as  
presented  in  Practice  ii   is  arguably  mundane).  Active,  goal-­oriented  characters  
are  a  key  component  of  classical  Hollywood  narrative  cinema.  The  importance  
of   this   classical   character   type   has   been   hailed   by   theorists   of   narrative  
structure  from  Aristotle  (2013)  to  William  Archer  (2011),    Robert  McKee  (1999)  
and   Syd   Field   (2005,   2006).   In   the   third   piece   of   practice   I   wanted   to   move  
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further  away  from  a  classical,  goal-­oriented  structure   in  an  attempt   to  avoid  or  
disturb   potential   narrative   expectations   that   a   spectator  may   have.   There   are  
some  plot  markers   that  help   to  anchor   the  work  as  a  narrative  piece.   I  do  not  
want  the  films  to  fall  into  pure  abstraction,  as  to  do  so  would  certainly  herald  a  
different  project  altogether.  My  films  are  about  human  experience,  and  that  fact  
alone   links   them   to   the   theatre   of   Greek   antiquity;;   but   the   status   of   the  
protagonist   separates   the   film   from   classical   narrative.   The   central   character  
‘drifts’   through   the   space:   not   only   does   he   have   no   goal,   but   he   is   also  
incapable   of   having   any   effect   on   the  world   around   him.   This   is   not   a  wholly  
original  character  trope,  of  course.  Deleuze  identified  this  character  in  the  crisis  
of  the  action-­image  (1989,  1992),  which  emerged  in  the  cinema  after  the  end  of  
the   Second  World  War   through   the   films   of   the   Italian   neorealists   and   in   the  
films  of  the  French  New  Wave,  and  which  is  echoed  in  films  by  the  directors  of  
the  New  American  Cinema  of   the  1970s,  specifically  Martin  Scorsese,  Francis  
Ford   Coppola,   George   Lucas   and   Alan   J.   Pakula.   In   the   crisis   of   the   action-­
image,  characters  are  unable  to  affect  their  milieu,  thus  complicating  Todorov’s  
classic   structure   of   equilibrium,   disequilibrium   and   new   equilibrium,   or   as  
Deleuze   formulates   it,   the   structure   of   situation-­action-­situation   or   action-­
situation-­action.    
The  Man  in  Practice  iii  differs  from  Taxi  Driver’s  Travis  Bickle  (Scorsese,  
1976)  or  The  Conversation’s  Harry  Caul   (Coppola,  1974)   in   that  he  makes  no  
attempt   to   affect   the   world   around   him.   The   Man   stands   enveloped   in   a  
fluctuating  pool  of  affect.  He  is  not  a  victim  of  circumstances  beyond  his  control.  
Rather,  his  body  is  a  witness  to  forces.  In  Practice  iii  I  wanted  to  capture  these  
forces  on  camera,  as  well  as  to  film  the  effects  of   these  forces  on  the  body  of  
the   protagonist.   In   order   to   achieve   this   I   moved   in   closer   to   the   characters,  
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employing  extreme  close-­ups,  and  I  allowed  the  camera  to  move  over  the  body.  
I  have  tried   to   film  the  figural,  and   in   this  case  I  am  drawing  upon  the  work  of  
Francis  Bacon,  but  more  specifically  Deleuze’s  engagement  with  Bacon   in  his  
monograph  Francis  Bacon:  The  Logic  of  Sensation  (2003).  In  Practice  ii  I  filmed  
a  dance;;  in  Practice  iii  the  whole  film  is  a  dance.  It  is  a  dance  between  the  lens  
of  my  camera,   the  body  of   the  characters  and   the  ontological  make-­up  of   the  
spectator.  In  The  Logic  of  Sensation  Deleuze  refers  to  El  Greco’s  painting  The  
Burial  of  the  Count  of  Orgaz  (1586–1588)  in  order  to  begin  to  conceptualize  the  
figural.   For   Deleuze,   the   figures   in   the   top   half   of   the   painting   are   liberated,  
relieved   of   their   representative   roles;;   these   figures   are   only   about   sensation,  
particularly  in  the  celestial  sense  in  that  they  concern  an  image  of  the  heavens  
(2003:   9).   The   figural   privileges   sensation   and   moves   ‘beyond   both   the  
illustrative   and   the   figurative’   (Deleuze,   2003:   34).   There   are   moments   in  
Practice   iii   in   which   the   camera   sweeps   over   the   surface   of   various   bodies:  
human  and  non-­human  bodies,  porcelain  bodies  and  liquid  bodies.  The  camera  
focuses  on  ripples  and  creases  in  the  skin,  milk  as  it  flows  over  the  rim  of  a  cup,  
and  hairs  standing  on  end.  These  shots  were  captured  using  a  technique  called  
‘freelensing’.   This   is   a   technique   in   which   images   are   captured   with   the   lens  
detached  from  the  camera  and  reversed,  resulting   in   light   leaks,  unusual   focal  
patterns,  a  very  shallow  depth  of  field,  and  shorter  focal  distances  that  enable  a  
focus  on  objects  close   to   the  camera   lens.  The  resulting   images   teeter  on   the  
edge   of   abstraction,   being   simultaneously   identifiable   and   somehow   strange.  
Bodies  stretch  and  blur,  and  they  move  in  unusual  ways.  The  images  are  figural  
rather   than   figurative.   Deleuze   clarifies   this   distinction   when   writing   on   the  
paintings  of  Bacon:  ‘The  figure  is  still  figurative,  it  still  represents  someone…  it  
still  narrates  something’   (2003:  97).  The   figural  does  not   represent  or  narrate,  
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but   rather   it   captures   forces.   In   the   words   of   Bacon,   the   figural   ‘create[s]  
resemblance,   but   through   accidental   and   nonresembling   means’   (Sylvester,  
1987:  105–107  cited   in  Deleuze,  2003:  98).  The   images   in  Practice   iii  present  
an  engagement  with  the  figural,  which  represents  feelings  and  forces  as  much  
as  it  does  objects.    
The  affective  tone  conveyed  in  Practice  iii  is  of  loneliness,  confusion  and  
anxiety.   The   protagonist   lives   a   solitary   and   quiet   existence   in   a   bachelor’s  
home.  Birds  and  a  cat  occupy  his  garden,  their   image  echoed  in  the  collection  
of   ceramic   birds   found   scattered   around   the   house.   A   new   character   is  
introduced  to   the   film   in   the   form  of  The  Stranger,  who  breaks   into  The  Man’s  
garden  and   later   into  his  house.  The  Stranger  begins   to  slowly  move   into  The  
Man’s   shed   whilst   removing   The   Man’s   belongings   from   his   house.   The   film  
ends   on   an   image   of   The   Man   in   the   shed,   surrounded   by   objects   from   the  
home  such  as  paintings,  statues  and  kitchenware.  The  film’s  image  reflects  the  
emotional  and  affective  state  of  the  character,  and  this  is  achieved  through  the  
texture  and  rhythm  of  the  film.  I  chose  to  use  close-­ups  and  a  shallow  depth  of  
field   to   obscure   the   view   of   The   Stranger   and   to   affect   the   shape   and  
consistency  of  the  objects  being  filmed.  Practice  i  and  Practice  ii  were  shot  with  
a  wide-­angle  lens  for  the  majority  of  the  film.  Practice  i  was  filmed  on  a  35mm  
lens,   and  Practice   ii   was   filmed   on   a   29mm   lens.i  A  wide-­angle   lens   yields   a  
larger  field  of  view,  and  a  deeper  depth  of  field  at  equivalent  f-­stops.  The  focal  
lengths  used  in  the  first  two  films  produce  a  field  of  view  similar  to  that  of  normal  
vision.  The  choice  of  lens  lends  the  first  two  films  a  feeling  of  vérité  in  that  there  
is  less  disruption  to  habitual  vision.  In  Practice  iii  habitual  vision  is  disturbed  in  
order  to  create  a  feeling  of  the  uncanny  in  the  spectator.  This  feeling  is  imparted  
by   the   film   to   create   an   affective   harmony   between   the   protagonist   and   the  
Comment [MS1]: The	  guideline	  document	  referenced	  in	  this	  endnote	  also	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  to	  be	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  bibliography.	  
	   102  
viewer.   Susan  Sontag   states   that   the   director  Robert   Bresson  makes   films   of  
narrative  experience  (2009:  181).  Sontag  shares  André  Bazin’s  view  that  film  is  
a   language,   and   whilst   the   content   of   much   of   this   thesis   appears   to   be  
diametrically   opposed   to   this   sentiment,   Sontag’s   analysis   of   a   Bressonian  
language  can  be  of  use  for  conceptualizing  a  film  practice  of  affective  tonality.  
Sontag   notes   that   Bresson’s   films   are   about   tranquillity   and   spiritual   balance,  
and  that  the  films  themselves  induce  this  feeling  in  the  spectator  (Sontag,  2009).  
It   is   Bresson’s   unique   ability   to   induce   a   feeling   in   the   spectator   which  
corresponds   with   the   theme   and   narrative   of   the   film   that   makes   Bresson   a  
superior   filmmaker   in   the   eyes   of   Sontag   (2009).   In   many   ways   this   is   the  
intention  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality:  to  induce  a  feeling  in  the  spectator  
which  is  analogous  to  the  film’s  subject.    
Compared  with  the  two  previous  films,  Practice  iii  has  a  looser  narrative  
structure   in   the   traditional   sense.   I   have   attempted   to   mobilize   the   entire  
taxonomy  of  affect  in  order  to  allow  the  spectator  to  understand  a  moment  in  a  
person’s  life  through  a  variation  of  affective  tone.  The  spectator  does  not  know  
the  protagonist,  but  understands  the  protagonist  through  the  feeling  imparted  by  
the  tapestry  of  affect.  I  have  expanded  upon  the  techniques  used  in  the  first  two  
pieces   of   practice   and   experimented   with   new   techniques.   An   RGB   colour  
scheme   is   deployed,   as   well   as   blocks   of   colour   which   are   not   attached   to  
objects  but  are  themselves  blocks  of  sensation.  Texture   is  considered,  as  well  
as   movement   of   the   camera   and  movement   within   the   frame.   I   introduce   an  
anonymous  character   in  the  form  of  The  Stranger  to  act  as  a  form  of  affective  
disruption.  The  film  presents  a  dualistic  relationship  between  human/nature  and  
domestic/wild.   This   is   mirrored   by   the   protagonist   and   the   domesticity   of   his  
house,   and   by   the   wildness   of   the   garden   and   the   animals   that   occupy   this  
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outside  space.  The  protagonist’s  desire  to  join  the  wild  is  present  in  the  ceramic  
birds   found   in   his   house.   This   desire,   like   all   desire,   is   both   seductive   and  
frightening.   The   dualistic   nature   of   this   relationship   is   problematized   by   the  
appearance  of  the  stranger.  He  literally  ignites  a  fire  within  the  domestic  setting.  
He   consumes   with   an   animalistic   recklessness,   and   he   is   possessed   of   a  
strength  and  physicality   that  are  not  available   to  The  Man.  The  protagonist   is  
both  drawn   to  and   frightened  of  The  Stranger’s   image.   In  Practice   iii   fear  and  
desire   are   represented   not   by   an   object,   but   through   duration,   rhythm   and  
sensation.  
   At  the  stage  of  shooting  and  editing  Practice  iii  I  knew  the  affective  tone  I  
wished  to  produce,  and  I  had  a  good  idea  of  how  I  wanted  to  produce  this  tone.  
I   had   certain   techniques   at   my   disposal,   developed   though   my   taxonomy   of  
affect.   I   knew   that   I   wanted   to   experiment  with   different   techniques,   so   as   to  
further  test  the  method  developed  in  the  first  two  pieces  of  practice.  I  had  also  
come  to  the  realization  that  the  taxonomy  of  affect  alone  is  limited,  and  as  such  
does   not   allow   a   full   expression   of   the   cinema   of   affective   tonality.   This   was  
hinted  at   in  the  previous  chapter  when  I  wrote  of  the  impossibility  of  viewing  a  
single  shot  or  a  single  frame  as  an  individualized  unit  separate  from  the  rest  of  
the  film.  The  filmic  techniques  laid  out  in  the  taxonomy  cannot  be  fully  realized  
on  an  individual  basis.  A  single  thread  in  a  tapestry  cannot  be  removed  from  a  
structure  and  studied  in  isolation,  as  to  do  so  would  be  to  rob  the  thread  of   its  
affective   force  and  risk   the  unravelling  of   the  rest  of   the   tapestry.   In  Time  and  
Free  Will,  Henri  Bergson  offers  a  commentary  on   the   impossibility  of  counting  
the  strokes  of  a  distant  bell  without  losing  something  of  the  nature  of  the  sound.  
To  count  the  strokes  one  must  separate  them,  and  by  doing  this  one  loses  the  
qualitative   impression  made  by  the  series  of  sounds  (Bergson,  2002:  54).  The  
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same  is  true  for  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality.  The  techniques  established  in  
the   taxonomy   are   relational,   as   it   is   only   through   their   relations   that   they  
become  tonal  rather  than  linguistic.    
   In   Practice   iii,   and   subsequently   Practice   iv,   I   had   to   take   a   different  
approach   to   the   construction   of   the   films.   Through   the   development   of   each  
piece  of  practice  I  moved  further  away  from  the  use  of  the  traditional  screenplay.  
For   each   film   I   had   an   overview/synopsis,   and   a   scenario   which   bore   a  
resemblance  to  the  traditional  screenplay.  However,  the  scenario  was  discarded  
in   the   edit,   as   attention   had   to   be   paid   to   the   material   being   shaped   into   a  
finished   film.   In  order   to  effectively  and  affectively  shape   the   film,   I  needed   to  
respond   to   the   perceived   affective   resonance   of   the   material.   My   emotional  
response   was   integral   to   producing   an   affective-­tonal   narrative   composition.  
Deleuze   comments   on   Bergson’s   reflections   on   art   and   music.   Bergson  
considered   the   storytelling   arts   to   be   lesser   than   the   emotive   arts   (Bergson,  
1935  cited  in  Deleuze,  1991).  For  Bergson  and  Deleuze,  the  novel  is  the  classic  
example  of  the  storytelling  art,  whereas  music  is  the  emotive  art  form  (Deleuze,  
1991:   135).   The   creative   aspect   of   emotion   is   important   for   the   cinema   of  
affective  tonality.  In  Bergsonism  Deleuze  states  that  a  piece  of  music  about  love  
is  not  about  a   love   for  a   specific  person,  but   rather  about   the   transference  of  
emotions  from  the  piece  of  music  to  the  hearer,  and  from  the  hearer  to  the  piece  
of  music  (1991:  110).  Barbara  Kennedy  comments  upon  the  musical  nature  of  
cinema   in  Deleuze  and  Cinema:  The  Aesthetics  of  Sensation   (2000),  and   it   is  
something   that   I   have   made   reference   to   in   previous   chapters.   The   film  
spectator   is   nudged  by   the  emotional   resonance  of   the   film   in   an  experiential  
mode.  It  is  my  job  as  a  filmmaker  to  respond  to  the  rhythm  of  the  footage  when  
working  with  the  already  shot  material.  
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   I   am   a   filmmaker   of   affective   tonality,   and   I   have   to   experience   the  
material   during   the   construction  of   the   film   in   order   to   know  something  of   the  
affective  nature  of  the  material  I  am  gathering  during  the  process  of  shooting.  In  
the   editing   suite   I   introduce   disparate   material   to   see   what   new   possibilities  
arise.   I   listen   to  and   feel   the   footage   to  understand  what   feelings   it   imparts   to  
me.   I   am   now   in   a   relationship   with   my  material   which   is   less   hierarchical.   I  
listen   out   for   the   film,   and   respond   to   the   timbre   of   the   images.   To   borrow   a  
phrase   from   documentary   filmmaker   Frederick  Wiseman,   editing   the   film   is   a  
voyage   of   discovery   (Grant,   1992).   The   editing   process   is   an   exchange   of  
emotional  responses:  my  emotional  response  to  the  material,  and  the  material’s  
reciprocal  response  to  itself.    
   I   managed   to   use   a   wide   range   of   techniques   in   Practice   iii,   and   the  
results  are  positive.  The  structure  of  the  film  obfuscates  linearity,  which  serves  
to   heighten   the   sense   of   the   uncanny   and   unease,   which   is   the   central   tone  
produced  through  the  film.  The  film  skips  through  time,  moving  from  day  to  night  
in  a  fluid  fashion.  It  was  my  intention  to  create  more  of  a  dream  logic  in  the  film  
in   which   a   continuity   of   space   and   time   are   disrupted.   The   editing   decisions  
here  were  driven  by  the  reverberatory  elements  of  the  image,  as  mapped  out  in  
the   taxonomy   of   affect.   Historically,   editing   styles   have   been   split   between  
continuity  editing,  which  developed  in  the  early  silent-­film  period  and  resulted  in  
the   classical   Hollywood   style   of   editing   (Bordwell   et   al.,   1985),   and  montage,  
developed   by  Soviet   filmmakers   in   the   1920s.ii  There   have   been   variations   of  
these   two   techniques   throughout   the   history   of   cinema—Steven   Shaviro’s  
analysis  of  Harmony  Korine’s  Spring  Breakers  (2012)  gives  a  good  example  of  
modern  cinema’s  subversion  of  continuity  editing  (Shaviro,  2013)—but  the  split  
in  editing  styles  in  narrative  cinema  is  still  very  pronounced.    
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There   are   examples   of   continuity   editing   in  Practice   iii,   specifically   the  
utilization  of  shot-­reverse-­shot.  For  example,  the  protagonist  is  seen  at  various  
times  looking  out  of  frame.  These  shots  are  followed  by  a  cut  to  a  second  shot,  
the  focus  of  which  can  be  assumed  to  be  the  object  of  the  protagonist’s  gaze.  
The   third   shot   is   again   of   The  Man   looking.   An   example   of   this   technique   is  
provided  in  the  first  scene  in  The  Man’s  kitchen.  It  is  morning,  and  The  Man  is  
making  breakfast  for  himself.  In  the  middle  of  this  preparation  he  turns  his  head  
to  the  left,  and  he  looks  out  of  frame  left.  I  cut  to  a  shot  of  pigeons  eating  bread  
in  the  garden,  before  cutting  back  to  The  Man.  It  can  be  assumed  that  the  man  
is  looking  at  the  pigeons.  In  classical  narrative  cinema  this  sequence  shot  would  
often  serve  the  purposes  of  character  identification  and  narrative  development.  
The  second  shot  would  give  information  that  might  be  important  for  the  plot,  and  
it   could   also   help   to  move   the   plot   forward.   The   sequence   also   positions   the  
spectator  with   the  character  doing  the   looking,   in   that   the  spectator  sees  what  
the  character  sees.  The  cut  in  classical  narrative  cinema  would  be  motivated  by  
the  act  of  looking,  as  though  the  image  and  edit  are  attached  to  the  vision  of  the  
character.    
In  my  example  from  Practice  iii  the  pigeons  are  not  important  for  the  plot.  
If  the  three  shots  are  taken  out  of  the  context  of  the  film  as  a  whole,  the  second  
shot  can  be  seen  as  an  example  of  the  spectator  seeing  what  the  protagonist  is  
seeing.   The   shots   that   follow   problematize   this   reading   of   the   sequence,  
however.  The  image  begins  to  move  as  the  camera  pans  to  the  left  whilst  The  
Man  continues  to  make  breakfast.  This  movement   is  broken  up  with  two  more  
cuts  to  the  pigeons  in  the  garden.  These  two  cuts  do  not  correspond  to  the  gaze  
of  the  character;;  he  is  still   looking  at  his  breakfast.  The  second  two  cuts  to  the  
pigeons   respond   to   the   movement   and   the   colour   on   screen.   The   slight  
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movement  that  occurs  on  screen  and  the  large  blocks  of  red  that  exist  within  the  
frame  are  cut  and  disrupted.  The  smooth  qualities  of  the  image,  the  colour  and  
the   slow   movement,   are   violently   interrupted.   The   Man   appears   to   be   quite  
composed  and  relatively  still  within   the  frame,  but  he   is  at   the  beginning  of  an  
emotional  and  psychological  disruption.  This  is  echoed  in  the  violent  cuts  to  the  
image.   The   soundscape   is   also   disrupted   by   the   sound   of   the   pigeons.   The  
sound  of  a  dripping  tap,  and  later  the  sound  of  a  boiling  kettle,  create  a  rhythm  
and  a  heightened  sense  of  duration   in   the  sequence.  The   repetitive  nature  of  
the  sound  serves  to  unify   the  space  and  time   in  which  the   images  occur.  This  
unity   is   undermined   by   the   repetitive   shots   of   the   pigeons,   as   the   sound   that  
appears  to  emanate  from  these  animals  seeps  into  the  image.  I  cut  back  to  The  
Man  looking  out  of  the  frame  twice  more  in  this  sequence:    
Shot  1:  Medium  shot,  The  Man  looks  up  and  out  of  frame.  
Cut  to:    
Shot  2:  Medium  long  shot,  the  garden.  
Cut  to:  
Shot  3:  Close-­up,  The  Man  looks  up  and  out  of  frame.    
In  this  instance  the  linearity  of  time  is  disrupted.  I  do  not  show  two  shots  of  The  
Man  looking,  separated  by  a  moment  in  time.  Rather,  I  repeat  the  same  image  
of   The   Man   looking,   at   different   intensities.   The   second   shot   of   The   Man   in  
close-­up   increases   the  affective   intensity  of   the  moment,  as  The  Man  and   the  
spectator   are   brought   closer   together.   The   shots   together   do   not   give  
information;;   they   are   a   study   in   the   movement   of   the   head.   The   cuts   to   the  
kitchen  serve  to  establish  the  affective  tone  of  the  scene.  It  is  here  that  I  want  to  
break  the  habitual  vision  of  the  spectator  to  make  them  feel  uneasy.  In  this  way  
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the  spectator  can  begin  to  know  something  of  the  internal  state  of  the  character  
through  a  change  in  their  own  internal  state.    
The  affective  tone  of  Practice  iii  is  one  of  uneasiness  and  of  the  uncanny,  
and   in   this   sense   the   film   is   successful.   Once   I   had   finished  with   the   editing  
process  I  screened  the  film  back  to  myself,  and  whilst  I  felt  a  resonance  with  the  
affective  tone  of  the  film,  I  was  not  fully  satisfied  with  the  results.  The  three  films  
made  so  far  had  been  an  exploration  of  and  an  experimentation  with  technique.  
In   Practice   i   I   explored   rhythm,   duration   and   movement   in   a   more   formalist  
mode,   which   bore   more   resemblance   to   experimental   film   than   traditional  
narrative   cinema.  The   techniques  were  expanded  upon   in  Practice   ii   in   a   film  
which  had  a  more  traditional  narrative  structure.  Practice  iii  was  to  take  the  next  
step  in  experimenting  with  technique.  The  different  formal  elements  used  in  the  
third  film  were  effective  and  affective,  but  the  combined  elements  did  not  work  
together  quite  as  well  as   I  had  planned.  The   individual  elements  worked  well,  
but  the  combination  of  the  disparate  parts  did  not  yield  a  satisfactory  whole.  As  
previously   noted,   the   affective   resonance   of   one   image   depends   upon   the  
images  that  surround  it,  and  in  this  instance  the  whole  was  less  than  the  sum  of  
its  parts.    
I  tried  to  figure  out  what  was  wrong  and  why  my  response  to  the  film  was  
lacking.  After  serious  consideration  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  there  were  too  
many  traditional  narrative  elements.  In  Practice  iii  I  wanted  to  take  the  next  step  
towards  understanding  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  by  moving  further  away  
from   the   classical   story   arc,   which   is   identifiable   in   Practice   ii,   whilst   still  
retaining   some   of   the   features   of   traditional   storytelling.   On   reflection,   the  
decision  to  retain  storytelling  elements  was  a  mistake,  as  it  left  me  somewhere  
between  classical  narrative  cinema  and  a  more  abstr
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with  a  film  that  was  not  fully  identifiable  as  either  one  or  the  other.  The  storyline  
concerns  the  central  character’s  move  from  his  house  to  his  shed,  prompted  by  
the  appearance  of  an  unnamed  stranger.  This  narrative  was  intended  to  be  the  
scaffolding   upon  which   the   affective   tone  would   be   built   using   the   techniques  
detailed   above,   but   in   doing   so   I   included   too  many   semiotic  markers.   These  
semiotic   markers   include:   the   protagonist’s   investigation   of   the   shed,   which  
occurs   at   regular   intervals   throughout   the   film;;   the   dripping   tap   and   its  
subsequent   fixing;;   the   disappearance   of   objects   from   the   kitchen;;   and   wide  
shots  intended  to  show  objects  in  the  house.  This  led  to  a  confusing  situation  in  
which   I  was  attempting   to  privilege  affect,  whilst   inviting   reading  and  cognitive  
interpretation  from  spectators.  I  was  trying  to  read  my  own  film,  when  I  should  
have  been  feeling  my  own  film.    
I   am  still  making  narrative   cinema,   but   a   different   category  of   narrative  
cinema.  My  starting  point  for  this  research  project  was  an  idea  and  a  belief  that  
the   concept   of   affective   tonality   would   allow   a   more   cinematic   form   of  
filmmaking.  I  had  in  mind  a  holy  grail  of  pure  cinema  which  could  exist  within  the  
realm  of  narrative.   I  would  make  a  cinema  concerned  with  human  experience,  
as  narrative  has  always  been,  but   this  cinema  of  human  experience  would  be  
formally   constructed   on   cinema’s   own   terms.   By   that   I   mean   the   cinema   of  
affective   tonality  would  not  borrow   from   the  structure  of  other  art   forms   in   the  
way  classical  narrative  cinema  has  done   in   the  past,  but  would  draw   from  the  
taxonomy   in  order   to  compose  a  given  affective   tone  which  was  unique  to   the  
form  itself.  The  three  films  produced  so  far  have  been  variations  on  a  theme:  an  
insular  male  protagonist   negotiates  a  world  which   is   in  equal   parts   confusing,  
seductive,   frustrating   and   frightening.   The   Man   does   not   openly   express  
emotional   responses   to   his   surroundings,   but   over   the   three   films   a   complex  
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picture  of  this  character  has  been  created.  There  is  also  a  linearity  to  the  three  
films,  in  which  the  characters  pass  through  time  in  a  regularly  ordered  fashion.  
This   linearity   is   problematized   somewhat   in  Practice   ii   and   iii,   but   I   felt   that   I  
needed  to  further  disrupt  the  flow  of  perceived  time  in  order  to  open  the  feeling  
of   the   film   to   affective   tonality.   Drawing   on   Peirce’s   concept   of   the   third   in  
semiotics,  I  decided  to  attempt  to  triangulate  the  three  films  in  order  to  create  a  
fourth   piece   of   affective-­tonal   cinema   which   disrupts   linearity   and   allows   the  
three   separate   films   to   respond   to   each   other   within   a   singular   affective  
framework,  that  of  Practice  iv.  
In  Practice  iv   images  from  the  dartboard,  The  Man’s  house  and  the  pub  
interrupt  each  other,  as  though  invading  the  consciousness  of  each  image.  The  
three   films  now  present   themselves  as  one  affective   image,   rather   than   three  
distinct   pieces   of   cinema.   By   merging   the   three   films   to   create   a   fourth,  
distinctive  piece  of  practice,  I  have  significantly  broken  away  from  what  Steven  
Eastwood   describes   as   the   vernacular   of   cinema   (2007).   The   narrative   in  
Practice  iv   is  cyclical  and  non-­linear,  but  not   in  the  traditional  sense.  Jean-­Luc  
Godard  is  often  quoted  as  stating  that  cinema  has  a  beginning,  a  middle  and  an  
end,  but  not  necessarily  in  that  order  (Corliss,  1981).  Godard’s  famous  maxim  is  
the  most  basic  definition  of  non-­linear  narrative:   linear  events  presented  out  of  
chronological  order.  The  structure  of  Practice  iv  is  more  complex  than  this,  as  it  
is  not  possible  to  distinguish  a  clear  chronology  of  events;;  thus  the  cause-­and-­
effect   relationship  which   structures  much   of   narrative   cinema,   and   indeed  my  
previous  three  pieces  of  practice,  has  been  broken  down.  The  film  ends  where  it  
begins,  with  The  Man   throwing  darts,  as   though  we  are  viewing  events   in   the  
midst  of  an  eternal  cycle.  The  film  presents  the  fluctuation  of  a  body  in  action,  
whilst  moving   through  varying   temporal  and  spatial  circumstances.  The   formal  
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structure  of  Practice   iviii  is  a  variation  of   that  established   in  Practice   i.  The  film  
avoids   resolution,   and   the   temporal   discontinuity   encourages   the   spectator   to  
resist  decoding  the  image  in  order  to  understand  what  it  is  that  the  film  is  ‘about’.  
The  cinema  of  affective  tonality  is  not  about  anything  at  all.  The  act  of  letting  go  
of  narrative  causality  is  liberating  in  that  it  allows  the  spectator  to  succumb  to  a  
sensory  experience.    
The  affective  tone  of  Practice  iv  is  established  in  the  opening  one  minute  
and   thirty   seconds.   The   film   opens   on   a   black   screen   accompanied   by   the  
rhythmic  sound  of  darts  hitting  the  board,  although  this  sound  could  equally  be  
coming  from  a  machine  on  a  factory  floor,  or  from  any  other  repetitive  action.  It  
is   the   repetitive   sound   of   the   mundane.   The   sound   here   comes   before   the  
image.   Walter   Murch   observes   that   the   development   of   cinema   in   the   early  
twentieth   century   is   an   inverted   mirror   of   human   gestation:   ‘We   gestate   in  
Sound,  and  are  born   into  Sight,  Cinema  gestated   in  Sight,   and  was  born   into  
Sound’   (1994:   vii).   The   opening   of  Practice   iv   is   a   brief   return   to   a   gestation  
state  in  so  far  as  sound  precedes  image.  The  image  appears  from  the  darkness  
of   the   screen,   bringing   light,   and   the   spectator   and   the   film   are   born.   The  
opening  moments  of  the  film  can  also  invite  parallels  with  the  act  of  waking  from  
sleep,  with  the  introduction  of  light  and  movement.  The  spectator  does  not  know  
exactly  where  they  are,  but  that  is  not  important.  They  are  to  be  introduced  to  a  
feeling.    
The  brief  opening  sequence  ends  with  a  series  of  freeze-­frames.  These  
freeze-­frames   punctuate   the   end   of   the   sequence   in   an   attempt   to   catch   and  
literally  freeze  an  affective  moment.  It  is  a  technique  used  throughout  the  film  at  
various   points.   The   freeze-­frames   serve   a   rhythmical   purpose   in   that   they  
change  the  pace  of  the  film  as  though  we  are  listening  to  a  visual  key  change,  
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and  they  allow  a  slowing  of  time  in  order  to  focus  in  on  an  element  of  the  image.  
These   freeze-­frames   were   discovered   in   the   edit   whilst   engaging   with   the  
footage  over  long  periods  of  time.    
A   filmmaker   develops   an   intimate   relationship   with   the   images   that  
appear  on  the  screen  of  an  editing  machine.  Each  piece  of  footage  is  watched  
over   and   over   again.   Filmmakers   see   footage   in   a   unique   way.   They   see   it  
forwards,   they  see   it  backwards.  The  footage   is  sped  up  to   lightning  speed  as  
minutes  pass  by   in   seconds.  Thanks   to   the  development  of   non-­linear  editing  
systems,   filmmakers  are  able   to  easily   and  quickly   jump   from  one  moment   in  
film-­time   to   another.   The   speed   can   also   be   slowed   to   a  metaphorical   snail’s  
pace;;  the  filmmaker  is  able  to  move  slowly  through  the  footage,  frame  by  frame,  
stopping  every  1/24th  of  a  second  to  study  the  image  in  detail.  Walter  Murch  is  
quick  to  correct  the  commonly  held  belief  that  an  editor’s  job  is  to  decide  when  
to  cut.  For  Murch,  an  equally  important  part  of  an  editor’s  job  is  deciding  when  
not  to  cut.  An  editor  makes  twenty-­four  decisions  every  second:  ‘No.  No.  No.  No.  
No.  No.  No.  No.  No.  No.  Yes!’  (2001:  16).    
The  relationship  between  the  filmmaker  and  the  editing  machine   is  also  
incredibly  tactile.  You  feel  the  footage  with  the  tips  of  your  fingers.  I  have  never  
been  tempted  to  reach  out  and  stroke  the  screen,  but  my  fingers  are  constantly  
stroking   the  keyboard  and  mouse.  My   fingers   tap  down  hard  on  shortcut  keys  
which  propel  the  footage  forward  or  stop  an  image  dead  in  its  tracks,  or  else  I  
softly  stroke  the  surface  of  my  mouse  to  track  through  a  specific  shot.  My  finger  
will  hover  over  the  right  cursor  key  as  I  decide  whether  or  not  to  move  forward  a  
frame.  Sitting   in   front  of   the  editing  machine,  my  body  moves   the   footage,  but  
the  footage  also  moves  my  body,  propelling  me  into  action  as  I  am  faced  with  
an   image   that   pricks   me,   a   decisive   moment   which   gives   me   pause.   The  
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machine   regulates  my   breathing.  My   respiratory   rate  increases   as   the   perfect  
image   eludes   me.   I   exhale   in   exasperation   as   I   struggle   to   find   the   right  
combination  of  images,  and  I  hold  my  breath  as  I  meet  the  perfect  moment.    
There  is  a  moment  towards  the  end  of  the  first  shot  in  Practice  iv  in  which  
The  Man  approaches  the  dartboard  to  retrieve  his  darts.  He  picks  the  first   two  
darts  from  the  board,  and  turns  back  towards  the  camera  as  he  grabs  the  third  
dart.  He  fumbles  with  the  final  dart,  and  has  to  reach  again  to  pull  it  cleanly  from  
the  board.  He  does  not  look  back  towards  the  board  as  he  does  this.  Rather,  he  
continues   his   journey   back   to   the   ocheiv  whilst   feeling   for   the   dart,   his   face   a  
mixture  of  concentration  and  annoyance.  This  small  movement  causes  an  extra  
strain  on  his  arm,  briefly  exposing  the  shape  of  the  body  and  face  in  an  unusual  
and  interesting  way.  This  image  grabbed  hold  of  me  as  I  moved  slowly  through  
the   footage   trying   to   find   an   out-­point,   a   point   in   which   to   cut.   I   paused   the  
image   on   that   final   frame,   and   as   I   did   so   my   body   paused   also.   I   held   my  
breath  and  my  body  became  deathly  still,  like  a  statue.  I  felt  my  ribcage  contract  
and   my   muscles   tense.   This   was   the   point   in   which   I   realized   that   the   edit  
needed  to  be  driven  by  my  affective  responses  to  my  material.  My  body  knew  
that   this   was   the   moment   to   cut.   To   return   to   Barthes,   I   was   struck   by   the  
punctum  in  the   image,  a  moment  that  pricked  and  bruised  me  (Barthes,  1993:  
27).   I   focused   in  on   the  arm,   the   face  and   the   folds   in   the  neck:   in   short,   the  
tension   in   the  body,  which  matched  my  own.   I  wanted  to  capture   this  moment  
on   the   screen   and   give   something   from   the   editing   suite   to   the   spectator.   I  
slowed   the   footage   down   and   used   freeze-­frames.   This   was   my   attempt   to  
capture   and   highlight   the   punctum—an   attempt   to   bottle   that   moment   of  
affective   tonality   which   pricks   or   even   bruises.   I   punched   in   on   the   image,  
jumping  closer  to  the  body,  causing  the  image  to  jut  like  a  dart.  The  image  cuts  
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to   black   as   I   reach   the   peak   of   a   small   visual   crescendo.   I   return   to   this  
technique   a   further   seven   times   in   the   film,   and   each   time   it   is   to   highlight   a  
movement:  a  tension  in  the  neck  or  mouth,  a  drift  of  smoke,  or  a  furrow  of  the  
brow.   It   is   how   the   film  ends,   on   a   freeze-­frame  and   several   short   beats   that  
punctuate  the  final  moments  before  an  abrupt  cut  to  black.    
I  also   take  an  affective  approach   to   the  shooting  of   the   film.  During   the  
pre-­production  stages  for  each  film  I  moved  further  away  from  a  fixed  script  or  
scenario.  I  had  a  very  clear  idea  as  to  how  Practice  i  was  to  look,  and  I  had  a  
good  idea  as  to  the  length  of  the  film  and  the  structure.  Practice  i  was  relatively  
straightforward  in  this  regard,  as  I  knew  which  elements  of  the  image  I  wanted  
to   experiment   with.   Practice   ii   also   had   quite   a   clear   structure,   although   the  
response   to   the   screenplay   was   far   looser.   The   screenplay   for   Practice   ii  
presented  a  series  of  scenarios,  but  within   those  scenarios   there  was  room  to  
respond   to   the   locations   and   the   affective   elements   of   the   space.   The  
immediacy  of  digital  technology  was  invaluable  for  this  purpose.  The  first  image  
of   The   Woman   smoking   in   the   kitchen   was   captured   in   the   morning,   before  
shooting   had   officially   begun.   Imola   Gaspar,   the   actor,   was   standing   by   the  
window   smoking   a   cigarette   whilst   we   prepped   the   shooting   kit   for   the   day  
ahead.   It   was   relatively   early,   and   the   orange   light   of   the   rising   sun   shone  
through   the  window.   The   light   beautifully   picked   out   the   side   of   her   face,   the  
muscles   in  her  neck  and   the  details  of  her  hand.   I   responded   to   this  moment  
with   the   camera,   and   I   knew   almost   instantly   that   this   would   be   the   shot   to  
introduce  the  character.  I  responded  to  the  combination  of  light,  movement  and  
colour.  In  this  regard,  the  concept  of  affective  tonality  can  shape  the  shooting  of  
a  film.  The  filmmaker  in  the  production  of  affective  tone  must  be  sensitive  to  the  
formal  elements  derived  from  the  taxonomy  of  affect.    
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Sensitivity  to  the  affective  elements  of  a  space  results   in  the  acquisition  
of   footage   that   responds   to   mood   and   tone,   rather   than   story   or   narrative.  
Christopher   Doyle   writes   on   a   similar   technique   developed   in   his   working  
relationship   with   Wong   Kar-­Wai.   Doyle   tries   to   capture   what   he   has   termed  
‘kongjing’.   He   explains:   ‘They’re   not   conventional   establishing   shots,   because  
they’re   about   atmosphere   and   metaphor,   not   space.   The   only   thing   they  
establish   is   a  mood   or   a   totally   subjective  POV.   They’re   clues   to   an   ambient  
world  we  want   to   suggest,   but   not   explain’   (2006:   278).   There   are   images   in  
Practice   ii   and  Practice   iii   which   are   a   result   of  my   affective   response   to   the  
environment.   In  the  opening  of   the  pub  scene  there  are  blocks  of  colour,  such  
as  the  green  of  the  pool  table,  and  the  red  of  the  carpet,  which  were  shot  as  I  
responded  to  the  affective  resonance  of  the  particular  space  at  a  particular  time  
of  day.  The  first  shot  in  the  pub  is  of  the  movement  and  diffraction  of  light  as  it  
passes   through   the  window  of   the  pub  and   the   lens  of   the  camera.  This   shot  
serves  no  narrative  purpose;;  it  simply  catches  the  movement  of  light.  The  tone  
of  the  space  directs  my  body  as  I  move  around  the  location.  I  notice  the  way  the  
sun  hits   the  pool   table,  and  I  move  towards   it  without   thinking.  When  shooting  
the  dance  sequence  in  Practice  ii  I  had  originally  planned  to  hold  the  shot  on  the  
couple  as   they  moved   through   the   frame.   I  had  pictured   this  shot   in  my  mind,  
but  my  body  had  other  ideas.  Whilst  the  couple  danced  towards  the  left  of  frame  
I  felt  a  weight  in  my  left  shoulder,  and  I  began  to  push  gently  on  the  arm  of  the  
tripod.  The  camera  began  to  move  towards  the  right,  and  I  eventually  came  to  a  
stop   on   a   row   of   yellow   lights   attached   to   the  wall.   I   too  was   involved   in   the  
dance.  The  movement  of  their  bodies  moved  my  own,  and  the  draw  of  the  lights  
on  the  wall  gave  me  direction.v    
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You  cannot   include  such  direction   in  a   screenplay.  Affective   responses  
must  emerge   from  an  encounter  with   the  world.  You  can  suggest   it   in  writing,  
and   you   can   give   visual   and   audible   cues   to   yourself   and   your   team,   but   the  
green  of  the  pool  table  does  not  exist  in  the  imagination  or  through  description;;  
it   only   comes   into   being   through   an   encounter.   Language   affects   in   a   wholly  
different  way.  To  borrow  a  phrasing  from  the  painter  Edward  Hopper,  if  I  could  
explain  it  in  words  I  would  not  have  to  make  the  film.vi    
   In  Practice  iii  I  looked  for  elements  of  nature,  and  the  way  nature  moved  
in  relation  to  a  static  central  character.  The  Man  is  often  still,  standing  like  a  tall,  
thin  pine   tree,   feet   rooted   to   the  ground.  He   is  seen   looking   through  windows  
and   standing   in   doorways   as   the  world  moves   around   him.   The   only   time   he  
really   moves   with   purpose   is   when   handling   the   dead   flesh   of   a   chicken.   I  
respond   to   different   types   of   movement,   from   the   macroscopic   to   the  
microscopic.   My   body   was   drawn   to   so   many   small   movements,   as   though  
trying  to  counter  the  stillness  of  the  protagonist.  I  caught  birds  in  flight  and  fight,  
a  cat  prowling,  dandelion  seeds,  leaves  from  a  tree  shaking  in  the  wind,  and  a  
small  army  of  ants  and  other  insects.  When  The  Man  left  the  house  via  the  front  
door  I  noticed  the  dust  flying  as  the  air  was  disturbed.  The  camera  did  not  pick  it  
up  so  clearly  on  the  first  take.  More  light  was  called  for,  allowing  a  clear  view  of  
this  elemental  dance  happening  around  The  Man.    
   Elements   of   travel   and   nature   are   present   throughout   the   films.   In  
Practice   iii   and   Practice   iv,   even   stone   and   ceramic   birds   are   given   a   life  
through  the  use  of  light,  camera  movement  and  sound.  The  sun  shining  through  
trees  casts  shadows  over  a  headless  stone  bird,  giving  the  illusion  of  movement,  
and  a  ceramic  robin  is  brought  to  life  through  the  drifting  of  focus  and  the  sharp  
splitting  of  light.  All  the  while  the  sound  of  wind  and  birds  chirping  lends  an  extra  
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depth  to  the  image.  The  sound  of  traffic  and  trains  coming  in  and  out  of  stations  
can  often  be  heard   in   the  background,  as  well   as   the   sound  of   darts  and   the  
wallavii  of   the   pub.   There   is   a   blanket   of   sound,   suggestive   of   life   and   action,  
which  envelops  the  majority  of  the  film.  The  sound  only  disappears  at  one  point:  
I  cut  to  an  image  of  The  Woman’s  hands  in  the  pub,  and  a  shot  of  the  lower  half  
of  The  Man’s  mouth.  Upon  the  cut  to  the  hands,  the  sound  drops  out.  Both  the  
spectator   and   I   are   left   to   experience   silence   for   the   first   time   since   the   film  
began.  This  move  to  silence  serves  three  purposes.  Firstly,  as  I  watch  the  film  
at  this  moment  I  become  hyperaware  of  my  own  body.  I  am  aware  of  the  sound  
I  make  in  my  chair,  and  the  internal  feeling  of  inhaling  and  exhaling.  This  is  an  
uncomfortable   feeling,   as   I   am  no   longer  able   to  be  an  anonymous  observer.  
The  feeling  of  discomfort  causes  me  to  slow  my  own  body,  and  to  become  still  
in   a  way   that   is   similar   to   the   feeling   I   have   in   the   editing   suite.   Secondly,   it  
allows  a  closer  examination  of   the  hand  and   the   face.  The  hand   is   shot  on  a  
wide  lens,  which  distorts  the  image,  making  the  fingers  appear  unnaturally  long.  
The   whole   hand   has   an   uncanny   look,   which   is   also   heightened   by   the   pink  
pigment  added   to   the   image.  The   two  shots  appear  as  a  moment  out  of   time:  
fascinating,  but  at  the  same  time  uncomfortable.  The  awkward  emotional  states  
of  the  protagonists  are  felt  intensely.  Thirdly,  the  return  of  the  soundtrack  makes  
me   momentarily   aware   of   my   hearing   and   some   of   the   complexities   of   the  
soundtrack,  as  well  as  providing  a   release  of   tension.  The  sound   is  back,   the  
intimate  image  is  gone,  and  I  can  relax.    
Practice   iv   uses   memory   as   a   structuring   device,   in   that   the   images  
emerge  onto  the  screen  just  as  memories  flash  into  our  consciousness,  beyond  
our  own  volition.  The  images  are  not  necessarily  being  narrated  by  a  particular  
character  in  what  Deleuze  would  describe  as  a  recollection-­image  (1989:  105).  
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Rather,  the  images  sneak  up  on  me,  out  of  time,  as  one  may  be  shocked  by  the  
sudden  visit  of  an  unexpected  memory  whilst  travelling  on  a  train  or  staring  into  
the  abyss  of  a  company  meeting.  The  images  themselves  are  not  sheets  of  past,  
as   Deleuze   describes   recollections   (1989:   105):   in   Practice   iv   it   becomes  
difficult   to  define  or   identify  with  certainty  which  moment  represents   the  actual  
present.  Therefore  the  memory  images  are  not  of  the  past,  because  we  cannot  
unpick   the   film’s   sequencing   in   order   to   define   a   chronology.   The   images   in  
Practice  iv  exist  outside  the  boundaries  of  linear  time;;  in  this  sense  they  are  not  
recollections   of   any   specific  memory,   but   rather   they   are   the   expression   of   a  
direct  bodily  experience  of  memory.  Thus  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  is  not  
a   non-­linear   cinema   in   way   that   Citizen   Kane   (Welles,   1941),   The   Killing  
(Kubrick,   1956)   or  Pulp   Fiction   (Tarantino,   1994)   are   non-­linear.   These   three  
films   by   Welles,   Kubrick   and   Tarantino   present   moments   or   scenes   out   of  
chronological   order,   but   one   could   easily   re-­edit   the   three   films   to   present  
events  in  a  linear  time  frame.viii  It  is  not  possible  to  do  this  with  Practice  iv.  Once  
I  found  the  rhythm  of  the  re-­edit  of  the  final  piece  of  practice,  I  stopped  trying  to  
decode  the  image  and  make  sense  of  the  relations  between  the  characters  and  
their  milieu.  I  gave  my  body  over  to  the  affective  tone  of  the  film.    
Practice   iv  presents   the   truest   image  of   the  cinema  of  affective   tonality.  
The   three   films   which   precede   this   final   piece   of   practice   have   acted   as   a  
training  ground,  an  experiment  and  a   theoretical  conversation.  Deleuze  states  
that  cinema  allows   the   invention  of  concepts  and  new  ways  of   thinking  (1989,  
1992).   My   position   behind   the   word   processor,   the   camera   and   the   editing  
machine  brings  new  thoughts   into  being,  both  on  the  page  and  on  the  screen.  
The   final   process   of   bringing   the   three   films   together   into   one   discrete  whole  
allowed  a  thorough  reflection  on  the  affective  process  of  production.  From  this  
	   119  
position   I   am   able   to   make   additions   to   the   taxonomy   of   affective   tonality   in  
order  to  develop  further  guidelines  for  composing  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.  
  
A  guide  to  composingix  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality:  five  conditions    
The   process   of   editing   the   four   pieces   of   practice   which   comprise   my  
investigation  into  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  has  come  to  an  end.  From  this  
position  I  am  able  to  present  a  further  five  conditions  for  composing  the  cinema  
of  affective  tonality.  These  five  conditions  complement  the  taxonomy  of  affective  
tonality.  The   taxonomy  concerns   the   threads  of   the   tapestry,  whereas   the   five  
conditions   present   an   overarching   guide   to   producing   the   cinema   of   affective  
tonality.   The   five   conditions   are   complementary,   and   they   build   upon   one  
another.  They  are  as  follows:  
1.   No  screenplay.  
2.   No  storyboard.  
3.   Be  aware  of  and  responsive  to  your  shooting  surroundings—be  open  
to  texture,  colour,  light,  ambient  sound  and  movement.  
4.   Listen  to  your  body  in  the  edit.    
5.   The  structure  of  memory  takes  precedence  over  cause  and  effect.  
  
1.   No  screenplay  
The  traditional  screenplay  or  scenario  is  not  an  appropriate  form  for  the  cinema  
of  affective   tonality.  Steven  Price  notes   that   the  conditions  which  gave   rise   to  
the   screenplay   form—industrial-­scale   filmmaking   and   print   culture—are   in  
decline   (2013:   1).   The   screenplay   form   emerged   in   tandem   with   narrative  
filmmaking   as   developed   in  Hollywood   in   the   early   twentieth   century,   and   the  
form   of   the   screenplay   had   to   serve   an   industrial   function   (Price,   2013:   6).  
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Cinematic   affect   cannot   be   written   or   imagined:   it   must   be   experienced.   To  
express  an  affective  tonal  cinema  through  the  written  word  is  not  possible,  and  
trying   to   do   so   is   a   futile   exercise.   I   began   to   understand   this   in   the   pre-­
compositional  stages  of  Practice  ii,  in  which  the  traditional  screenplay  format  of  
textual   description   and   dialogue   was   abandoned,   to   be   replaced   by   whole  
pages   that  were  blank  apart   from  a  single  statement   to  convey  a  mood  or  an  
idea.  The  need  to  turn  away  from  the  screenplay  was  confirmed  by  Practice  iii’s  
failure   to   fully   convey   the   intended   affective   tone.   This   failure   began  with   the  
written   word   and   the   form   of   the   screenplay   with   its   privileging   of   structure,  
characterization,  inciting  incidents  and  so  forth.  To  return  to  Antonioni,  the  form  
cannot  be  separated   from   the  content   (Chatman,  2008:  11).  The  evocation  of  
the  spirit  of  Antonioni  brings  us  on  to  condition  two.  
  
2.   No  storyboard  
If   cinematic  affect   cannot  be  written,   it   also  cannot  be  drawn.  Meticulous  pre-­
production,   and   the   detailed   planning   of   every   shot,   is   a   feature   of   classical  
narrative   cinema,   and   is   probably   best   exemplified   in   Alfred   Hitchcock’s  
approach   to   production.   Hitchcock   would   arrive   at   a   film   set   on   day   one   of  
principal  photography  with  the  film  already  made,  mapped  out   in  his  head  and  
meticulously  storyboarded.  In  the  article  ‘Director’s  Problems’,  Hitchcock  states  
that  he  aims  at  ‘getting  a  complete  vision  of  my  film  before  it  goes  to  the  studio  
floor’   (1995:   186).   The   process   of   production   was   simply   the   act   of  
photographing   the   storyboards   or   the   film   that   existed   within   his   head. x  
Alternatively   there   are   filmmakers   such   Michelangelo   Antonioni,   who   would  
arrive   on   location   (Antonioni’s   films  made   far  more   use   of   location   shooting),  
where   he   would   try   to   find   the   correct   shot   in   response   to   a   given   situation  
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(Arrowsmith,  1995,  Chatman,  2008).  In  a  2005  interview  on  The  Culture  Show  
the   cinematographer   Christopher   Doyle   states   that   he   feels   a   certain   energy  
from  specific   locations,  and   that  he  will,   for  example,  walk   into  a  bar  and  ask  
himself  ‘how  blue  do  I  really  feel’?  With  the  use  of  storyboards,  you  never  get  to  
ask  the  question  ‘how  blue  do  I  really  feel?’  With  storyboarding  one  is  not  able  
to  respond  to  the  affective  tone  of  a  space.  The  biggest  problem  with  the  use  of  
a   storyboard   is   that   it   lacks   the   three   essential   components   of   cinema:   time,  
movement,  and  the  direct  experience  of  the  cut.    
  
3.   Be  aware  of  and  responsive  to  your  shooting  surroundings—be  open  
to  texture,  colour,  light,  ambient  sound  and  movement  
Working  without  a  storyboard  forces  the  filmmaker  to  respond  differently  to  their  
immediate  surroundings,  and  signals  a  shift   in   film-­thinking.  Rather   than  arrive  
on  location  with  a  clear  list  of  shots,  the  filmmaker  of  affective  tonality  arrives  on  
set  with  a  set  of   forces   to  capture.  The   filmmaker  of  affective   tonality  must  be  
willing  to  create  and  metaphorically  bottle  different  elements  from  the  taxonomy  
of  affective   tonality.  The   filmmaker  must  develop  a  bodily   relationship  with   the  
camera  lens  and  the  digital  viewfinder  or  LCD  screen,  which  allows  a  response  
to  the  shifting  formal  elements  of  the  emerging  image.    
  
4.   Listen  to  your  body  in  the  edit  
The   body   of   the   editor   and   the   body   of   the   editing  machine   are   absent   from  
canonical   theories   of   editing.   The   Soviet   filmmakers   and   the   masters   of  
continuity  editing,  as  well  as  the  editors  of  European  art  cinema,  all  refer  to  the  
body  of  the  image,  especially  in  terms  of  rhythm  and  tempo.  Editing  for  classical  
narrative  cinema  can  be  a  very  analytical  process,   in  which  cuts  are  made   to  
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forward   the   plot   or   reveal   information.   Walter   Murch   (2001)   writes   of   the  
importance  of  emotion  when  choosing  a  cutting  point,  but  his  reference  is  to  the  
emotion  on   screen,  which  excludes  his  own  affectual   response.  When  editing  
the   cinema   of   affective   tonality,   the   filmmaker   must   respond   to   the   peculiar  
movements   of   the   body   when   it   is   engaged   with   the   editing   machine.   The  
filmmaker  must  listen  with  the  whole  of  their  body,  from  the  tips  of  the  fingers  to  
the  depths  of   the  spleen;;   they  must   listen   for  movements   in   the   image  and   in  
themselves.    
  
5.   The  structure  of  memory  takes  precedence  over  cause  and  effect  
The  narrative  structure  does  not  progress  in  terms  of  the  cause-­and-­effect  laws  
of   character  action.  The  narrative   is  more  concerned  with   internal   states,   and  
the  transferal  of  these  internal  states,  than  with  laws  of  action.  Just  as  memory  
images   permeate   our   consciousness   without   regard   for   our   volition,   so   the  
images  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  have  no  regard  for  the  regular  laws  of  
space  and  time.  The  screen  is  porous  in  this  regard.  Images  may  slip  in  and  out  
of   time,   and   over   and   under   each   other.   We   recognize   this   structure,   as   it  
mirrors   our   own   consciousness.   Thus   we   understand   that   the   images   do   not  
need   to   be   interpreted   or   read;;   rather,   the   images   need   to   be   felt   and  
experienced.  They  wash  over  us   like  waves  of   the  sea.  They  rain  down  on  us  
like   a   million   tiny   grains   of   sand   falling   from   the   sky.   There   is   no   need   for  
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i  Focal   lengths  are  35mm  equivalent,  as  established  by  Guideline  of   the  Camera  and   Imaging  
Products   Association,   document   DCG-­001-­Translation-­2005,   Guideline   for   Noting   Digital  
Camera  Specifications  in  Catalogs,  revised  11  October  2005.  
ii  Detail   on   the   development   of   Soviet  montage   can   be   found   in   the  writings   of   Lev  Kuleshov  
(1992),  Vsevolod  Pudovkin  (2006),  Sergei  Eisenstein  (1992)  and  Dziga  Vertov  (1985).  
iii  The  film  starts  and  ends  on  the  same  action,  and  although  there  is  a  clear  running  time  to  the  
film,  it  is  possible  to  begin  watching  at  any  point  in  the  film.  This  is  exemplified  by  a  screening  of  
the  film  which  took  place  at  the  Exploding  Cinema  event  as  part  of  the  Goldsmiths  Besides  the  
Screen  conference.  The  film  was  screened  on  a  loop  on  a  digital  projector;;  no  sooner  had  the  
last  dart  been   thrown   than   the   film  started  again.  The   looping  system,  and   the  position  of   the  
screening   (in   a   dark,   open   room   towards   the  back  of   the   building),   encouraged   spectators   to  
enter  and  leave  the  screening  at  any  point.    
iv   The   oche   in   the   game   of   darts   is   the   line   designating   the   position   of   the   thrower.   In  
Professional   Darts   Corporation   rules,   the   oche   is   five   feet   and   eight   inches   from   the   board  
(Rules  of  Darts,  no  date).  
v   I   have   used   these   techniques   in   various   documentary   scenarios.   On   several   occasions  
participants   have   commented   on   my   appearance   whilst   shooting.   People   have   asked   the  
producer  if  I  am  feeling  okay,  or  if  they  have  done  something  to  make  me  angry.  I  have  had  to  
reassure  people  that  I  am  perfectly  happy.  Opening  to  the  affective  tone  of  the  moment  has  an  
effect  on  my  body  and  my  face.  I  look  and  feel  with  an  intensity  which  is  interpreted  by  people  
as  the  sign  that  I  am  in  some  kind  of  emotionally  distressed  state.    
vi  In  an   interview  with  Time  magazine  entitled   ‘The  Silent  Witness’,  Hopper   famously  said:   ‘If   I  
could  say  it  in  words  there  would  be  no  reason  to  paint’  (1956:  37).    
vii  Walla:  a  sound-­effects   term  describing   the  murmur  of  a  crowd   in   the  background  (Walla,  no  
date).  
viii  A  re-­edit  of   these  films  would  result   in  a  different  experience  of  the  films,  rather  than  simply  
reordering  events.  The  result  would  be  so  fundamentally  different  that  you  would  not  be  able  to  
claim  to  have  seen  the  same  film.  Despite  this,  a  simple  reordering  of  scenes  would  be  a  very  
straightforward  task.  
ix  I  have  chosen   to   refer   to   the  process  of  conceiving,  shooting  and  editing  a   film  as  an  act  of  
composing.  The  finished  film  is  a  composition.  This  very  deliberate  and  unusual  phraseology  is  
oppositional,  in  that  it  stands  against  the  traditional  notion  of  film  production.  Films  are  seen  as  
something   to   be   produced   in   an   industrial   context,   a   viewpoint   that   carries   with   it   ideas   and  
assumptions   based   on   the   mode   of   production,   themes,   and   notions   of   narrative   and   plot.  
Composition  has  a  very  different  meaning  and  different  cultural  associations  in  both  the  arts  and  
the  sciences.  In  the  arts,  the  term  composition  is  often  used  in  relation  to  music  and  poetry,  two  
of   the  more   rhythmical   art   forms.   In   chemical   sciences,   composition   refers   to   the  make-­up  of  
elements.   The   cinema   of   affective   tonality   is   more   closely   aligned   with   rhythmic   and  
compositional  elements  from  the  arts  and  sciences.    
x  A  wonderfully  detailed  exploration  of  Hitchcock’s  working  methods,  and  an  assessment  of  his  
films,  can  be   found   in   the  books  Hitchcock   (Truffaut  et  al.,  1987)  and  Hitchcock  on  Hitchcock  
(Hitchcock,  1995).    
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Figure  3:  Doménikos  Theotokópoulos  ‘El  Greco’,  The  Burial  of  the  Count  of  Orgaz.  1586–1588.       
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CHAPTER  5:  
CONCLUSION:  A  CINEMA  OF  AFFECTIVE  TONALITY  
  
The  aim  of  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  is  to  place  the  spectator  in  the  
embodied  position  of  the  central  character(s).  This  cinema  is  not  about  knowing,  
but   about   feeling.   The   cinema   of   affective   tonality   imparts   a   feeling,   and   that  
feeling   corresponds   with   the   narrative   experience   of   the   characters.   Upon  
finishing  the  film,  the  spectator  may  not  easily  be  able  to  tell  you  the  details  of  
the  plot,  for  plot  is  not  the  main  concern  of  our  cinema.  They  will,  however,  have  
experienced   a   feeling   induced   by   the   cinematic   apparatus   at   play.   The  
taxonomy  of   affective   tonality   proposed   in   this   thesis   is   not   a   blueprint   for   an  
idealized  structure  for  the  production  of  affective  tonality.  That  is  not  the  aim  of  
this  thesis.  What  has  been  proposed  is  a  set  of  tools  that  can  be  freely  used  by  
filmmakers  working  in  narrative  cinema  or  documentary  cinema.  The  taxonomy  
and   the   guidelines   can   also   enable   researchers   working   with   varied   visual  
methods   to   think   about   the   production   of   moving-­image   works   in   a   more  
affective   way.   The   taxonomy   of   affective   tonality   allows   one   to   think   feeling  
through  moving-­image  practice,  and  it  gives  the  practitioner  a  language  through  
which  to  consider  and  conceptualise  this  feeling.    
The   four   films  were  made  over  a  period  of   three  years,  and  during   this  
time  I  controlled  of  every  stage  of  the  production.  I  devised  the  concept  for  the  
films,  I  wrote  a  scenario,  and  I  collected  the  footage.  I  spent  many  hours  in  front  
of   the   editing   machine   looking   over   every   pixel   of   the   image,   and   listening  
intently   to   even   the   most   minute   of   sounds.   The   editor   has   an   extremely  
intimate  relationship  with  the  images  of  the  film.  We  spend  hours  locked  away  in  
a  dark  room  exploring  the  body  of   the   image.  A  person  could  go  through  their  
whole   life   and   not   experience   the   intimacy   felt   between   an   editor   and   that  
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machine.  It   is  a  private,  delicate  and  often  tumultuous  relationship.  Yet  despite  
my  meticulous  and  intimate  relationship  with  the  making  of  these  films,  I  still  do  
not  really  know  what  they  are  about,  as  these  films  are  not  really  about  anything  
in  a  traditional  sense.  To  quote  Christopher  Doyle:  ‘Don’t  worry,  you  don’t  have  
to  figure   it  out,   just  succumb  to   it,   that’s  the  point’  (cited  in  Godfrey,  2011).  To  
add   to   this,   I   cannot   give   you   a   narrative   concerning   the   life   of   the   central  
character  of  the  films.  I  cannot  give  you  a  backstory,  details  of  his  childhood,  or  
how  he  came  to  be  living  the  life  he  is  currently  living.  I  do  not  know  his  name  or  
intimate  details  about  his  circumstances.  I  cannot  even  tell  you  much  about  the  
journey   he   undertook   during   the   course   of   the   films.   However,   I   do   know  
something   of   the   nature   of   his   being-­in-­the-­world.   There   is   something   of   his  
ontological   make-­up   that   now   exists   in   my   own   ontological   make-­up.   I   have  
been   infected   by   his   spirit.   My   body   knows   something   of   his   world   which   is  
difficult  to  express  in  words.  I  have  an  a  priori  knowledge  of  his  existence.    
By   the   time   the   films   have   ended   I   have   inherited   a   feeling  which   has  
been  passed  from  the  film  to  myself.  I  carry  this  feeling  with  me  in  the  darkness  
of  the  editing  suite  as  the  film  fades  to  black,  and  I  take  it  with  me  when  I  leave  
the   building   and   walk   out   into   the   street.   As   I   walk   through   the   streets   after  
screening   my   film,   I   hold   with   me   a   knowledge   of   the   central   character   that  
exists   outside   my   current   experience.   To   return   to   Gormley’s   assertion:  
‘attending   a   cinema   screening   is   a  masochistic   endeavour’   (2005:   12).  When  
sitting   in   a   darkened   room   in   front   of   a   screen   and   an   array   of   speakers,  we  
willingly  submit  to  a  series  of  affects.  We  cease  taking  action,  and  we  surround  
ourselves  with  a  pool  of  sensation.  The  act  of  sitting   in   this  darkened   room   is  
akin   to   returning   to  a  womb-­like  state.  We  cannot  have  any   tangible  effect  on  
the  world.  All  we  can  do  is  simply  sit  back  and  experience  the  play  of  affect.  In  
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this  regard,  the  cinema  experience  is  a  break  from  reality  and  a  return  to  a  pre-­
active   state.  From  a  philosophical   perspective,   in   this  womb-­like   state  we  are  
able   to   gather   a   priori   knowledge   through   the   experience  of   affective   tonality.  
From   a   scientific   perspective,   affective   tonality   imparts   something   akin   to   a  
genetic  memory   to   the   spectator,   and   the   spectator   carries   this  memory  with  
them  as  they  leave  the  cinema.    
The  concepts  of  a  priori  knowledge  and  genetic  memory  here  serve  not  
as  metaphors,  but  as  frameworks  through  which  to  fully  understand  the  process  
of  affective   tonality.  For  clarity,   I  am  not  suggesting   that  one   is   literally   reborn  
when  one  leaves  the  cinema.  I  am,  however,  drawing  a  direct  parallel  between  
the  act  of  experiencing  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  and  a  preconscious  state.  
Whilst  we  are  in  a  preconscious  state,  certain  feelings  can  be  imprinted  upon  us.  
Plato  argues  that  a  priori  knowledge  exists  before  birth;;  it  is  a  knowledge  carried  
from  one  life  to  the  next  (Scott,  2006).  Parallels  can  be  drawn  between  Plato’s  a  
priori   knowledge   and   Brian   G.   Dias   and   Kerry   J.   Ressler’s   experiments   with  
genetic   memory.   Dias   and   Ressler   examined   the   inheritance   of   parental  
traumatic   exposure   between   different   generations   of   mice   (2014:   89).   They  
achieved   this   by   exposing   mice   to   odour   fear   conditioning.   They   found   that  
‘subsequently   conceived  F1   and  F2   generations   had   an   increased   behavioral  
sensitivity  to  the  F0-­conditioned  odor,  but  not  to  other  odors’  (Dias  and  Ressler,  
2014:   89).   The   genetic  memory  was   passed   on   to   two   further   generations   of  
mice,   causing   them   to   avoid   a   certain   smell   despite   never   having   had   direct  
experience  of  the  smell  itself.    
To   leave   the   laboratory   and   return   to   ancient   Greece,   Socrates   and  
Meno  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  the  intention  of  defining  virtue.  Socrates  asks  a  
young  slave  boy  a  series  of  mathematical  questions  concerning   the  geometric  
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dimensions   of   squares   and   circles.   The   boy   is   initially   unable   to   correctly  
answer  Socrates’  questions,  but  after  some  time  and  a  further  series  of  probing  
questions  the  boy  arrives  at   the  correct  answer.  Socrates  asserts   that   the  boy  
possessed  knowledge  of  geometry  without  ever  being  taught.    
Socrates:  If  there  have  been  always  true  thoughts  in  him,  both  at  the  
time   when   he   was   and   was   not   a   man,   which   only   need   to   be  
awakened  into  knowledge  by  putting  questions  to  him,  his  soul  must  
have  always  possessed  this  knowledge,  for  he  always  either  was  or  
was  not  a  man?  
(Plato,  2012)  
  
The  mice   in  Dias  and  Ressler’s   lab,  and   the  slave  boy   in  Plato’s  dialogue,  all  
possess  knowledge  not  gained  through  direct  experience.  As  I  emerge  from  the  
embryonic   state   of   film   viewer   into   the   bright   light   of   day,   I   too   possess   a  
knowledge   not   taught   but   passed   on   to   me.   This   knowledge   does   not   come  
from   my   immortal   soul,   nor   is   it   genetic:   it   is   imparted   to   me   through   the  
affective  tone  created  in  the  screening  room,  wrapped  around  me  like  amniotic  
fluid,  absorbed  through  my  skin.  
   This   amniotic   absorption   does   not   negate   notions   of   representation.  
Spectators  from  varied  cultural  backgrounds  will  respond  to  the  films  in  different  
ways.  Practice  i  is  the  affective  manifestation  of  the  banal  achieved  through  the  
rhythmic  patterns  of   the  game  of  darts.  For  certain  spectators   this   is   indeed  a  
very  banal  situation,  yet  for  viewers  that  are  perhaps  not  familiar  with  the  sport  
of  darts  the  film  may  be  a  source  of  fascination.  I  could  very  easily  tie  myself  up  
in   knots   trying   to   negotiate   representation   in  my   films.   The  only  way   to   avoid  
these   issues   would   be   to   move   into   pure   abstraction,   but   even   this   poses  
problems.   Firstly,   to   deal   with   narrative   cinema—to   which   the   cinema   of  
affective  tonality  certainly  belongs—one  must  produce  representational  images.  
Secondly,  even  purely  abstract  imagery  carries  with  it  cultural  associations.  For  
example,  meanings  associated  with  varying  colours  differ  from  culture  to  culture  
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(Madden  et  al.,  2000).  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  taxonomy  and  the  guidelines  
suggested   in   this   thesis  cannot  be  used  as  a  blueprint,  but   rather  are  a  set  of  
guiding   principles.   My   films   produce   a   certain   set   of   affects   in   me.   Your  
response  may  well  be  different,  and  that  is  okay.  Affects  are  wild  and  difficult  to  
pin   down.   The   affective   intensities   of   cinematic   images   are   difficult   if   not  
impossible  to  measure.  Affects  are  often  personal,  and  my  affective  response  to  
the  same  stimuli  will  change  over  a  lifetime,  or  even  over  a  single  evening.  For  
this   research   project   I   am   my   own   ideal   spectator.   To   reference   Thomas  
Elsaesser  and  Malte  Hagener:  
Each   type   of   cinema   (as   well   as   every   film   theory)   imagines   an   ideal  
spectator,   which   means   it   postulates   a   certain   relationship   between   the  
(body  of  the)  spectator  and  the  (properties  of  the)  image  on  screen.  
(2010:  4).    
  
I   have   created   affects   for   myself   as   a   filmmaker   during   the   process   of  
composition,   and   during   the   consumption   of   the   finished   films.   During   this  
process,  concentrating  on  my  own  affective  response  was  a  necessity,  and  this  
necessity   influenced  my   representational   choices.   The   central   character   in   all  
four  films  is  a  white,  English  male,  as  am  I.  I  do  not  purport  to  represent  anyone  
other   than   myself.   In   this   regard   the   films   are   not   rhetorical,   but   rather   a  
performance  of  the  self.    
I   have  made   representational   choices  which   run  against   the  grain.  The  
gaze  of   the  camera  was  turned  upon  the  male  character.  The  topic  of  enquiry  
was  not  a  fetishized  European  woman  or  an  Othered  character.  The  camera  is  
focused  on  The  Man  for  the  majority  of  the  films’  duration.  The  camera  studies  
the  face  in  close-­ups  and  mid-­shots.  Macro  photography  is  used  to  explore  the  
body   of   the  male   character(s).   The  Woman,   in   her  most   eroticized   image,   is  
photographed   lying   in  her  bed.  She  appears   in  profile,  with  her  gaze   fixed  on  
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the   ceiling.  Her   eye   does   not  meet   the   camera.  When   she  moves,   she   turns  
away  from  the  camera.  She  is  composed,  and  often  nonchalant  in  her  actions.  
The  power  relations  are  clear:  she  is  in  control  of  the  situation,  and  she  will  be  
making  decisions  and  taking  actions.  The  representational  decisions  were  both  
ethical  and  methodological.i  I  grew  up  in  a  working-­class  community,  and  I  have  
spent   a   perhaps   unhealthy   and   certainly   unnecessarily   large   amount   of   time  
throwing  darts  at  a  dartboard.  I  have  direct  experience  of  the  banal  inertia  of  the  
situation,  which  enables  me  to  ethically  and  authentically  capture  these  affects.  
These  are  my  affects,  and  I  hope  that  I  am  able  to  convey  them  to  a  spectator;;  
but  this  cannot  be  assured,  and  nor  should   it  be.  I  have  neither  the  desire  nor  
the  magical  ability  to  take  possession  of  and  control  your  affective  constitution.  
Hitchcock’s   metaphor   of   the   giant   organ   plugged   directly   into   the   audience’s  
brain  is  a  useful  image  to  lead  into  a  conversation  about  affect,  but  it  would  be  
quite  a  dystopian  vision  if  this  machine  were  ever  to  become  a  reality.    
The   four   films   produced,   which   comprise   a   major   component   of   this  
research,  express  the  central  argument  of  the  thesis.  They  represent  that  which  
cannot  easily  be  put  into  words.  As  stated  in  the  introduction,  affect  in  cinema  is  
often  difficult  to  write  about,  especially  when  it  comes  to  atmosphere  and  mood.  
One  cannot  easily  explain  in  words  a  gut  feeling  or  a  sensation  felt  in  one’s  toes  
whilst  watching   a   film.   The   films   produced   for   this   research   project   can  more  
readily  express  those  affects,  percepts  and  blocks  of  sensation.  The  production  
of   the   four   films   allowed   me   to   experiment   with   form   and   build   upon   my  
argument.   The   process   of   making   also   allowed   a   different   form   of   thinking.  
Different   ideas  emerge  when   I   place  myself   behind   the   camera,   or  when   I   sit  
down   in   front   of   an   editing   machine.   The   production   of   my   films   enabled   a  
different  style  of  thinking,  but  also  a  different  way  in  which  to  express  ideas.  It  is  
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for  this  reason  that  I  think  the  only  way  to  really  understand  the  make-­up  of  the  
cinema   of   affective   tonality   is   to   watch   the   films,   and   to   understand,   if   only  
slightly,  the  concept  through  your  own  body.    
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  change  the  direction  of  the  conversation,  or  to  
at  least  offer  new  avenues  for  discussion  around  film  practice  and  what  can  be  
considered   cinematic   narrative.   The   cinema   of   affective   tonality   constitutes   a  
shift  in  what  can  be  considered  the  transformative  nature  of  narrative.  David  K.  
Danow   argues   that   ‘transformation,   some   kind   of   change…   is   the   invariable  
constituent   that  makes  drama,  as  one  consideration,  watchable,  and  narrative  
readable’   (1998:   89).   In   the   cinema   of   affective   tonality   the   transformation  
occurs   in   the  spectator,   rather   than   in   the  characters  depicted  on  screen.  The  
transformation   is   shifted   from   being   solely   representational   to   being   one   of  
feeling.   Tarkovsky   writes   that   cinema   ‘allows   an   utterly   direct,   emotional,  
sensuous  perception  of  the  work’  (1986:  176).  I  would  like  to  reappropriate  this  
statement   for   the   cinema   of   affective   tonality:   direct,   emotional,   sensuous  
perception  is  the  work.  The  films  composed  do  not  paint  a  picture,  but  allow  the  
spectator  to  be  woven  into  one.    
In   this   sense,   the   thesis   is   concerned   with   a   kind   of   aesthetics   as  
originally  coined  by  Alexander  von  Baumgarten   in  1735.  As  David  Howes  and  
Constance   Classen   note,   for   Baumgarten   aesthetics   has   to   do   with   the  
‘plenitude  and  complexity  of  sensations,  which  culminated   in   the  perception  of  
art’  (2014:  19).  This  definition  of  aesthetics  differs  from  Immanuel  Kant’s  use  of  
the   term,  which  was   concerned  with  what  Howes   and  Classen   describe   as   a  
‘disinterested   contemplation   and   judgement   of   beauty’   (2014:   19).   The   four  
pieces  of  practice  and  the  accompanying  thesis  could  then  be  seen  as  a  return  
to  Baumgarten,  in  that  they  are  an  attempt  to  navigate  and  codify  the  complexity  
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of  sensations  that  move  between  screen  and  spectator  so  as  to  be  used  by  film  
practitioners  in  the  composition  of  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality.    
This  research  project  had  two  aims.  Firstly,  the  project  aimed  to  mobilize  
affect  theory,  as  conceptualized  by  film  studies  scholars,   in  order  to  develop  a  
framework  in  which  to  think  through  narrative  film  practice  affectively.  Secondly,  
through   experiments   in   film   practice,   I   aimed   to   reconceptualize   narrative  
structure   in   order   to   privilege   a   holistic   approach   to   affect   over   Aristotelian  
linearity.  The  combination  of  these  two  aims  has  led  to  the  conceptualization  of  
a   new   mode   of   narrative   filmmaking,   which   I   have   termed   the   cinema   of  
affective   tonality.  As  can  be  read   in   the   introductory  chapter,  affect   theory  has  
long  been  established  as  a  method  of  analysis  in  film  studies.  The  advantages  
of   approaching   cinema   beyond   textuality   have   been   thoroughly   debated,   and  
theoretical   approaches   have   been   applied   to   the   field   of   film   theory.   The  
affective   turn   (Clough  and  Halley,  2007,  Gregg  and  Seigworth,  2010)  has  had  
less  of  an  impact  on  film  practice  at  the  level  of  research,  or  at  the  level  of  art  
and   industry,   however.  Whereas   the   affective   turn   has   clearly   shaped  writing  
about  film,  it  has  yet  to  explicitly  influence  the  making  of  film.  Affect  film  theory  
argues   that   linguistics   and   semiotics   constrain   the   understanding   of   cinema  
whilst  disregarding  some  of  the  fundamental  formal  and  conceptual  elements  of  
the   image.  Chapter  4  details   the  way   in  which  narrative   film  practice   is  overly  
concerned  with  grammar  and  linguistics,  with  a  reliance  on  the  individual  shot,  
the  screenplay  and   the  storyboard.  By  applying  concepts   from  affect   theory   to  
film   practice   I   have   been   able   to   offer   an   alternative   to   the   language-­based  
approach   to   the   construction   and   production   of   narrative   cinema.   Narrative  
cinema  in  a  Western  context  has  suffered  from  the  same  issues  as  film  studies  
in   terms  of  a   reliance  on   language-­based  systems  of  understanding.   It   is   then  
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no   surprise   that   film   studies   in   its   original   incarnation   took   language   and  
grammar  as  its  starting  point,  as  the  films  being  studied  were  born  of  the  same  
systems.  This  thesis  offers  an  approach  to  the  construction  of  film  narrative  that  
is   based   around   affect,   rhythm   and   sensation,   rather   than   signification   and  
representation.   My   engagement   with   film   practice   allowed   the   testing   of  
concepts  and   the  development  of  a   film  practice   framework   that  serves  as  an  
alternative  to  a  film  grammar  approach  to  narrative  filmmaking.  The  framework,  
consisting  of  the  taxonomy  of  affect  and  the  five  conditions  for  the  production  of  
a   cinema   of   affective   tonality,   facilitates   a   film-­thinking  which   privileges   affect  
over  storytelling,  and  therefore  presents  a  shift  in  the  discourse  which  allows  a  
reconceptualization   of   what   cinema   can   become.   Following   this   framework,  
narrative   filmmakers   can   be   liberated   from   a   dependence   upon   cause-­and-­
effect  relations,  and  shots  that  carry  information  and  meaning  can  be  eschewed  
in   favour   of   images   that   carry   specific   force   and   sensation.   Whilst   the   films  
produced   as   part   of   this   research   project   carry   specific   affects,   the   affective  
framework  presented  is  flexible  enough  to  be  used  to  originate  affective  works  
in  a  wide  variety  of  social,  cultural  or  political  contexts.    
   The  second  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  consider  narrative  outside  Aristotelian  
linearity,  and  to  place  a  renewed  focus  on  the  holistic  play  of  affect  that  works  
across  the  duration  of  a  film.  In  Chapter  1  and  Chapter  2  I  argue  that  this  play  of  
affect  does  not  just  contribute  to  narrative,  but  rather  the  feeling  and  sensation  
produced  by   these  affects   is   the  narrative.  The  central  argument  of   the   thesis  
revolves  around  two  propositions:  
1.  To  narrate  in  cinema  is  to  impart  a  feeling.    
2.  The  power  of  cinema  lies   in   its  ability   to  disrupt  affective  tonality  and  
rebuild  it  anew.    
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The  application  of   the  method  presented   in   this   thesis   is   demonstrated  
through  narrative  cinema,  but   it   is  not   limited   to   this  mode  of   filmmaking.  The  
theoretical  underpinnings  of   this   research  project  draw  from  affect  studies  and  
the  analysis  of   fiction  film,  and  my  practical  applications  of   this  method   is  built  
upon   experiments   in   narrative   film   practice   conducted   at   undergraduate   and  
master’s   level.  Therefore,  affective   tonality  and  narrative  cinema   is   the   logical  
starting  point   for   this  exploration.  However,   there   is  scope  for   the  taxonomy  of  
affective   tonality   to   be   employed   as   a   method   in   other   areas   of   research   in  
which  digital  moving  image  work  is  a  key  component.  Documentary  cinema  and  
sociological  research  are  two  areas  in  which  I  would  be  particularly  interested  in  
taking  this  research  further.    
The  method  and  approach  established   in   this   thesis  have  already  been  
employed   on   different   sociological   research   projects,   which   have   included   a  
moving   image  work  as  a  method.  These   include   the  Leverhulme  Trust   funded  
project   Migration,   Health   and   Well-­being:   Health   Practices   in   Place  
(Rabikowska,  Hawkins,  Dyck,  Ortega-­Alcázar,   2012)   and   the  Food  Standards  
Scotland-­funded  project  In  or  Out:  A  Slice  of  What  We  Eat  (Wills  and  Hawkins,  
2015).   I  was  employed  as  a  filmmaker  on  both  of   these  projects   to  assist  with  
the  gathering  of  visual  data,  and  the  dissemination  of  research  findings  through  
video   via  DVD  and  online  platforms.   In   the  project   funded  by   the  Leverhulme  
Trust,   the  concepts  underpinning   the   taxonomy  of  affect  were   implemented   in  
order   to   better   visually   represent   the   participants   of   the   research   in   the   final  
DVD   video.   This   project   investigated   the   health   making   practices   of   three  
migrant  groups  in  London.  The  research  project  included  filmed  interviews  and  
participant   observation.   A   style   of   shooting   which   attempted   to   capture   the  
affective   resonance  of   the   research   participants’   experience  was   employed   in  
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order   to  add  depth   to   the   talking  head  videos.  Limitations  are   imposed  on   the  
production  of  an  affective  video  in  this  scenario,  due  to  obligations  of  perceived  
authenticity   that   researchers   from   a   sociological   background   felt   towards   the  
representation   of   the   research   participants.   The   interdisciplinary   challenge   of  
this   method   was   discussed   alongside   footage   shot   for  Migration,   Health   and  
Wellbeing   at   the   Visual   Dialogues   seminar   at   the   Open   University   (Hawkins,  
2010).  A  similar  method  was  employed   in   In  or  Out…,   in  order   to  capture   the  
energy  and  movement  of  the  young  people  involved  in  the  project.        
Documentary   cinema   and   ethnography   films   are   particularly   suited   for  
further   exploration   of   this   method.   This   is   supported   by   the   creation   of   the  
Sensory  Ethnography  Lab  at  Harvard  University.  According  to  the  lab’s  website,  
“[t]he   Sensory   Ethnography   Lab   (SEL)   is   an   experimental   laboratory…   that  
promotes  innovative  combinations  of  aesthetics  and  ethnography”  (The  Sensory  
Ethnography   Lab,   n.d.).   Irina   Leimbacher   discusses   two   of   the   SEL’s   most  
successful   films,   Leviathan   (Paravel,   2012)   and  Manakamana   (Spray,   Velez,  
2013),   commenting   on   the   formers   visceral,   violent   imagery,   and   the   latter’s  
small   gestures   (2014:   36).   Leimbacher   notes   the   lab’s   emphasis   on  aesthetic  
experience   and   the   force   of   the   cinematic   form   (ibid).   The   lab’s   emphasis   on  
affective   experience   and   the   visceral   imagery   goes   some   way   to   prove   the  
potential   for   further   developing   an   affective   ethnographic   form.   The  
ethnographic   filmmaker,   David   MacDougall’s   comments   on   the   body   and   the  
moving   image,   presented   in   his   monograph   The   Corporeal   Image   (2006),  
highlight   the  potential  of   the  concept  of  affective   tonality   for  documentary  and  
ethnographic  cinema.  MacDougall  argues,    
Filming  is  fundamentally  acquisitive  in  “incorporating”  the  bodies  of  others.  
The   filmmaker’s  consciousness  must  also  expand   to  accommodate   these  
other  bodies,  but  it  cannot  hold  them  all;;  they  must  be  given  to  others  –  or  
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at   least  returned  to  the  world.   In  achieving  this,   the  bodies  of   the  subject,  
the   filmmaker,  and   the  viewer  become   interconnected  and   in   some  ways  
undifferentiated.  (28)  	  
An  investigation  into  the  relationship  between  the  body  of  the  filmmaker  and  the  
body   of   the   film   and   the   documentary   subject  would  make   for   an   appropriate  
starting  point  for  an  exploration  into  affective  tonality  and  documentary  practice.    
   The   possibilities   of   an   affective-­tonal   documentary  will   be   tested   in  my  
next   practice   as   research   project   in   the   form   of   the   film,  Husband   and  Wife  
[working   title]   (Hawkins,   forthcoming).   The   documentary   will   engage   with   the  
experience  of  a  woman  from  central  Europe  who  travels  to  London  in  order  to  
collect   the   ashes   of   her   dead   husband.   Her   husband   had   immigrated   to   the  
United  Kingdom  in  order  to  find  work,  before  he  died.  The  film  mixes  personal  
interviews  with   an   observational   style,   whilst   the   form   of   the   film  will   take   an  
affective,   tonal  approach   to   the   representation  of   female  agency.  The   film  will  
attempt   to   capture   the   force   of   action   of   the   character,   as   well   as   interior  
subjectivities.  The  film  draws  upon  Lucy  Bolton’s  mobilization  of  the  philosophy  
of  Luce  Irigaray,  who  notes  that  rhythm,  gesture  and  light  have  the  potential  to  
constitute  a  visual  language  for  depicting  female  interiority  (2015:  52).  The  film  
captures   the   rhythm   of   interior   and   exterior   movements,   from   the   movement  
through  the  streets  of  London  to  small  gestures  of  the  body  and  engagements  
with   personal   objects.   Through   an   affective   visual   form,   the   film   presents   a  
physical  and  emotional  journey  of  a  woman  regaining  a  semblance  of  autonomy.  
The  film  is  scheduled  for  completion  in  the  summer  of  2018.  
   There  is  potential  to  experiment  with  this  method  in  different  areas  of  film  
practice,   but   it   is   important   to   acknowledge   the   fact   that   there   are   several  
limitations  to  the  research  project,  particularly   in  relation  to  spectator  reception  
and   the   industrial   structure   of   film   production,   as   well   as   financing.   Martin’s  
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article  on  the  cinema  of  Weerasethakul  in  Sight  and  Sound  argues  that  regular  
audiences   find   it   difficult   to   watch   and   to   comprehend   films   that   do   not  
correspond   to   classical   narrative   structure   or   present   images   that   are  
representationally  ambiguous  (2010:  16).  The  affective-­tonal  films  produced  for  
this   research   project   do   not   present   a   radical   departure   from   established  
cinematic  imagery,  but  they  do  offer  an  alternative  to  filmmaking  practices  that  
put   plot   and   story   at   the   centre   of   meaning   making   process.   The   films   of  
affective   tonality   take   a   poetic   approach   to   meaning,   and,   as   Sobchack  
observers  in  relation  to  Shane  Curruth’s  Upstream  Color  and  Terrence  Malick’s  
To  the  Wonder  (2012),  these  types  of  films  have,  
also  put  a   lot  of  viewers  to  sleep  (if   they  haven't  already  fled  the  theatre).  
Not   everyone   likes   poetry-­and   not   all   poems   are   successful   in   their  
attempts   to   condense   and   figure   something   otherwise   amorphous   or  
invisible  in  concrete  imagery  (2014,  53).  
  
Sobchack’s   observation   strikes   at   the   heart   of   the   limitation   of   my   proposed  
method   of   film   practice   from   the   perspective   of   both   reception   and   financing.  
Understanding   meaning   through   the   body   is   a   complicated   process,   and   the  
results  are  not  at  all   guaranteed.  One  cannot,   in  good  conscience,  promise  a  
funder,  whether  research  council,  arts  grant  board  or  film  production  company,  
that   your   affective   delivery   will   be   met   with   the   intended   response   from   the  
target   audience.   This   is   the   case   with   all   art   forms,   but   this   uncertainty   is  
accentuated   when   employing   such   a   fluid   form   as   the   proposed   cinema   of  
affective   tonality.   It  would  be  very  difficult   to   reach  a  wide  audience  with  such  
films,  and  this  difficulty  is  then  transferred  to  the  issue  of  raising  finance  for  the  
production  and  distribution  of  such   films.  The  difficulties   in   raising   finances   for  
films  that  take  an  experimental  approach  to  form  and/or  structure  is  notoriously  
difficult.   Antonioni,   a   director   whose   challenging,   poetic   and   critically   lorded  
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oeuvre  has  cemented  his  position   in  the  art  house  canonii,   found  it  notoriously  
difficult   to   raise   financing   for   his   films   (Lyman,   2007),   and   his   films   found   it  
difficult  to  turn  a  profit.  Zabrinskie  Point  (Antonioni,  1970)  lost  a  record  amount  
of   money   for   the   financers,   Metro-­Goldwyn-­Mayer   (Chatman,   2008:   7).  
Government  funded  film  funding  boards  are  more  likely  than  private  financers  to  
have  a  remit  that  is  not  centered  solely  on  profit.  The  British  Film  Institute  (BFI)  
Film   Fund   state   that   they   support   “diverse,   bold   and   distinctive   films”   (British  
Film   Institute,   2018),   and   they   have   partly   financed   films   directed   by   Andrea  
Arnold,   and   Joanna   Hogg.   The   BFI   have   also   distributed   films   directed   by  
Apichatpong   Weerasethakul.   I   have   cited   all   three   directors   as   examples   of  
filmmakers   whose   narrative   practice   corresponds   with   that   of   a   cinema   of  
affective   tonality.  The  BFI   film  fund  does,  however,   require  a  screenplay   to  be  
submitted  as  part  of  the  funding  process  (ibid),  as  would  be  the  case  for  many  if  
not  all   funding  bodies  supporting  narrative  cinema.  A  mode  of   filmmaking   that  
eschews   the   screenwriting   process  would   therefor   find   it   incredibly   difficult   to  
raise  finances  through  well-­established  routes  for  feature  film.  This  is  not  to  say  
that   funding   would   be   impossible.   Research   councils   are   increasingly  
supporting   filmmaking   as   research,   as   is   the   case   with   projects   such   as  
Rehearsing  Reality  (Simoes,  2007),  Buried  Land  (Eastwood,  2010),  and  Love  in  
the  Post:  From  Plato   to  Derrida   (Callaghan,  2016)   to  give   just   three  examples  
funded  at  least  in  part  by  the  Arts  and  Humanities  Research  Council.    
The  limitations  of  this  method  may  also  differ  depending  on  the  demands  
of   a   particular   project.   It   is   possible   that   only   certain   elements   from   the  
taxonomy  of  affective  tonality  and  the  conditions  for  production  be  taken  up  by  
researchers/filmmakers.   This   research   project   is   not   intended   to   produce   a  
dogmatic  manifesto  on  a  specific  filmmaking  practice.  It  would  be  possible,  and  
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in   fact   theoretically   and   artistically   beneficial,   for   a   filmmaker   to   implement  
elements  of  this  thesis  that  they  find  useful,  and  to  abandon  the  elements  which  
are  not  of  value  to  a  particular  project.  In  this  regard,  the  project  may  have  a  life  
outside  of  its  original  direction,  which  may  take  it  in  unexpected  directions.    
  
In   the   opening   pages   of   A   Thousand   Plateaus,   Deleuze   and   Guattari  
state  that  ‘there  is  no  difference  between  what  a  book  talks  about  and  how  it  is  
made’  (1987:  4).  This  is  also  true  for  a  cinema  of  affective  tonality:  the  subject  of  
a  film  is  its  affects.  These  affects  carry  the  feeling  of  the  film  and  imprint  them  
on  the  spectator.  To  return  to  Bergson,  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  presents  
a  shift  in  the  consideration  of  narrative  film,  from  a  storytelling  art  to  an  emotive  
art  in  which  there  is  a  transference  of  emotions  from  the  film  to  the  viewer  and  
from  the  viewer  to  the  film.  Thus  the  cinema  of  affective  tonality  has  two  unique  
functions.  It  offers  film  theorists  a  new  approach  for  the  analysis  of  film  narrative  
whilst  adding  to  the  field  of  affect  theory.  It  also  presents  a  toolbox  to  be  used  
by  filmmakers,  through  which  a  new  form  of  narrative  filmmaking  can  emerge.  If  
this   thesis   is   at   all   Deleuzian,   it   is   in   this   toolbox   approach.   To   paraphrase  
Deleuze  and  Guattari,   this   thesis   surveys  and  maps  affects,  and  even   realms  
that  are  yet  to  come  (1987:  5),  in  order  to  present  a  taxonomy  which  filmmakers  
may   use   to   construct   cinema   from   affect.   The   four   films   that   accompany   the  
written   component   of   this   thesis   are   an   embodiment   of   my   own   affects.   The  
taxonomy   of   affect   and   the   five   conditions   for   the   production   of   a   cinema   of  
affective  tonality  enable  affective  narrative  cinema  to  be  shaped  by  others.    
I  would  like  to  end  with  a  reference  to  a  conversation  I  had  with  my  wife,  
the   academic   and   filmmaker   Marta   Hawkins.   We   were   discussing   the  
subjectivity   of   affect,   and   the   affective   shape   of   my   films.   She   expressed   a  
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desire  to  present  the  affective  tone  of  her  own  subjective  experience  of  being  in  
a  pub  in  south-­east  London,  as  it  was  certainly  different  from  my  own.  I  replied  
that  the  affective  framework  that  is  the  result  of  this  research  could  help  her  to  
shape  her  own  cinematic  affects.  In  short:  these  are  my  affects,  show  me  yours!  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i  Of  course,  it  is  difficult  to  make  a  methodological  decision  that  is  not  also  ethical.  ii	  In  1993  Antonioni  was  awarded  an  honorary  Oscar  “in  recognition  of  his  place  as  one  of  
cinema’s  master  visual  stylists”  (Chatman,  2008:  7).	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APPENDIX  2:  
PRACTICE  II  SCREENPLAY  	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EXT. TRAIN STATION – DAY 
 
Train tracks. Traffic and birdsong mix. 
 
A train rushes past. 
 
People leave the station in a hurry. 
 
The exit is narrow, causing a momentary bottleneck of 
shirts, ties, saris and overalls. 
 
The crowd quickly thins, leaving one man standing outside 
the station exit. 
 
He wears a shirt and trousers. The suit is not made to 
measure.  
 
It looks old. 
 




EXT. HIGH STREET – DAY 
 
A woman stands in front of an ill-kept red brick wall.  
 
She wears an ill-kept long blue dress. 
 
She is lovely. 
 
A glance at her watch, and 
 
INT. PUB – DAY 
 
Bubbles rise up in a pint glass. 
 
Three weather-worn men sit at a bar. 
 
The woman in the blue dress sits in the corner alone, with 
what looks like a gin and tonic. 
 
The carpet is fading, once multicoloured. Sunlight shines 
in through high windows, casting patterns on the floor.  
 
A man in an old suit enters.  
 
He looks around, spots the woman in the corner.  
 
She forces a smile.  
 
He is next to her now. 
 







































































INT. MUSIC HALL 
 




A soft spotlight. 
 

















































INT. BEDROOM – DAY 
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INT. PUB – DAY 
 
A flash of cheap blue cotton.  
 
The door is pulled open. 
 
The man and the woman leave. 
 
EXT. HIGH STREET – DUSK 
 
The street is busy. It’s rush hour. 
 
Buses pass in both directions.  
 
Car horns can be heard. 
 
The man and the woman cross the street. 
 
He stands outside a newsagent. The window is full of 
handwritten paper advertisements. 
 
Multicoloured cards offer rooms to rent, vans for hire, 
massages and music classes. 
 
She comes out of the shop with a bottle of wine.  
 
INT. HALLWAY, HOUSE – DUSK 
 
Two familiar figures can be seen through the large window 
of a double-glazed door. 
 
After what sounds like the fiddling of keys the woman 
enters, with the man not far behind. 
 
She walks to the kitchen, with wine in hand. 
 




A stranger stands in the kitchen, making a sandwich, 
returning the gaze. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – DUSK 
 
The man stands in the middle of the room. 
 
It’s unfamiliar to him. He looks around, examining the 
decor and familial memorabilia. A woman’s whole life in one 
room. 
 
He does not touch a thing. 
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INT. UPSTAIRS LANDING – DUSK 
 
The woman stands at the top of the stairs, behind a half-
open door. She looks through the contents of a small bag. 
 
The man can be seen through the gap in the door.  
 
INT. BEDROOM – DUSK  
 
The door is pushed open, and the woman walks in, her lips a 
little redder than before.  
 
The man turns in her direction. 
 
WOMAN. 
   My room. 
 
MAN. 






She comes closer. 
 
He is still, 
 
for a moment. 
 
He kisses her. 
 
Their figures merge. 
 
He steps back, 
 
she steps forwards. 
 
They fall out of sight. 
 




Bodies hit a bed. 
 
A thin layer of condensation covers the bedroom window. 
Water droplets slide down the pane of glass. Occasionally 
these droplets collide, merge briefly and break off from 
each other.  
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INT. BATHROOM – NIGHT 
 
The man stands in front of a toilet, naked from the waist 
down. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
The woman is in bed, covered by a duvet.  
 
The door opens. 
 




   It’s late. 
 
WOMAN. 
   Yes. 
 
The sound of the man putting on his trousers can be heard, 
followed by footsteps. 
 
Bent down, he kisses her on the lips. 
 




   I will see you Monday morning? 
 
WOMAN. 
   See you on Monday. 
 
The woman rolls over onto her back. 
 
The streetlights are on. Orange dots shine through net 
curtains. 
 
EXT. HIGH STREET – NIGHT 
 
The man walks away, merging with the neon glow of the high 
street, before fading away into darkness. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
The woman, in bed, rests her eyes. 
 
FADE TO BLACK. 	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PRACTICE  III  SCREENPLAY  	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EXT. STREET – NIGHT 
 
A street on the edge of the city.  
 
A row of Victorian houses, cars, wheelie bins, a 
normal street illuminated by the orange glow of 
streetlights. 
 
A mattress rests against a wall in one of the front 
gardens, probably waiting to be picked up by the council’s 
refuse collectors. 
 
A young man moves towards the mattress. At least it looks 
like a young man; it’s difficult to tell in the dark. He 
grabs the mattress, rips it over the wall and drags it, 
casually, off down the street. 
 
 
EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
Overgrown shrubs in an unkempt garden. Some RUSTLING is 
heard. A bright light, probably from a torch, cuts through 
the dark of the night, illuminating leaves and branches for 
a moment before leaving them in darkness. 
 
The light catches something: a movement, an eye, two, 








INT. KITCHEN – NIGHT 
 
A kitchen, or more accurately a bachelor’s kitchen.  
 
The place is neat and tidy, but there is plenty of work 
that needs to be done to the house.  
 
The walls need painting, radiators need fixing. Everything 
is half-finished.  
 
Maybe it’s been like this for a week, maybe a year. The 
owner has every intention of finishing the job, but as we 
know, this is no guarantee that it ever will be done. 
 
A table and two chairs are pushed up next to the wall. 
 
A plate, chicken and chips, some ketchup.  
 
Three paintings hang on the back wall. 
 
A young man (mid-twenties?), clean-shaven but casually 
dressed, pulls up a chair and sits down with a cup of 
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tea. 
  
This is our protagonist. He’s clearly a creature of 
habit.  
 
He was last seen wielding a torch in the back garden of 
this house. 
 
He seasons his food with a little salt and pepper, and 
begins to eat his dinner. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
In the light of day it can be seen that the garden 
echoes the house. A few flowers have sprung, a tree has 
been trimmed, but the dead branches still litter the 
ground. An old rusty bicycle is tucked in behind an old 
wooden shed. 
 
Harry walks through the garden in an old green 
bathrobe.  
 
He shuffles towards the old shed and peers through 
the shit-brown windows. 
 
Once convinced that no monsters hide behind the 
Plexiglas, our hero moves around to the front of the 
construction and slowly opens the door. 
 
The inside of the shed is cluttered with tools and scraps 








resting in the corner amongst other rusty shed-type 
paraphernalia.  
 
It looks as though someone has been resting their 
head in this cold, wooden box. 
 
 
INT. KITCHEN – DAY 
 
Harry, in his shabby green robe, turns on the tap and adds 
water to the kettle. 
 
He puts the kettle on to boil and grabs a cup and a bowl 
from the cupboard. 
 
He reaches towards a porcelain hen, opens her up and grabs 
a teabag. 
 
Small drops of water leak from the tap. 
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Harry notices, gives the tap an extra turn and the 
dripping stops. 
 
He opens another cupboard.  
 








He reaches for the cornflakes and opens the box. 
 
 
EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
Birds flutter, small flowers sunbathe, the wind rustles 
through the leaves  
 
la la la. 
 
The sound of the kettle BOILING can be heard. 
 
There is a pond, covered in green algae.  
 
If there were ever fish in this pond they have long 
since moved on. 
 
INT. KITCHEN – DAY 
 
Steam rises from the kettle. 
 
A fly buzzes around a naked light bulb. 
 
A teabag in a mug, levitating on a cloud of boiling 
water. 
 
The clear liquid begins to turn brown as the tea infuses 
with the water. 
 
Milk now mixes with the tea. 
 
Harry turns his head towards the window and stares out 
into the garden. 
 
The tea verges on overflowing as the milk keeps pouring 
into the mug. The liquid reaches the top and hangs, 
momentarily, to the rim before spilling over the top. 
 
Milk runs down the side of the mug and onto the granite 
kitchen worktop. 
 
The liquid continues to flow, off the end of the kitchen 
side, down the bright red cabinets and onto the floor. 
 
A white puddle begins to form on the wooden floorboards. 
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EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
The shed.  
 
The door, ajar.  
 
The latch, lockless.  
 
The muddy plastic windows. 
 
 
EXT. BACK OF HOUSE – DAY 
 
At the back of The Man’s house is a window to the 
kitchen, the back door and a bathroom extension. 
 
The window to the kitchen is dirty. Not as dirty as the 
shed window, but still in need of a little TLC.  
 




The outline of the man can be seen through the 
window. It’s hard to describe what it is that he is 
doing.  
 
One might say: he is milling about. 
 
In other words, busy doing nothing. 
 
 
INT. HALLWAY – DAY 
 
Harry, wearing a green duffel coat, throws a rucksack on 
his back. 
 
Packed up and ready to go, he opens the door and leaves 
the house. 
 
The only living presence left behind is a fly buzzing 
through the house. 
 
 
EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
The garden is empty, but some movement can be detected in 
the background. 
 
A figure can be seen towards the back of the garden. 
 
It’s a stranger, young, maybe mid- to late twenties. He 
wears a dark blue coat and tatty denim jeans. 
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INT. KITCHEN – DAY 
 
The kitchen is empty, quiet. 
 
Some movement can be seen outside the window. The 
Stranger moves close to the windowpane. 
He peers in. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
Harry is tucked up in bed.  
 
Really tucked up.  
 
His white sheets are tight around his slim frame. He 
stares at the ceiling. A small bedside lamp glows orange. 
It’s the type of lamp that could be used for reading, 
although there is no sign of a book by the bed. 
 
The sound of MUSIC can be heard. It’s distant and muffled, 
probably from next door. Although not loud, the repetitive 
electronic thud of the bass would be enough to prevent one 
sensitive to such sounds from sleeping. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – CONTINUOUS 
 
Harry stands in front of his bedroom window. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
There’s movement in the garden, albeit indistinct. 
 
It’s the shape of a man, moving through the grass towards 
the shed. 
 
He opens the door and disappears inside. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
Harry observes from the bedroom. 
 
 
EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
The windows to the shed look even murkier under moonlight. 
The brown sludge that clings to the cheap plastic looks 
as though it may take on a life of its own, like it could 
start creeping about, sliding down the pane of its own 
volition. 
 
Behind the windows, inside the shed, there is movement.  
 
 
At least, it looks like movement.  
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It could be a trick of the light. 
 
No, it’s definitely movement. And light, a dim orange 
light. 
 
The Stranger, no doubt. 
 
 
INT. KITCHEN – DAY 
 
Pink, wrinkly flesh. 
 
Fast running water, at first clear then pink, running into 
a plughole. 
 
Harry washes a whole chicken in the kitchen sink. 
He turns off the water. 
Small drops of water fall from the tap. 
 
With a THUD, he drops the carcass onto a wooden chopping 
board, turns the thing over and picks up a kitchen knife. 
 
With his spare hand he reaches to the sink and tightens 
the tap. 
 
He brings the knife down, and begins to chop up the animal 
into smaller pieces. The tool he has chosen is not 
particularly good for the job at hand. 
 
Harry has to really hack at the flesh and bone, but with a 
bit of perseverance he manages to get the job done. 
 
These newly portioned pieces of poultry are not the most 
aesthetically pleasing, but it looks as though there is 
enough meat for a few meals at least. 
 
The tap begins to drip, again.  
INT. KITCHEN – CONTINUOUS 
 
He sits at the table, in his usual seat. His dinner is in 
front of him. 
 




INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
The Man lies in bed, tucked in like an Egyptian mummy. 
 
  
A SQUEAKING sound can be heard. It’s distant, but 
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probably from inside the house. 
 
It gets a little louder.  
Footsteps?  
Yes, footsteps.  
And a door opening. 
Now the sound of WATER can be heard.  
 
A running tap. 
 
The Man’s breathing deepens slightly. It seems as though 
he is starting to feel uncomfortable. 
 
INT. KITCHEN – NIGHT 
 
The cupboard doors underneath the sink are open. 
 
A man has his head in the cupboard, under the sink. 
 
His legs are spread out across the kitchen floor. 
 
It’s not clear as to exactly what it is that he is doing, 
but he seems to be fiddling with some of the pipes there. 
 
He moves from under the sink and switches the water on and 
off. 
 
Drying his hands on his jeans, he moves over to one of the 
cupboards above the worktop and opens the door to take a 
look inside. 
 
Plates, cups and bowls in three neat lines, inside the 
cupboard. 
 
The door closes, a flurry of red. 
He pulls open the wine rack, 
opens the fridge, and takes out the plate of food left 
over from Harry’s dinner. 
 
The stranger sits at the table, eating. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
Daylight.  
The sound of morning, birds CHIRPING, a slight 
breeze. 
 
The Man walks out of the house. He looks out towards 
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the garden and then down to his feet. 
 
He approaches the shed. 
 
He reaches the door and sees: 
a padlock. 
This sudden appearance of this foreign object stops Harry 
in his tracks. 
 
He grabs the padlock, gives it a shake and moves around 
to the side of the shed. 
 
Placing his hands against the windowpane, he looks into 
the shed. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
Old tree branches are piled up in the corner of the 
garden. It looks as though the wood was felled some time 
ago. 
 
The stranger gathers some of the old timber and arranges 
it in the middle of the garden. 
 
There’s a spark, an old Zippo lighter. 
 
The twigs and kindling slowly catch fire, turning red, 
then orange. 
 
The stranger warms his hands by the blaze. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
A bedroom window.  
A small orange lamp. 
The Man stands, looking out of his window. 
The Man’s POV: the fire burns in the garden.  
 
The silhouette of the stranger can be seen crouching next 
to the blaze. 
 
The Man moves away from the window, briefly. He peeks his 
head back through the window. 
 
He sees the flame dancing in the night. The silhouette 
is shuffling, rocking slightly. 
 
He looks towards his hands. Back out of the window. 
The silhouette moves, as though looking into the bedroom. 
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EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
The house is dark. A small light can be seen in the 
bedroom window. 
 
The stranger no longer faces the fire, but looks towards 
the house. 
 
The light goes off. 
 
INT. HALLWAY – NIGHT 
 
The Man stands in his hallway with his back to the door. He 
has something in his hand. 
 
A mobile phone. 
 
He looks at the phone, presses a button. 
 
The freshly illuminated screen brings a little light to 
the dark of the hallway. 
 
He presses another button, then stops. 
 
He cancels the call, extinguishing the light in the 
hallway. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
A small, black pile of ash surrounded by unkempt green 
grass. A gentle breeze picks up a few grey flakes, sending 
them up into the air, momentarily, before dropping them to 
the ground. 
 
The Man looks down at the remains of his guest’s 
midnight bonfire. 
 
The sun rises in front of him. 
 
INT. KITCHEN – DAY 
 
The Man moves sluggishly around the kitchen. 
 
He opens his cupboard and reaches for a bowl. 
No bowls! 
His row of bowls has vanished. 
 
A little confused but unperturbed, he opens another 
cupboard and grabs a bowl. 
 
He tilts the bowl in order to inspect the inside. He 
doesn’t look impressed with what he sees. 
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With a little more determination he moves to the kitchen 






Without taking the time to dry his new bowl, he reaches 




No tea.  
A pause for thought.  
Bottom cupboard, next to the sink. 
A plastic box, used to store a supply of teabags. 
 
With his spare hand he reaches for the tap, but this time 




He then reaches for his box of cornflakes.  
 
These too have vanished. 
 
The Man looks a little unhappy. 
 
A little smoke rises from his toaster. POP. 
Toast springs forth. 
 
He now sits at the kitchen table, eating toast. 
 
A picture is missing from the back wall. There are now 
two paintings where there once were three. 
 
INT. HALLWAY – DAY 
 
The Man leaves for work. 
 
INT. BACK DOOR – DAY 
 
A narrow walkway by the back door. A selection of men’s 
shoes clutter up the narrow space. 
 
The back door opens. The Stranger walks through 
the space. 
 
INT. STAIRS – DAY 
 
The stranger darts across the top of the stairwell. 
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INT. BEDROOM – DAY 
 
A telescope is positioned next to the window, pointed 
towards the stars. 
 




INT. BEDROOM – CONTINUOUS 
 
The stranger lifts two small weights for exercising, maybe 
10kg each. 
 




INT. BEDROOM – CONTINUOUS 
 
The stranger looks towards The Man’s bed. It’s unmade. 
The sheets are in a pile and the pillows are strewn across 
the mattress. 
 
He moves to the sheet and rips it off the bed. He gives 
the sheet a shake, sending it high into the air, towards 
the ceiling. 
 
EXT. STREET – DUSK 
 
The Man approaches his house. He is carrying several 
blue carrier bags full of groceries. 
 
He opens his door and enters the house. 
 
INT. HALLWAY – DUSK 
 
He closes his door behind him, and stops for a moment.  
 
He’s listening.  
 
Silence. 
He moves forward. 
 
The sound of the back door CLOSING can be heard. 
He stops. 
INT. KITCHEN – CONTINUOUS 
 
Blue carrier bags are scattered about the kitchen floor. 
Some of the contents have fallen out. 
The Man stands by his window. 
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EXT. GARDEN – DUSK 
 
Pigeons circle the garden. 
 
INT. BEDROOM – NIGHT 
 
A bedroom window.  
A small orange lamp.  
No one to be seen. 
The sound of RUNNING WATER can be heard, first quiet, then 
a little louder. 
 
Then louder still. 
Then 
INT. BATHROOM – NIGHT 
 
Water running into a bathtub. 
Bubbles. 
The sound is distorted, like it’s being heard from 
underwater. 
 





The stranger’s hair is wet, parts of his face covered in 
soap. 
 
He disappears, underwater, under bubbles. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
The Man stands outside the bathroom. The frosted glass 
is lit from behind. 
 
The shadow of a person can be seen moving through the 
window. 
 
He is frozen, still. 
 
 
INT. BATHROOM – NIGHT 
 
The stranger stands in the bath, facing the wall, holding 
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the shower. 
 
The shower is running, soap runs down his back. 
His naked body moves through the layer of foam. 
Water washes away the soap. 
INT. KITCHEN – DAY 
 
The Man stands in front of his table. His dinner is in 
front of him, but his chair is gone. 
 
He walks around to the other side of the table, picks up 
the spare chair and carries it around to his usual seating 
position. 
 
Problem solved, he sits down to eat. He takes a few bites 
of his food, but he seems uninterested in what’s on his 
plate. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – NIGHT 
 
The Man stands by his back door. He leans against the wall, 
almost nonchalant, but there is a tension in his body. 
 
He holds his torch in his hand. 
 
A small lamp flickers above his head. 
 
His thumb moves anxiously over the button of the 
torch. He is poised like a gunslinger outside an old 
saloon. 
 
A RUSTLING sound is heard. The Man moves forward. 
CLICK. 
 
The torch lights up, pointed to the ground for now, as The 
Man continues to edge forward. 
 
He stops at the edge of the patio. 
He raises the torch. 
The light cuts through the night. The trees and shrubs are 
momentarily scratched with light. 
 
The light catches a leg, jeans. 
A part of a coat. 
The Stranger’s face. The light holds on this image. The 
movement stops. The face stares ahead. 
 
The Man looks at The Stranger. He holds still, doesn’t 




he was gone. 
 
The light from the torch begins to move again, quickly, as 




The moves the torch. It shines straight at us, blinding. 
 
EXT. GARDEN – DAY 
 
The garden. Harry walks towards the shed, cup of tea in 
hand. He has two weeks of beard growth on his face. 
 
The door to the shed is open. The padlock is gone. 
 
The shed is full of The Man’s belongings. Chairs, plates, 
teabags.  
 
His pictures hang on the wall. 
 
The Man enters the shed, and sits down in the chair. He 
looks at home here. He takes a sip of his tea, and as he 
does the shed door slowly closes. 
 
FADE TO BLACK 
Comment [MS2]: Word	  missing?	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